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PART 0 INTRODUCTION 

Chapter 1 
The scope of the study 
/./ Introduction 
In addition to marketable goods such as food, raw materials, and ornamental plants the 
agricultural sector also produces 'non-marketable' goods like wildlife and landscape. These 
goods are the result of a specific way of using agricultural land. Agricultural landscapes known 
as 'small-scale landscapes', characterised by small fields surrounded by hedges or wooded banks, 
or peatland areas with narrow plots and wide ditches, are the product of farming where land use 
is relatively capital-extensive and labour-intensive. In the Netherlands, the agriculture of the first 
half of the 20* century can be characterised by this type. 
After 1950, the rise in wages induced labour-saving and production-enhancing techniques 
in agriculture, which increased agricultural output and helped the dwindling number of farmers 
achieve incomes comparable to those outside the sector. A higher level of mechanisation, 
intensification of land use, and specialisation at the farm and regional level accompanied the 
changes in agriculture. As a result there was deterioration of wildlife and landscape and in the 
quality of soil, water and air. While agriculture experienced these developments, higher incomes 
increased the demand for wildlife and landscape, leisure and outdoor recreation. Thus during a 
time when the supply of wildlife and landscape decreased, the demand for these amenities 
actually increased (Oskam and Slangen, 1998: 113). Adjusting to this demand, the land-use 
pattern in rural areas in the Netherlands underwent a change. 
Changing agricultural practices (more mechanisation, intensification of land-use and 
specialisation at the farm and regional level) and non-agricultural developments (urbanisation 
and land-buying by the government for wildlife and landscape preservation) determine the land-
use pattern in rural areas. This thesis focuses on a kind of land use in which agriculture is 
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combined with wildlife and landscape management. In the Netherlands, farmers manage wildlife 
and landscape mainly in the following two contractual arrangements: 
1. A direct contractual arrangement between individual farmers and a principal (an 
entity such as a governmental agency or large wildlife and landscape preservation 
organisation). 
2. An indirect contractual arrangement with a principal through environmental co-
operatives (organisations of farmers). In this case the environmental co-operative 
has contractual arrangements with both farmers and a principal. 
The direct contractual arrangement has a relatively long history in the Netherlands. In 1974, the 
Dutch government decided to develop regulations with the objective of improving the relation 
between agriculture, wildlife and landscape. Management contracts were instruments for 
achieving this objective. These contracts were meant to provide a suitable financial compensation 
for managing wildlife and landscape in agricultural areas. A key characteristic of the contracts is 
their voluntary nature, though defaulting on contracts may be subject to a penalty, which can 
involve the return of payments received. A policy paper presented to the Dutch parliament in 
1975 resulted in the first regulation in 1977. After its introduction, the regulation was adapted 
more than once. For instance the number of management provisions was reduced; the system of 
financial rewards was standardised; administrative procedures changed; contract duration was 
reduced from 6 to 5 years; and compensation was added for organisational activities. 
During the first years hardly any contracts were signed. In the period 1981-1999, the 
number of contracts and the number of farmers involved grew respectively by about 22 % and 
25 % per year. In 1999 about 11.000 farmers in the Netherlands; contracts covered about 65.000 
ha, and expenses on compensation payments totalled about € 27 million (Dienst Landelijk 
Gebied (DLG), 2000: 18-21). 
The indirect contractual arrangement is of more recent date. At the beginning of the 1990s 
the first environmental co-operatives were legally founded. These co-operatives were groups of 
farmers co-operating with the aim of preserving wildlife and landscape and combining this 
activity with farming. The co-operatives were initiated by the farmers and had to establish their 
own role in their working areas. In 1999 the total number of farmers involved in environmental 
Introduction 
3 
co-operatives was about 6600 belonging to about 80 organisations which covered an area of 
about 134.000 ha. 
1.2 Subject of the study 
The subject of this study is an analysis of the combination of agriculture and wildlife and 
landscape management in the Netherlands, and especially, the organisation of the supply-side of 
wildlife and landscape management on Dutch farms. Of central importance is the design of 
contractual arrangements in which farmers are involved. The demand for wildlife and landscape 
is exogenous to this study. Governmental agencies and/or private organisations willing to 
conclude contracts with farmers for wildlife and landscape management are assumed to be 
present. The study focuses on contractual arrangements in which participation of farmers is 
voluntary. Other arrangements like direct regulation are not a topic of this study. However, this 
does not mean that other arrangements could not produce the same effect or even be more 
efficient. The question whether the contracts between farmers and contractors contribute to the 
quality of wildlife and landscape is also beyond the scope of this study. 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the design of contractual arrangements for wildlife 
and landscape management. From this broad objective three specific objectives are defined and 
developed in the subsequent parts and chapters. The first objective is to develop a framework for 
analysing contractual arrangements for wildlife and landscape management by farmers. The 
second objective is to analyse contractual arrangements for wildlife and landscape management 
between a governmental agency and individual farmers. The third objective is to analyse the role 
of the intermediary organisations between individual farmers and the government, or large 
wildlife and landscape preservation organisations. This leads to the following research questions: 
1. What is a suitable framework for analysing the design of institutional 
arrangements? 
2. What elements of contract design can be distinguished? 
3. What are the explanations for the decision to conclude contracts for wildlife and 
landscape management by farmers? 
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4. What are the effects on Dutch farms of concluding contracts for wildlife and 
landscape management? 
5. How can environmental co-operatives be characterised? 
6. How can the institutional design of environmental co-operatives be characterised 
and analysed? 
To answer these questions a "literary" method combined with survey research is used. A literary 
approach is based on theory and makes use of close reasoning. Further, in order to answer 
questions 2 ad 3, formal models focussing on the decision to contract and the consequences of 
contracting on the farm level are used. 
1.3 Outline of the study 
This thesis consists of four parts: (I) institutional economics analysis; (H) contractual 
arrangements involving individual farmers; (III) environmental co-operatives for managing 
wildlife and landscape and (IV) a synthesis. 
In Part I a framework for analysing institutional arrangements is developed. Further this 
framework is tailored to analysing institutional arrangements for combining agriculture and 
wildlife and landscape management. Part I starts with Chapter 2 introducing the theoretical 
background for analysing institutional arrangements. In Chapter 3 the analysis of institutional 
arrangements will be applied to wildlife and landscape management by farmers. Part I finishes 
with Chapter 4, containing a description and discussion of the methodology applied in this thesis. 
Part n deals with contractual arrangements for wildlife and landscape management 
involving individual farmers. This means that the framework developed in Part I will be applied 
to contractual arrangements between two parties: individual farmers and the government. Chapter 
5 examines contract design from a New Institutional Economics point of view. The contractual 
arrangements in which individual farmers are involved are analysed. The second chapter in Part 
II looks at the management of wildlife and landscape within the context of farming. To do this, 
an empirical economic model of production behaviour in dairy farming will be developed and 
elaborated. For this purpose an extra theoretical restriction is made: dairy farmers maximise 
Introduction 
profits in the short run, while facing technical and institutional restrictions. 
The third part of the thesis concentrates on the application of the framework developed in 
Part I on groups of farmers having the objective of managing wildlife and landscape. In the first 
chapter of Part UJ, New Institutional Economics is applied to analyse explanations for, and 
activities of, environmental co-operatives, including the existing situation of environmental co-
operatives in the Netherlands. In the second chapter of Part III, New Institutional Economics is 
used to analyse the relation between the (external) institutional environment and the (internal) 
governance structures of environmental co-operatives, and to examine club aspects of 
environmental co-operatives. The institutional environment consists of formal and informal rules 
in a society. The third chapter of Part III explores ways (or design principles) to reduce the 
number of problems resulting from incomplete information on wildlife and landscape 
management within an environmental co-operative. The goal of this chapter is to contribute to the 
development of a theoretical framework for self-organising and self-governing forms of co-
operation in the management of wildlife and landscape by farmers. 
In Part IV, the thesis will finish with synthesis concerning the thesis. Chapter 10 integrates 
the preceding chapters into a broader context of policy relevance. 
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PART I INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS ANALYSIS 

Chapter 2 
Analysing institutional arrangements: theoretical background 
2.1 Introduction 
The main theoretical basis for analysing institutional arrangements in this thesis is the New 
Institutional Economics. Two important concepts in New Institutional Economics are the 
institutional environment and institutional arrangements. They are central concepts for analysing 
wildlife and landscape management by farmers in this thesis. The institutional environment deals 
with the 'rules of the game' that guide individuals' behaviour. It is the set of fundamental 
political, social, and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange and 
distribution (Davis and North 1971: 6). Rules that govern elections, property rights, and the right 
to contract are examples. 
Institutional arrangements (governance structures) are the play of the game, the activity. 
According to Menard (1995: 175) an institutional arrangement is a way to implement and 
operationalise the 'rules of the game'. The institutional environment mainly defines (or acts as a 
constraint on) the environment of the institutional arrangements (cf. Williamson 1996: 5). An 
institutional arrangement is an arrangement between economic units that governs the ways in 
which units can co-operate and/or compete. The arrangement may be either formal or informal, 
temporary or long-lived. The arrangement may involve a single individual, a group of 
individuals co-operating, or the government (alone or in co-operation with others) (cf. Davis and 
North 1971: 7). 
This chapter starts with an introduction to the New Institutional Economics approach for 
analysing institutional arrangements in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 examines the main 
characteristics of the institutional environment. The central question to be analysed in this 
chapter is: what are the main components of institutional arrangements from an institutional 
7 
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economics point of view? This question is central to the analysis and design of institutional 
arrangements for wildlife and landscape management by farmers and is analysed in Section 2.4. 
In Section 2.5 contracts and contract types are analysed. The chapter finishes with a summary 
and conclusions. 
2.2 A New Institutional Economics approach to analysing institutional arrangements 
The main theoretical basis of this thesis is the New Institutional Economics. The central 
proposition of institutional economics is that institutions matter (see for instance Furubotn and 
Richter, 1997: 1; North, 2000:7, Williamson, 2000a: 595). A fundamental idea animating New 
Institutional Economics is that transaction costs exist and necessarily influence the structure of 
institutions and the specific economic choices people make. The transaction costs, boundedly 
(i.e. not complete rationality) rational individuals and the existence of opportunistic behaviour 
are among the main features that distinguish it from the standard Neoclassical point of view. 
Bounded rationality means that is will be costly for individuals to contemplate every contingency 
that might arise over the course of a transaction (Kreps, 1990: 744). Opportunistic behaviour 
means that individuals are self-interested with guile (Williamson, 1985: 30). If it will benefit 
them, opportunistic individuals will break any of the commandments (Kreps, 1990: 744). 
Opportunism refers to the willingness of transactors to renege on promises, cheat on agreements, 
shirk responsibilities, circumvent rules, search for loopholes, or otherwise exploit the 
vulnerabilities of a trading partner in hopes of getting more benefits from the exchange. Of 
course, not everyone is so unprincipled, but bounded rationality makes it difficult to distinguish 
the trustworthy from the unscrupulous, making guarding against opportunism the prudent course 
(Masten, 1996: 6). 
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New Institutional Economics is at times referred to as the New Theory of Organisation (cf. 
Furubotn and Richter 1997: 29). New Institutional Economics partly overlaps and in some areas 
extends Economic Organisation Theory (see for instance Milgrom and Roberts 1992)1. 
The New Institutional Economics approach came about as the result of groundbreaking 
studies in various sub-fields of what is now known as modern Institutional Economics (Furubotn 
and Richter 1997: 30-31). Figure 2.1 gives an overview of the sub-fields of New Institutional 
Economics distinguished in this thesis, although other classifications of the sub-fields are 
possible (see for instance North, 1986: 235 and Foss and Foss, 2001: 9). The dashed lines 
illustrate that the sub-fields are not isolated, but related to each other. 
New Institutional Economics 
Transaction cost economics ! Property rights analysis ! Economic theory of 
contracts 
Old property 
rights approach 
New property 
rights approach 
Complete 
contract theory 
Incomplete 
contract theory 
Figure 2.1: Overview of New Institutional Economics 
Eggertsson (1990: 6) distinguishes New Institutional Economics from Neo-Institutional Economics. Neo 
Institutional Economics constitutes a modification of the protective belt of neo-classical economics, primarily, by 
introducing information and transaction costs and the constraints of property rights. New Institutional Economics 
rejects elements of the hard core of neo-classical economics, such as the rational choice model. Further, New 
Institutional Economics has to be distinguished from Old Institutional Economics (see for instance Groenewegen 
(2000): 39, Groenewegen, et al. (1995): 468^70, and Hodgson (1998) for discussions of Old Institutional 
Economics). 
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The first sub-field of New Institutional Economics is transaction cost economics. The main 
message of transaction cost economics is that transaction costs arise in connection with the 
exchange process, and that their magnitude affects the ways in which economic activity is 
organised and carried out (cf. Furubotn and Richter, 1997: 31). Examples of categories of 
transaction costs are search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and pricing and 
enforcement costs. The central idea of Williamson is that when any transaction is described in 
terms of three key dimensions, it maps the most efficient institutional arrangement (Holmstrom 
and Roberts, 1998: 76). These dimensions are frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity 
(Williamson, 1996: 59). 
The second sub-field is property rights analysis. Foss and Foss (2001) distinguish two 
different approaches to property rights: the 'old property rights approach' and the 'new property 
rights approach'. The old property rights approach consists of work of Alchian (1977), Demsetz 
(1988), and Barzel (1997). Much of this work was taken up with identifying differences between 
alternative systems of property rights as alternative ownership arrangements (Foss and Foss 
2001: 19). Two main ownership arrangements are collective and private ownership. The key 
concern of the new property rights approach is the issue of why it matters who owns an asset. 
Exponents of this approach are Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart (1995). 
However, the literature on the new property rights approach is also sometimes referred to 
as the incomplete contracting literature (see Tirole, 1999: 745). In this stream the agents are 
assumed to behave rationally. Unfortunately there is no clear definition of incomplete 
contracting in the literature (Tirole 1999: 743). Incomplete contracts are contracts that do not try 
to take into account all future contingencies, because of incomplete foresight of what the future 
will bring. Incomplete foresight makes it impossible to take all future contingencies into account 
when writing a contract. Uncertainties and unobservables make contracts unavoidablebly 
incomplete. The parties to a contract have to allocate residual control rights - i.e. the rights to 
make decisions in circumstances not fully foreseen in the contract. The owner of an asset has the 
residual control rights over that asset: the right to decide all usages of the asset in any way not 
inconsistent with prior contract, custom or law. The possession of residual control rights is taken 
virtually to be definition of ownership (Hart, 1995: 30). The new property rights theory 
addresses the question of how these contracts can be allocated efficiently. 
10 
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A number of ideas follow from the New Property Rights approach/incomplete contracting 
literature (cf. Tirole, 1999: 749-751): 
• the allocation of property rights determines the bargaining powers in the ex-post 
determination of the terms of trade and that the holders of property rights are 
somewhat protected against the expropriation of their specific investment 
• the exercise of property rights is limited by the indispensability of the other party 
in the ex post production process; 
• the allocation of property rights may affect the efficiency ex post trade. Bargaining 
under asymmetric information may lead to inefficient haggling or sub-optimal 
trade; 
• clusters and splits of multiple decision rights are governed by incentive 
considerations. For instance Hart (1995: 47-49) argues that highly complementary 
assets should be owned in common. Concentrating the rights in a single hand 
reduces the risk of hold ups. 
The third main sub-field of New Institutional Economics is contract theory. Since the 1980s 
there has been a growing interest in contract theories of various kinds. According to Hart and 
Holmstrom (1987: 71), this development is partly a reaction to our rather thorough understanding 
of the standard theory of perfect competition under complete markets, but more importantly a 
reaction to the resulting realisation that this paradigm is insufficient to accommodate a number of 
important economic phenomena. Contracts provide the foundation for a large part of economic 
analysis. Any transaction must be mediated by some form of contract, whether it be explicit or 
implicit. In the case of spot trades, where the two sides of the transaction occur almost 
simultaneously, the contractual element is usually downplayed, presumably because it is regarded 
as trivial. In recent years, economists have become much more interested in long-term 
relationships where a considerable amount of time may elapse between signing the contract and 
transaction. In these circumstances, a contract becomes an essential part of the (trading) 
relationships. 
The approaches to contractual arrangements can be structured along different lines. One 
approach predominant in recent literature emphasises the formal analysis of contracts, and 
focuses on conditions that would determine an optimal contract, i.e., a contract that could 
Chapter 2 
fundamentally be self-enforcing (cf. M6nard, 1997: 1). The principal/agent theory belongs to this 
branch of research. In the standard principal/agent model the parties negotiate only once and on a 
once-and-for-all basis. Under certain assumptions the principal can determine a result-dependent 
remuneration plan for the agent Moreover, the situation created is one in which the agent 
maximises not only his own but also the principal's utility. One of the assumptions is that, after 
the contract is concluded, both parties fulfil their obligations without problems. This approach is 
also called the theory of complete contracts (see among others Mas-Colell et al., 1995: 436-510; 
Salante, 1997; 4-7; Furubotn and Richter, 1997: 181-182). Complete contracting can be 
characterised by complete contingent contracting which means that all variables that may have an 
impact on the conditions of the contractual relationship during its whole duration have taken into 
account when negotiation and signing the contract (cf. Salanie, 1997: 150). This means that the 
contract is perfectly contingent on all these variables. Impediments to perfectly contingent 
contracting are: 
• agents may have private information at the date of contracting (adverse selection); 
• agents receive information that cannot be directly verified by contract enforcement 
authorities (hidden knowledge); 
• agents may take actions that cannot be verified (moral hazard) (cf. Tirole, 1999: 
754). 
In perfectly contingent contracting there is no limitation on the parties' ability to foresee 
contingencies, to write contracts, and to enforce them (Tirole, 1999: 754). 
Despite the variety of settings in which risk sharing, moral hazard, and adverse selection 
are potentially important, complete contract theory's performance, as a positive theory has been 
disappointing. Complete contract theory failed to account for the observed simplicity of sharing 
rules in most real-world contracts. Complete contract theory has also been faulted for its inability 
to distinguish between, and therefore account for the choice between contracting and other 
institutional and organisational forms such as property rights and the firm (cf. Masten, 1998: 5). 
However, this does not mean that the results of complete contract theory are useless for this 
thesis. The complete contract literature is used for giving insight into contracting mechanisms. 
The other approach to contractual arrangements focuses on the incompleteness of 
contractual arrangements, based transaction cost economics. The implementation of these 
12 
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contractual arrangements and their enforcement necessitate "filling in the blanks" and imposing 
constraints on the partners involved (cf. Menard, 1997: 1). Under the influence of the work of 
Williamson (1985, 1996, 1998) a significant change was made; emphasis was placed on 
incomplete contracts. This kind of incomplete contract theory has its basis in transaction cost 
economics. An important objective of incomplete contracting is to overcome the ex post 
contractual opportunism that may result from the difficulties courts or other third parties face in 
verifying the execution of contractual obligations. Credible commitments and self-enforcing 
commitments are important topics in this field (Furubotn and Richter, 1997: 31-32). Authors in 
this field are Menard (e.g. 2000) and Williamson (e.g. 1985; 1996; 1998; 2000a). According to 
Holmstrom and Roberts (cf. 1998: 74-75) this theory has to be distinguished from the more 
formal new property rights approach. The detailed logic of both theories differs, resulting in quite 
different empirical predictions. 
2.3 The Institutional Environment 
Williamson (1998: 27) defines the institutional environment as the rules of the game in which 
economic activity is organised. Above the level of the institutional environment there exists a 
level called the social embeddedness level. This is where informal institutions, customs, 
traditions, norms, etc. are located. This level is taken as given by most institutional economists 
(Williamson, 2000a: 596). In this thesis the level of social embeddedness is taken as part of the 
institutional environment. Several studies have shown that the institutional environment matters 
for the variability of contracts in relation to their transactions; there exist different arrangements 
in the same environment; and that the institutional environment influences the performance and 
duration of contracts (cf. Menard, 2000: 236). It is not easy to obtain measures of relevant 
dimensions of the institutional environment in order to isolate its impact on institutional 
arrangements (Oxley 1999: 284). The institutional environment is analysed by using the 
following three characteristics; 
1. place: the institutional environment differs among communities; 
2. time: the institutional environment is not fixed in time and changes in general 
slowly; 
13 
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3. level: the institutional environment operates at an aggregate level. 
The first characteristic is that the institutional environment differs among different 
communities (e.g. countries, provinces, and regions). For instance, the existence of norms in the 
society as a part of the institutional environment in which an organisation is active influences the 
relative performance of this organisation. The main role of norms is that they lead people to 
perceive the 'game' of social life as a kind of generalised assurance game: by contributing to a 
public good, an individual manifests his willingness to share in the life of the group, and his 
understanding that everyone has to participate at some level in collective efforts to make the 
group viable (cf. Baland and Plateau, 1996: 119). 
A second characteristic is that the institutional environment is not constant in time. 
According to Williamson (1998:27, 2000a: 596) the institutional environment changes 
considerably in a period of 10 - 100 years. In a single community only changes in the 
institutional environment in time can be observed. For instance, the recognition of property rights 
(part of the institutional environment) is not immutable. They may, for example, change from one 
generation to another (Cooler and Ulen, 1997: 72). This can have consequences for the way in 
which the government recognises and protects assets. Property is a bundle of rights which 
describe what people may and may not do with the resources they own; the extent to which they 
may possess, use, transform, transfer, or exclude others from their property. The environment can 
also be altered (cf. Davis and North, 1971: 7). Property rights can be changed by changes in law. 
It is important to realise that since the institutional environment changes only slowly and in 
complex ways, comparative static analysis in a single regional or country setting is problematic 
(see Oxley, 1999:284). In this study the institutional environment is taken as given. 
The third characteristic is that the level of analysis is at an aggregate level. Institutional 
arrangements operate at the level of individual transactions whereas the institutional 
environment is more concerned with composite levels. For instance, the legal system is a 
framework which defines the ways in which property rights can be implemented and enforced 
(Menard, 1995: 164). Contract law as a part of the legal system can help people to co-operate by 
enforcing, interpreting and regulating promises (cf. Cooler and Ulen, 1997: 202). Contract law is 
relevant to all kinds of institutional arrangements, ranging from wildlife and landscape 
management contracts, employment contracts to house renting contracts. Individuals in a society 
14 
Theoretical background 
are often involved in more than one arrangement. This can be between individuals, between 
individuals and organisations, or institutional arrangements between organisations. 
Law and the judiciary are reflected in constraints that originate in the institutional 
environment (cf. Williamson, 1996: 327). Laws that regulate transfers, as well as the procedures 
and mechanisms for implementing and enforcing these laws, are central to the effectiveness of 
contracts (Menard, 2000: 247). Wildlife laws assign property rights to various attributes of wild 
species; they specify ownership of certain wildlife attributes to private individuals, local 
governments, states, federal agencies, and international organisations (Lueck, 1989: 303). 
This thesis focuses more on institutional arrangements than on the institutional 
environment itself. Attention is paid to relations between the institutional environment and 
institutional arrangements. The institutional environment or rules of the game has consequences 
for analysing institutional arrangements and determines the feasibility and optimality of 
institutional arrangements due to their characteristics in place, time and level. Perfect 
institutional environments do not exist; for instance court order issuing procedures are not 
perfect. Public ordering defines rules of the game for private ordering and a series of 
mechanisms explicitly designed to enforce contracts and to support transactions (cf. Ménard, 
2000: 246). But courts are costly, much contract management and dispute settlement is worked 
out privately by the parties (cf. Williamson, 2000a: 599). 
2.4 Institutional arrangements 
In a society there exist all kinds of arrangements between individuals, individuals and groups or 
between groups. An institutional arrangement has to be designed to accomplish at least one of the 
following goals: 
• to provide a structure within which its members can co-operate to obtain some 
added income that is not available outside that structure; 
• or to provide a mechanism for changing laws or property rights so that individuals 
or groups can legally compete in new ways (Davis and North: 1971: 7). 
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In this thesis organisations and contracts are seen as 'institutional arrangements' (see also 
Menard, 2000: 238). When organisations are seen as institutional arrangements (organisational 
constructions) the internal structure has economic purpose and effect (cf. Williamson, 2000a: 
602). Menard (1995: 172) characterises an organisation as institutional arrangement designed to 
make possible the conscious and deliberated co-ordination of activities in identifiable boundaries, 
in which members associate on a regular basis through a set of implicit and explicit agreements, 
commit themselves to collective actions for the purpose of creating and allocating resources and 
capabilities by a combination of command and co-operation. 
An institutional arrangement is more than a formal contract: an arrangement consists of a 
contract and other forms of co-ordination. If one looks carefully at actual contracts in 
organisations, it is possible to identify several complementary procedures that co-ordinate 
economic activities, most of which do not involve the price system (Menard, 1994: 244). 
Command (hierarchy) is only one of the ways to allocate resources in an organisation. In 
Principal agent theory contracts (agency contracts) do not represent any specific institutional 
arrangement. According to Menard (2000: 237-238) it is typically the realm of agency theory 
which considers forms of contractual arrangements as a continuum. Agency theory continuously 
seeks the optimal contract which include built-in mechanisms making further enforcement 
procedures unnecessary. There is no need for an enforcement procedure other than the built-in 
mechanisms. 
The standard microeconomic theory focuses on the market as the mechanism for co-
ordinating economic transactions. In the extreme case there are no firms or organisations apart 
from the market system itself. It is the analysis of a system of extreme decentralisation (Coase, 
2000: 3). Autonomous agents are induced to make mutually compatible plans and are not 
required to do other than what they deem in their own best interest. Individuals exercise foresight 
and choose between alternatives. The system assumes that everyone knows what the prices are 
and when goods can be bought and sold. The theory assumes further that the allocation of 
resources is dependent directly on the price system. Coase (1996: 90) argues that an economist 
thinks of the economic system as being co-ordinated by the price mechanism and becomes not an 
organisation but an organism. The economic system "works itself". There is no need to study 
institutions that let the market "work". 
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A market equilibrium can be identified as an outcome of a market economy in which each 
agent in the economy (i.e. each consumer and firm) is doing as well as possible given the actions 
of the other agents. The price system achieves this efficient allocation of resources without 
requiring communication among individual decision-makers of anything more than the summary 
information about the economy embodied in the prices. The First Welfare Theorem provides a 
set of conditions under which it can be assured that the market economy will achieve a Pareto-
optimal result. An economic outcome is Pareto-optimal if it is impossible to make individuals 
better off without making any other individual worse off. The Second Theorem states that under 
the same set of assumptions - the first welfare theorem plus convexity conditions - all Pareto-
optimal outcomes can in principle be implemented through the market mechanism. That is, a 
public authority who wishes to implement a particular Pareto-optimal outcome may always do so 
by appropriately redistributing wealth and "letting the market work" (cf. Mas-Colell et al., 1995: 
307-308). If the competitive equilibrium of the Neoclassical model provides a good and 
complete description of how markets work, there is no need for other economic organisations 
aiming at improving economic efficiency, although political organisation might still exist in 
order to bring more equity into the system. 
In standard microeconomic theory, the market is the fundamental and exclusive 
institutional arrangement for co-ordinating economic activities (cf. Menard 1995: 169). Any 
inefficiency that arises in a market economy, and hence any role for Pareto-improving market 
intervention, must be traceable to a violation of some of the assumptions of the Welfare 
Theorems. In that case the market equilibria fail to be Pareto-optimal and market failures will be 
present. When the economic environment departs significantly from the artificial Neoclassical 
pattern, would-be profit maximising firms and utility-maximising consumers do not suffice to 
bring the ideal of Pareto efficiency, or even constrained Pareto optimality (Furubotn 1999: 187). 
However, as long as transaction costs are positive and large, there is no way by which to define 
an efficient solution with any real meaning, because there is no way of specifying what an 
efficient "government" is underlying the economic structure op property rights. Without being 
able to specify an efficient government, we really cannot talk about Pareto efficiency (cf. North 
1986: 236). 
Alternative to the market mechanism would be a situation where the price system is 
eliminated by a system of explicit hierarchical organisation. Hierarchy in institutional 
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arrangements obviously serves a co-ordinating purpose, performing functions that could be co-
ordinated instead through the pricing mechanism (cf. Medema 1996: 572). A hierarchy is 
responsible for the ordering of transactions in an institutional arrangement: for example, 
deciding what transaction should be organised at what point in time (cf. Menard, 2000: 245). 
With hierarchy, formalisation is essential: if there are divergent opinions about a course of action 
is must be clear whose decision will prevail (Menard, 1996: 157). It is the discretionary power of 
the management - ultimatedly the owners of the assets or their representatives - that prevails in 
initiating and terminating contracts, in determining and reconfiguring tasks, and in allocating 
resources among departments (cf. Menard, 2000: 245). Generally speaking, hierarchical relations 
fail when discretionary power deteriorates into arbitrariness (Menard, 1996: 244-245). A 
limitation to hierarchical relations is that the ability to impose constraints on the choice of 
subordinates is quite limited. Subordinates can resist by implementing decisions imperfectly, by 
failing to put a specific decision into operation or by outright rebellion against the hierarchy, as 
when they quit or go on strike. 
Both market and non-market failure can be viewed as resulting from the particular 
transaction cost characteristics and burdens associated with markets and organisations (which 
include governments) as alternative institutional arrangements for organising economic activities 
(Wolf, 1993: 7). In comparison to the study of market failure, the study of hierarchy failure is 
seriously underdeveloped (Williamson, 1996: 17). The behaviour and deficiencies of hierarchical 
organisations should be included in a comprehensive theory of non-market failure that can 
highlight similarities and differences among them, as well as permit suitable comparisons 
between the market and the market sector (cf. Wolf, 1993: 6). This thesis attempts to assess how 
institutional arrangements can successfully deal with the combination of agriculture and wildlife 
and landscape management. 
A major contribution of recent literature on transactions is the demonstration of the 
fundamental importance of "hybrid forms' observed between the two polar cases of markets and 
hierarchies. Specific combinations of market incentives and modalities of co-ordination 
involving some form of hierarchical relationship characterise hybrid forms (M6nar<L 1995: 175). 
They necessarily involve some forms of planning and administrative decision, both with and 
among the firms concerned (M6nard, 1996: 157). Hybrid forms develop for dealing with bi- or 
multilateral dependence, when this dependence is strong enough to require close co-ordination 
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but not strong enough to induce full integration (or when integration is not possible, e.g., when 
prohibited by regulations) (Menard, 1998: 410). However the hybrid form of organisation is not 
a loose amalgam of market and hierarchy but possesses its own disciplined rationale 
(Williamson, 1996: 119). This arrangement is co-ordinated and conducted by active forms of 
governance emanating from the partners and operating through authority. Authority should be 
distinguished from hierarchy. With authority there is a continuously renewed agreement on the 
transfer of capacities to make decisions, while in hierarchies the power to make decisions is 
discretionary and rooted in rights that are exogenous to subordinates (cf. Menard, 1994: 244). 
The literature on hybrid forms has emphasised features of the contractual aspect, such arbitration 
clauses, take-or-pay procurement, reciprocity, and measures to create hostage positions (Menard, 
1996: 157). 
Authority relations differ in several aspects from hierarchies. The ability to co-ordinate 
through hierarchy is a privilege embedded in an institutional arrangement. The essential 
difference is that hierarchy is backed by a specific institutional arrangement; this may or may not 
be the case with authority (Menard, 1996: 155). Authority can be formal when explicitly 
delineate by rules, or informal when it depends solely on personal influence (Menard, 1994:234). 
Authority is closely associated with a specific person. Several factors favouring the effectiveness 
of authority can be distinguished (cf. Menard, 1994:239-240): 
• a certain level of expertise; 
• access to information not generally available; 
• ability to control or renegotiate the allocation of resources; 
• a strategic position in a process; 
• qualitative factors like personality and leadership aptitude. 
Hierarchy involves the capacity to supervise and to control, the right to make decisions (cf. 
Menard, 1994: 237), and depends more on position and status than authority, which requires 
mutual consent and commitment in order to be efficient (Menard, 1996: 180-181). Non-
hierarchical co-ordination can be viewed as horizontal co-ordination. 
Three categories of institutional arrangements are distinguished in this thesis: markets; 
hierarchies; and hybrids. As summarised in Table 2.1, incentive intensity (price) plays an 
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important role within markets but is of no importance in hierarchical organisations, whereas 
administrative controls are. 
Table 2.1: Distinguishing^ characteristics of markets, hybrids and hierarchical institutional 
arrangements 
Institutional arrangement 
Market Hybrid Hierarchical 
organisation 
Instruments: 
• Incentive intensity (prices) ++ + 0 
• Administrative controls 0 + ++ 
(hierarchy) 
• Authority 0 ++ 0 
Adaptation: 
• Autonomy ++ + 0 
• Co-ordination 0 + ++ 
Enforcement 
• Contract law ++ + 0 
• Private enforcement 0 + ++ 
Residual control rights clear not clear clear 
++ = important; + = less important; 0 unimportant 
Source: partly based Williamson (1996:105) 
The hybrid form is located between the other two institutional arrangements and the main 
instrument is authority. The choice of adaptation mode depends whether or not there is bilateral 
dependency between the contracting partners, and the determination of the distribution of the 
gains of trade between the partners (cf. Menard, 1996: 160). When significant disturbances of 
the environment and bilateral dependency develop, transactions cost economics predicts that 
delay in responding will decrease the efficiency of the price system. Further, there is an 
increased possibility that opportunistic behaviour of the contracting parties will considerably 
reduce the efficiency of the price mechanism. Compared to market relationships, hybrid forms 
represent a shift towards co-operation and administrative controls in order to adjust more rapidly 
and in a more co-ordinated way to these disturbances (cf. Menard, 1996: 159). But this shift also 
weakens the monetary incentives that are the strength of the market, without providing the 
incentives of hierarchical structures (e.g. promotions or extended powers of decision). Because 
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of the limited role of the price mechanism and uncertainties surrounding appropriation of rents, 
information disclosure is essential to the existence and stability of hybrid forms (cf. Ménard, 
1996:159). 
A fundamental explanation for the existence of hybrid forms is that they enhance the 
capacity of firms to deal with disturbances that spot-markets cannot easily meet or could only at 
prohibitive costs, while maintaining the incentives that pure integration lacks (Ménard, 1996: 
161). According to Williamson (cf. 1996: 101-105), the central problem of economic 
organisation is adaptation to changing circumstances. He distinguishes two types of adaptations: 
(1) when prices serve as sufficient information and (2) by co-ordination within internal 
organisations. Changes in the demand or supply of a commodity are reflected in price change, in 
response to which participants are able to take the right action. Williamson (1996: 102) refers to 
adaptations of this kind as autonomy adaptations. This is the Neoclassical ideal in which 
consumers and producers respond independently to parametric price changes so as to maximise 
their utility and profits respectively. Some disturbances, however, require co-ordinated 
responses. Failures in co-ordination can occur when autonomous parties read and react to signals 
differently, even though their purpose is to achieve a timely and compatible combined response. 
Williamson (1996: 103) refers to adaptations of co-ordination as co-operation adaptations (see 
Table 2.1). Compared with the spot market, a formal organisation orchestrating co-ordinated 
adaptation to unanticipated disturbances enjoys adaptive advantages as bilateral dependency 
builds up. 
Enforcement differs for the various institutional arrangements. A distinctive form of 
contract law supports each generic mode of governance (Williamson, 1998: 37; cf. Ménard, 
2000: 248). Contract law is important for markets because this type of governance assumes that 
laws can solve most conflicts. In case of markets there are relatively stable conditions because 
there are no consequential discrepancies before and after the transaction and therefore simple 
self-enforcing mechanisms can be designed (cf. Ménard, 2000: 241). Enforcement mechanisms 
are designed to adjust to relatively unstable conditions, i.e. consequential uncertainties. These 
mechanisms can be formal or informal. (Ménard, 2000:241). 
In the case of hybrid forms we have to deal with more or less equal members who work 
together in an organisation which makes use particularly of forms of horizontal (non-price) co-
ordination. The hybrid institutional arrangement typically comprises: 
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1. contractual arrangements defining a framework for efficient co-ordination with 
embodied adaptation mechanisms; 
2. specific incentive mechanisms for allocation of residual rights in a structure in 
which ownership is separate and all rights cannot be specified by contracts; 
3. Particular forms of control and adaptation (because the price mechanism plays a 
limited role as a vector of adaptation, and there is no hierarchy to decide in favour 
of one partner against others) (Menard, 1999:410). 
The legitimacy of hybrid forms depends on the mutual and renewable consent of participants (cf. 
Menard, 1999: 410). The basis elements of the co-ordination mechanism are commitment, trust, 
reputation, standardisation of norms or beliefs, and shared codes of conduct. Members largely 
maintain the property rights over their assets, but some of the attributes of the assets are or 
become common property. This implies that the residual control rights are not clear. 
In contrast to hierarchical co-ordination - that is mostly vertical - horizontal non-market co-
ordination is based on elements of motivation, trust and commitment. The co-ordination 
mechanisms that are used in such an organisation are mutual adjustments and the standardisation 
of values and norms. Mutual adjustment refers to the co-ordination achieved by informal 
horizontal communication. Standardisation of norms and values means shared codes of conduct 
usually for the entire organisation, so that everyone functions according to the same norms of 
behaviour. To work effectively, such a horizontal organisation could be partly based on formal 
rules, but they must be complemented by informal rules (sanctions, conventions, norms or codes 
of behaviour) that reduce enforcing costs (cf. North, 1993: 20; see also Douma and Schreuder, 
1998:140-143). 
Standardisation of values and norms in organisations leads to common values and norms. 
Common values and norms pertain to a congruent set of preferences in a group of people. 
Common values of norms form guiding co-ordination principles among a group or community. 
Most people work in an organisation of some kind. Almost everyone grows up in an organisation 
called the family. There is a variety of groupings in which people interact for various reasons. 
The most important characteristic of such an organisation is that the members co-operate under 
forms of agreements. This agreement may be based on a formal contract, a quite informal 
contract, mutual expectation, or just on bonds of kinship as in a (possibly extended) family. 
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Repeated interaction promotes solidarity, consensus, trust, and common values and norms in a 
group. 
Dasgupta (1991: 75, 79) interprets social norms as implicit social contracts to co-operate, 
embedded in customs and rituals and resulting from repeated interactions. If people are not 
extremely myopic, it is the self-interest of each member of the group to keep to the norms, in 
other words, they are self-enforcing. Common values and norms diminish the incidence of 
opportunistic behaviour between the members of the group. Effective co-ordination based on 
common values and norms coincides with a strong motivation and commitment of individual 
members of a group to achieve their common goal (CPB, 1997: 55). 
Nooteboom (1999: 24- 25) emphasizes the role and meaning of trust. Trust can lower the 
costs of search and verification because trusting people are less secretive and more readily 
supply information, and the costs of contracting and monitoring since, reducing fears of 
opportunism, it leads to the acceptance of more influence from the partner. In the case of trust, 
people will deliberate and renegotiate on the basis of give and take ('voice') rather than walk out 
('exit') when conflicts arise. 
In last row of Table 2.1 the allocation of residual rights of control are used to characterise 
institutional arrangements. Hybrid institutional arrangements maintain separate ownership 
(Menard, 1996: 159). Ownership is a bundle of decision rights. According to the new property 
rights approach, it is the owner of the asset in question who has the residual control rights (Hart, 
1995: 30). This means that the owner has the right to use the asset in any way not inconsistent 
with a prior contract, custom, or any law. Owing to bounded rationality and the associated 
transaction costs, most agreements framing behaviour are incomplete and thus fail to determine 
future actions of parties exactly. Contractual incompleteness has important economic 
implications. Under complete contracting, the division of income in each eventuality would be 
specified contractually, and there would be no returns that could be considered as residual. If 
contracts are incomplete the allocation of power of control matters. The party that has power of 
control has also the residual rights of control, and the one who is entitled to receive the residual 
income is the residual claimant (cf. Milgrom and Roberts, 1992:291). 
According to the new property rights approach, it is the owner of the asset in question who 
has the residual control rights (see for instance Foss and Foss, 2001: 25). Residual income and 
residual control rights are highly complementary and it makes sense to allocate them to the same 
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person. However, according to Hart (1995: 64) residual income and residual control are not 
always bundled together on a one-to-one basis. In some cases it may not be possible to measure 
or to verify all aspects of an asset's return. The new property rights approach does not consider 
employees to be part of the firm because, given that employees cannot be owned, there is no 
sense in which they are any different from agents who contract with the firm at arm's length (cf. 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998: 388). An important characteristic of hybrid forms is that the members 
of such organisations maintain (for a major part) their private property rights over their land and 
other marketable assets. 
In summary, in an economy a mix of systems is used to co-ordinate and manage various 
kinds of activities. The kind of co-ordination that is most effective depends on the nature of the 
transaction. In the approach of the New Institutional Economics, as elsewhere in mainstream 
economics, the preferences of agents are taken as given, exogenous, or performed. But now, in 
addition to agents adjusting their behaviour to prices, as in Neoclassical theory, they also do so 
in relation to the overall 'incentive structure' of society. In other words, legal norms, along with 
other formal and informal rules, impose constraints to which individual agents respond. Formal 
rules are an important part of the institutional framework, but only a part. To work effectively 
they must be complemented by informal constraints (conventions, norms of behavior) that 
supplement them and reduce enforcement costs (North, 1993: 20). Hence governance means 
more than a formal contract between two parties. 
2.5 Contracts 
The diversity of contractual arrangements explains the necessity of an adequate framework for 
analysing transactions that have diverse characteristics. Different contractual arrangements are 
related to different contracts for implementing, co-ordinating and monitoring different kinds of 
transactions. The differences among contracts correspond to the characteristics of the institutional 
arrangements in which they are embedded (Menard, 2000: 248). Selection of an institutional 
arrangement must take into account the mutual interdependency of the institutional arrangement 
and the characteristics of the contracts. 
24 
Theoretical background 
Which institutional arrangement corresponds to which contract depends on the 
completeness and complexity of the contracts. Incompleteness results from bounded rationality, 
particularly if the environment is uncertain. Opportunistic behaviour makes reliance on 
incomplete contracts impossible (cf. Furubotn and Richter, 1997: 4). Moving from simple to 
complex (incomplete long term) contracts is attended by a whole series of features: the length of 
the contract increases, penalties to deter breach are introduced, provision is made for added 
information disclosure and processing, and specialised disputed settlement mechanisms appear 
(Williamson, 2000a: 603). Complexity has to do with the writing of contracts, and, even more 
importantly, with their implementation, mainly as a result of unclear residual control rights. 
There is still no uniformly accepted classification of contract types. Three types of 
contracts (contract law) are distinguished in this thesis: classical, neo-classical and relational (for 
contract classifications see: Williamson, 1985: 68-72; Lyons and Metha, 1997: 48-49; Menard, 
1996: 157; Williamson, 1996: 95-100; and Menard, 2000: 239). This approach is proposed by 
Williamson and has its roots in the work of Macneil (1974, 1978). Several elements are used to 
characterise different types of contracts. Table 2.2 gives an overview of the classification of 
contracts. There is overlap between the different contracts with respect to these characteristics. 
The first element is related to the identity of the parties to the contracts. This is unimportant for a 
classical contract, but crucial for a relational contract. Second, the duration of the relationship is 
fixed in a classical contract, while it is open-ended in relational contracts. The third element 
relates to how the contract is expected to deal with contingencies, i.e. the degree of completeness. 
The final element is enforcement in anticipation of problems in dealing with changing 
circumstances. There is a significant variety of enforcement procedures in contractual 
arrangements. The characteristics of these procedures largely depend on the level of uncertainty 
surrounding the transaction that a contract is designed to organise (cf. Menard, 2000: 242). 
Table 2.2: Classification of contracts • 
Contract type Identity of Duration Degree of Safeguards 
parties completeness 
Classical 0 short ++ public 
Neo-classical + medium + public/private 
Relational ++ long 0 private 
++ = strong; + = moderate; 0 = weak 
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A classical contract is characteristic of market relationships. The dependence among parties in a 
classical contract is very weak or non-existent. This can be explained by the low degree of asset 
specificity (Menard, 2000: 239). In these contracts, formal clauses specify most characteristics at 
stake, the identity of the parties to the contract is irrelevant, and the transactions highly 
monetized (Menard, 1996: 157). The short term orientation makes it appropriate to regard the 
contract as fully expressing all the future rights and obligations of the parties, while the absence 
or relation-specific investments means that opportunism can be effectively countered by the 
threat of exit from the relationship or by resort to courts. This means that these contracts are 
mainly self-enforcing. Law courts adjudicate in the event of a disagreement (Lyons & Mehta, 
1997: 49); the safeguards can be characterised as public ordering. The role of public ordering is 
limited to reaching an agreement and/or ordering the recalcitrant party to comply or to pay 
damages (Ménard, 2000: 246). With court enforcement the low likelihood of repeated contracts 
makes the loss of significant future goodwill unimportant (cf. Deakin & Michie, 1997: 11). 
Long-term commitment plays no role in classical contracts. 
A neo-classical contract is typically a long-run arrangement in order to develop a 
continuing relationship. Normally the contract specifies a fixed duration or task to be completed 
(Lyons & Mehta, 1997: 49). The identity of the parties does matter in this relationship, since 
bilateral dependency is non-trivial, while adaptation mechanisms must be elastic enough to 
enable parties to adjust to moderately consequential disturbances. A neo-classical contract 
defines adaptation mechanisms for improving - relative to pure market relationships - the 
capacity to adjust to unanticipated disturbances (Ménard, 1996: 157-158). The parties accept at 
the outset of the agreement that the contract is incomplete, in the sense of being unable to specify 
their rights and obligations in all future states of the world. Because of the incompleteness of this 
type of contract, disputes are more frequent and more complex to solve, and less likely to be 
resolved by formal enforcement procedures in the contract (Ménard, 2000: 239). The written 
documentation provides the status quo from which to renegotiate. Courts are used to solve 
problems. The parties attempt to use their agreement to plan for future contingencies by using 
mechanisms of 'trilateral governance', including hardship and arbitration clauses (cf. Deakin and 
Michie, 1997: 12). Public ordering is also important for neo-classical contracts. Public ordering 
goes beyond defining the rules of the game for the domain of private ordering. It also 
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complements a series of mechanisms explicitly designed to enforce contracts and to support 
transactions. As a result, it continuously interferes with private ordering (Menard, 2000: 246). 
Relational contracts are characterised by the substitution of the legal and its accompanying 
formal documents by informal agreements such as verbal promises, letters of intent, or 
gentleman's agreements (cf. Lyons & Mehta, 1997: 51). In relational contracting prices play a 
small role as adjustments; instead norms of behaviour or shared codes of conduct prompt 
responses to new developments as they unfold. These norms or shared codes of conduct overrule 
written documents in settling outputs. The duration is normally indeterminate (cf. Lyons and 
Mehta, 1997: 49). In these contractual arrangements, adaptability to highly consequential 
disturbances is crucial, while highly specific assets create risks of opportunism that detailed 
safeguards are built in to reduce. Private ordering prevails, while public rules delineate the 
acceptable domain in which arbitrariness can operate (cf. Menard, 2000:248). Hierarchy is at the 
core of adaptability and operates through "fiat," acting as "its own court of ultimate appeal" 
(Menard, 1996: 157; Williamson,1996: 98; Menard, 2000: 247). This makes safeguards within 
the contract not important because one of the parties has the power to take decisions. The 
identities and personal attributes of parties are crucial in these types of contracts (cf. Lyons & 
Mehta, 1997:49). 
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2.6 Summary and conclusions 
Standard micro-economic theory focuses on the market as exclusive mechanism for co-ordinating 
economic activities. However, when the economic environment significantly departs from the 
artificial Neoclassical pattern the market will fail to produce Pareto-optimal outcomes. An 
alternative to a market is a non-market government intervention. However, also government 
intervention often fails. Both kinds of failures are examples of institutional arrangement failures. 
New Institutional Economics is concerned with the question of which institutional arrangement is 
economically efficient under what circumstances. 
The basic elements of the framework for analysing institutional arrangements are the 
institutional environment and institutional arrangements. The institutional environment is the set 
of fundamental political, social, and legal ground rules that establish a basis for production, 
exchange and distribution and are concerned with composite levels of activities. The institutional 
environment depends on place and changes in time, and is on an aggregate level. 
In a society there exist all kinds of arrangements between individuals, individuals and 
groups, or between groups. An institutional arrangement is designed to provide at least a 
structure in which its members can co-operate. Institutional arrangements can be formal and/or 
informal. Two of them can be distinguished as extreme poles: markets, and hierarchical 
organisations. The areas of overlap between markets and hierarchical organisations give rise to 
hybrids. Hybrids are co-ordinated and conducted by active forms of governance which emanates 
from the partners, and operate through authority. In order for authority to be efficient, it requires 
mutual consent and commitment. 
From the institutional economics analysis in this chapter it follows that these characteristics 
are relevant to analysis of institutional arrangements: 
1. the transaction; 
2. the influence of the institutional environment with respect to time, place and level; 
3. the instruments of an arrangement: incentive intensity, administrative controls and 
authority; 
4. performance attributes: autonomy and co-operation adaptation; 
5. the role of contract law; 
6. the clarity of residual control rights; 
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7. type of contractual arrangement. 
Differences among contracts correspond to the characteristics of the institutional arrangements in 
which they are embedded. Along with the differences in institutional arrangements, contracts 
differ in the following key elements: 
1. relevance of the identity of parties; 
2. contract duration: discrete exchange or indeterminate duration; 
3. degree of completeness; 
4. enforcement procedures. 
The characteristics of institutional arrangements and the key-elements contracts show that order 
can be brought into the array of available institutional arrangements and contracts, the design of 
which shall be analysed in following chapters. 
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Institutional arrangements for wildlife and landscape management 
3.1 Introduction 
The institutional environment and institutional arrangements are linked in a framework for 
analysing transactions in wildlife and landscape management as presented in Section 3.2. 
Transactions, and the involved transaction costs - given the institutional environment - determine 
the selection of an appropriate institutional arrangement. This gives rise to the first question in 
this chapter: How can the transactions of farmers concerning managing wildlife and landscape 
be characterised? Section 3.3 examines this question. The second question in this chapter is: 
what is a suitable institutional arrangement given the characteristics of this transaction. Section 
3.4 looks at the selection of institutional arrangements from the point of view of transaction costs 
economics. The chapter finishes with a summary and conclusions in Section 3.5. 
3.2 Framework for analysing institutional arrangements 
The institutional environment and institutional arrangements constitute the basic theoretical 
elements of the framework applied in this thesis for analysing institutions. The framework is 
presented in Figure 3.1. The way in which the institutional environment and arrangements are 
linked is based on the work of Williamson (e.g. 1996: 223; 1998: 26; 2000a: 597). The solid 
arrows, which connect resource allocation and employment with the institutional arrangements 
and the institutional arrangements with the institutional environment, signify that the higher level 
imposes constraints on the level immediately below. The circular arrows within the institutional 
arrangements show that institutional arrangements - like environmental co-operative and 
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contractual arrangements - have a life of their own, which can be spontaneous or intentionally 
designed. The dashed reverse arrows connecting, respectively, the institutional environment with 
the institutional arrangements, the institutional arrangements with resource allocation and 
employment, and finally resource allocation and employment with individuals and groups, signal 
a feedback. For instance, individuals can influence the institutional environment through the 
electoral process (cf. Williamson, 1994: 323). The level of resource allocation and employment is 
the level on which neo-classical analysis works. Optimality apparatus - often marginal analysis -
is employed, and for these purposes, is typically described as a production function (cf. 
Williamson, 2000a: 600). Optimisation takes place given the existing institutions. The level of 
individuals and groups is added to show that people in a society influence and are influenced by 
the institutions in a society. The individuals and groups are boundedly rational and behave 
opportunistically. 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual frameworkfor analysing institutional arrangements 
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Two arrangements for combining agriculture and the management of wildlife and landscape are 
analysed in this chapter in more detail: contractual arrangements and environmental co-
operatives for wildlife and landscape management. Both arrangements have in common that they 
are meant to combine agriculture with the management of wildlife and landscape. The main 
difference between environmental co-operatives and contractual arrangements is the number of 
agents involved. The contractual arrangements are bilateral arrangements between individual 
fanners and the government or a private contractor. The relevant relationships for contracting 
arrangements are given by the fat arrows labelled "A" in Figure 3.1. These relations can be 
divided into two groups. First, the relation between the parties to the contractual arrangement: 
farmers and contract givers. Second, the influence of the institutional environment on both 
parties, such as the public enforcement mechanisms that are available in all contracting 
arrangements. 
An environmental co-operative concludes contracts collectively with the government or 
private contractors. The relationships for environmental co-operatives are labelled with a "B" in 
Figure 3.1. The parties to the environmental co-operative arrangement are farmers and 
contractors. The relationships of farmers to an environmental co-operative are more complicated 
than the relationships of farmers to contractual arrangements. On the one hand the farmers are 
contracted by the environmental co-operative to provide management services and on the other 
hand they are members or participants of the co-operative. The contract givers conclude contracts 
with the co-operative for managing wildlife and landscape on the level the environmental co-
operative. The co-operative is also influenced by the institutional environment, e.g. by the laws 
regarding the possibilities of legal entities. Having distinguished the relations involved in 
managing wildlife and landscape, the next step is to analyse the transaction of wildlife and 
landscape management in more detail. 
3.3 The attributes of wildlife and landscape management 
Two important criteria characterising the attributes of wildlife and landscape are non-
excludability and non-rivalry.Non-excludability is the property of a good such that the benefits of 
that good not only can be, but also in fact are, made available to all. Exclusion may not be 
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feasible for technological reasons, as in the case of national defence, or for an institutional 
reason, as in the case where property rights can not be assigned. When exclusion is impossible, 
the free rider problem and the associated prisoner's dilemma arise (Boadway and Bruce, 1989: 
129 - 130). Field research confirms that the temptation to free-ride on the provision of collective 
benefits is a universal problem (Ostrom 2000: 138). Non-rivalry in consumption means 
indivisibility of the benefits. A good is non-rival or indivisible when a unit of the good can be 
consumed by one individual without detracting in the slightest on the opportunities for 
consumption of the same unit still available to others (cf. Cornes and Sandler 1996: 8). 
Based on the characteristics of rivalry and excludability of goods, a spectrum of goods can 
be distinguished. Pure public goods have the properties of non-rivalry and non-excludability. 
Pure private goods are fully rival and excludable. Impure public goods, whose benefits are 
partially rival and/or partially excludable, occupy the intermediate points along this spectrum. An 
important subclass of such goods comprises those whose benefits are excludable but partially 
non-rival; these goods are club goods (Cornes and Sandler 1996: 9). The essential difference 
between club goods and pure public goods depends on the existence of an exclusion mechanism. 
Based on the criteria of rivalry and excludability, the benefits of wildlife and landscape are 
impure public goods. Technically it is possible to exclude people from the benefits, e.g., by 
fencing them out. Geographical exclusion is also possible. Technical exclusion can involve 
considerable costs however. 
Land, as an asset with valuable wildlife and landscapes, has many attributes. Some 
attributes are excludable like the use of land for agricultural purposes, and some are non-
excludable like wildlife and landscape scenery. Further, some attributes are rival in consumption, 
like the using of land for agricultural production, while others are non-rival like wildlife and 
landscape. The question is: who has the property rights over these attributes? For the use of 
agricultural land for agricultural production this seems clear: the landowner has the property 
rights. However, establishing effective control over wildlife is difficult and the property rights 
are unclear. If attributes of land are valued differently from each other, ownership conflicts can 
arise. Farmers could say: "It is my land, and therefore I have the property rights and I can decide 
how to use my land". But because of the properties of non-rivalry and (to some extent) non-
excludability, wildlife and landscape are not pure private goods. Ownership of many attributes is 
often divided between two or more persons rather than being assigned to a single person. 
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The costs of determining, 'capturing', and retaining the attributes of an asset are defined as 
transaction costs. The presence of transaction costs means that asset attributes can not be fully 
known to (prospective) owners. The result is that the rights to assets - or more specifically, to the 
asset attributes - are not fully delineated (cf. Barzel, 1997: 4). Property rights assigned to valued 
attributes of a species can be viewed as a subset of the attributes inherent in a tract of land. In 
general, the size of a landholding will be closely correlated to the attribute that most influences 
the value of land (Lueck, 1989: 300). Therefore ownership of farmland is related to the 
agricultural production. This implies that the ownership pattern of land - which itself has a 
variety of valuable uses - often does not coincide with the actual territories of valuable wildlife 
stocks (cf. Lueck, 1989: 300). A similar way of reasoning applies to landscape. 
The consequences of goods and services possessing many attributes and also the relatively 
high transaction costs involved in determining these attributes are twofold. First, divided property 
rights emerge, with two or more individuals having rights to distinct attributes of the same asset. 
Second, the incomplete separation of property rights means that some attributes can not be 
specified or allocated to the property right holders. As a result of these two effects, some of the 
attributes remain part of the 'public domain', or form what Barzel (1997: 5) calls common 
property. According to Barzel (cf. 1997: 5) a commodity lies in the 'public domain' when the 
resources needed to acquire it accrue to no one. Once attributes are in the public domain, 
individuals can spend resources to 'capture' it. This is characterised as 'capture' because here, in 
contrast to a market sale, the original owner does not receive what the recipient spends. For 
example the travel cost and waiting time that people spend in line to acquire a 'free' good accrue 
to no one, therefore such a good lies in the public domain (Barzel, 1997: 5). 
People tend to delineate their property rights more carefully as the value of these rights 
increases and less so as their value declines. Imperfect delineation of property rights is sometimes 
a result of the choice of the owners not to exercise all of their rights. Owners find or deem some 
of their rights too expensive to exercise and choose to place them in the public domain (Barzel, 
1997: 93). In the past farmers have left (or placed) the gain from the attribute wildlife and 
landscape in the public domain. They did not claim the property rights. 
For reasons of non-excludability and non-rivalry and transactions costs, the characteristics 
of 'wildlife and landscape' are distinguished from the activities and services of providing or 
managing these attributes. A service can be defined as a relation between a service-performer and 
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a service-receiver that delivers the desired attributes (Ruys, 2000: 2). In the case of an individual 
farmer, this farmer is both performer and provider of a service. In the case of an intermediary 
organisation the farmer is a service performer and the intermediary organisation is a service-
provider. Consumers of wildlife and landscape are service-receivers, however they do not 
contract these services themselves. Service contractors are the government and private 
organisations in the sense that they conclude contracts with farmers. The main difference 
between wildlife and landscape and the services provided by farmers or organisations is the 
possibility of excluding persons from making use of or benefiting from the attributes. On the 
basis of the criteria of specification (type of the property rights), the establishment and 
enforcement of property rights, wildlife and landscape are in practice partially non-excludable 
attributes. Regarding the property of rivalry, wildlife and landscape are also non-rival attributes. 
On the other hand, the activities and services of individual farmers and intermediary 
organisations are excludable (and on a certain level rival) goods. These services can be 
contracted. 
Wildlife and landscape is often managed in combination with the production of private 
goods such as food, raw materials and ornamental plants. If, on one hand, the type of wildlife and 
landscape management is technologically tied to agricultural land use (joint inputs), potential 
non-agricultural providers have to adopt a similar mode of land-use. This means that this type of 
wildlife and landscape management is not separable in terms of land-use and that no separate 
production functions can be written to both outputs (cf. Chambers, 1988: 288). If, on the other 
hand, wildlife and landscape management and the production of private goods are not joint in 
terms of input quantities, each output is produced by a separate production function, with the 
supply of production factors allocated to the different outputs. This means that the attributes of 
land can be produced or managed by different parties. 
In addition to the problem of delineating property rights, there can be problems of writing a 
contract due to measurement problems - even when the ownership of attributes is clear. 
Measurement means quantifying the attributes of a transaction. In fact, what is exchanged among 
parties to a transaction is a bundle of rights that measure various attributes of the goods and 
services exchanged or of the performance of agents (cf. North 1986: 232). Problems and costs of 
measurement pervade significantly and affect all economic transactions (cf. Barzel, 1982: 354). 
Some dimensions have a natural measure such as the financial compensation or duration. Other 
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dimensions are not continuously measurable, but are discrete choice variables, such as the 
decision to use a standard provision or a penalty clause. Dimensions like the quality of wildlife 
and landscape are even more difficult to measure. 
None of the central hypotheses of contract theory is immune to chronic measurement 
problems (Lyons, 1996: 30). Transaction cost hypotheses require data on organisation form as 
well as such detailed information about the character of transactions as: the level of uncertainty 
associated with exchange, the complexity of products and processes, and the extent to which 
assets needed for products are specific to the particular relation (Masten, 1996: 47). Also the 
contracting parties themselves are confronted with these measurement problems, although they 
might perceive these in a different way. Measurement problems are one of the causes of 
incomplete contracting because the contracting parties are not able to write a clear and 
enforceable contract. These incomplete contracts may lead to opportunistic behaviour concerning 
execution of the contract or investments. For instance, in the case of incomplete contracts for 
wildlife and landscape, the quality the government (or others) want cannot be fully specified. 
The cost of measuring wildlife and landscape means that the rights to wildlife and 
landscape are perfectly delineated, and it is unlikely that a landowner controls all of them or 
control any of them perfectly. Therefore the attributes of wildlife and landscape are not fully 
known to prospective owners and are often not known to the current farmer either (cf. Barzel, 
1997: 4). If measurement is not possible or too costly, a free-rider problem exists and monitoring 
is effective. For instance, farmers benefit from receiving financial compensation for concluding 
contracts with the government for preserving meadow birds. However it could be that difficulties 
in measuring effort of farmers to preserve meadow birds result in little incentives to put effort 
into management. The contract is in that case reduced to a form of income support to farmers. 
But even when the attributes of goods or services are known, the greater the variability of 
measurement surrounding the true value, the less the information about the commodity. In 
practice, various methods are applied to lower measurement costs like product warranties and 
share contracts (Furubotn and Richter, 1997: 293). 
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3.4 Contractual arrangements and contracts for wildlife and landscape management 
Following transaction cost economics, three key dimensions are involved in a transaction: asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency (cf. Williamson, 1985: 52; Williamson, 1996: 45; cf. 
Menard, 1996: 173; cf. Williamson, 1998: 36). Within transaction cost economics it is assumed 
that transaction costs are linked directly to these dimensions (cf. Saussier, 2000a: 381). Asset 
specificity refers to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses, and by 
alternative users, without sacrifice of productive value (cf. Williamson, 1996: 105). The basic 
logic is that higher levels of uncertainty and higher degrees of asset specificity, particularly when 
they occur in combination, result in a more complex contracting environment and a greater need 
for adjustments after the relationship has begun and commitments have been made (Holmstrom 
and Roberts, 1998: 76). A hierarchical relationship is presumed to make resolving potential 
disputes easier than does a market relationship. The frequency of a transaction matters because 
the more often a transaction takes place, the more widely are spread (over different transactions) 
the fixed transaction costs of establishing a non-market governance system. 
Williamson (1983: 526) distinguishes several types of asset specificity. However Joskow 
(1987: 170), following a suggestion of Tirole, believes that the identified types of asset 
specificity are simply different instances of the same phenomenon. These different types of asset 
specificity give insight into the dimensions of asset specificity. In his later work Williamson 
distinguishes six different types of asset specificity: (1) site specificity; (2) physical asset 
specificity; (3) human asset specificity; (4) dedicated assets; (5) brand name capital and (6) 
temporal specificity (Williamson, 1996: 59-60). The following types of asset specificity are 
relevant in transactions for wildlife and landscape management: 
1. Site specificity 
Site specificity refers to an asset that becomes committed to a particular use owing 
to its location. Investments are valuable on a specific location and cannot be 
moved to another location. Once the investment is sited the assets in question are 
highly immobile (cf. Joskow, 1987: 170). Valuable areas for wildlife and 
landscape are immobile and local (i.e. tied to a particular area). Investments that 
increase the value of wildlife and landscape are site specific investments. 
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2. Physical asset specificity 
Specific physical investments are investments that have a narrowly defined 
purpose. Investments in equipment or in machinery used for wildlife and 
landscape management can be narrowly defined and are sunk investments. An 
example is the special equipment used to protect the nests of meadow birds. 
3. Human asset specificity 
Human asset specificity arises in a learning-by-doing process (cf. Williamson, 
1996: 105). Attending courses for wildlife and landscape management and gaining 
experience in wildlife and landscape management are examples of human specific 
investments. 
4. Dedicated assets 
Dedicated assets are investments in the general production capacity for a special 
customer; these investments have no special purpose. Dedicated assets are those 
that are put in place contingent upon particular supply agreements and, should 
such contracts be prematurely terminated, would result in significant excess 
capacity (cf. Williamson, 1996: 129). An example of dedicated assets is 
investment in extra farmland that is needed for wildlife and landscape 
management. 
Contingent on the set of transactions to be effected, the basic proposition following from 
transaction costs economics is that institutional arrangements differ in their capacities to respond 
effectively to uncertainties (cf. Williamson, 1985: 56). In the case of non-specific investments, 
uncertainty has little effect. There is potential maladaptation in reaction to disturbances. Greater 
uncertainty could take either of two forms (Williamson, 1996: 116). One is that the probability 
distribution of disturbances remains unchanged but that more numerous disturbances occur. The 
other is that disturbances become more consequential (due, for example, to an increase in the 
variance). Uncertainty of a strategic kind is attributable to opportunism and Williamson (1985: 
58) refers to this kind of uncertainty as behavioural uncertainty. Examples of uncertainties with 
respect to wildlife and landscape management are weather conditions. 
The third dimension, frequency, involves the repetition of the same transaction. The 
frequency of a transaction can be recurrent, occasional or once time (cf. Williamson, 1985: 72). 
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The frequency of repeated dealing is important, both because it is repetition which generates 
transaction specific knowledge and because infrequent dealing would not warrant the 
development of an expensive institutional arrangements (cf. Ricketts, 2002: 49). The costs of 
specialised institutional arrangements are easier to recover for large transactions of a recurring 
kind (cf. Williamson, 1985: 60). Recurrent transactions make possible a reputation mechanism in 
case of specific investments. Reputation serves as a safeguard against ex post opportunism. With 
respect to determining the frequency of service delivery it is important to know when a service 
transaction is completed. A wildlife and landscape management transaction is assumed to be 
completed if the objectives of the transaction are met or the management prescriptions within the 
contract are fulfilled. The objectives or management prescriptions depend on natural seasons and 
are for every year of the contracting period the same. 
Several types of transactions for wildlife and landscape management by farmers can be 
distinguished. These transactions differ in the following dimensions: asset specificity, frequency, 
and uncertainty. With help of these dimensions the following transaction types for wildlife and 
landscape management are defined: 
1. Wildlife and landscape preservation transactions 
Farmers preserve natural "handicaps" by refraining from activities that change the 
attributes of the land. Examples of attributes that are preserved are soil structure, 
form of parcels, and ground or ditch water level. However, location specificity is 
important although this does not require (new) investments, attributes that are 
preserved should be available. The loss in investment opportunities to transform 
the attributes of land means a transaction specific investment. There may be a cost 
or benefit to delaying investments (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994: 8). Uncertainty for 
the farmer is low because the task to perform is clear. The frequency of the 
transaction is recurrent and once a year. 
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2. Wildlife and landscape development transactions 
Wildlife and landscape development means above all that the existing attributes of 
land are preserved. This is similar to the transaction type "wildlife and landscape 
preservation" (transaction 1), but beyond that management is carried out that is 
thought to develop meadow bird populations and plant species. The most 
important characteristic of development transactions is that farmers must eschew 
certain land use practices, and land use is restricted. These transactions are quite 
diverse in terms of wildlife and landscape management prescriptions: certain 
management activities are modified (e.g. cutting grass or livestock grazing are 
postponed), others eliminated (e.g. fertilising, scarifying). 
Relevant existing examples of management transactions are transaction-
types that center on the delay of the first cut of grass until a predetermined date. 
These transactions give meadow birds the opportunity to settle, lay and sit eggs, to 
sit on the eggs, and to raise their young. The loss of eggs or young due to grass-
cutting or trampling by cows will be restricted or prevented by these contracts. 
These reproduction-period contracts are combined with restrictions on agricultural 
activities in spring (no ploughing, use of rotary cultivator, or sowing; almost no 
use of pesticides) and can be extended with optional restrictions or provisions, as 
in the allowance for use of a certain amount of straw manure. 
Reproduction-period transactions have a large impact on farm management 
in total and not only on the farmland under contract (Haan et al., 1995: 67 and 
Vellinga and Verburg, 1999: 1). The first-cut grass from land under a management 
agreement has a low energy and protein content in comparison to the other 
roughage on the farm. This grass (hay) is fed to dry cows, heifers and calves (in 
this sequence, Haan et al. 1995: 8). In general, there is no market for hay from 
land with a delayed first cut (Haan et al., 1995: 62). The possible area of grassland 
with management agreements on a dairy farm is in practice limited. Haan et al. 
(1996: 23) calculate that at certain levels of milk quotum per hectare, the amount 
of management agreements that can fit in varies between 0 and 50% off the total 
area of grassland. 
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When a transaction is carried out, the dry matter content of the first cut does 
not change. However, it does have an effect on the size of the first cut. The longer 
the reproduction period of birds, the lower the grass amount of the other cuts. Due 
to this transaction extra hay from this land becomes available for the farm. The 
longer the reproduction period, the more hay comes available. Because of the 
changing roughage production on the farm it will be necessary to buy roughage 
and feed concentrate. The longer the reproduction period the more roughage and 
concentrate feed have to be bought. 
Wildlife and landscape development transactions lead to changes in type of 
land-use that change the quality of farmland and therefore mean site-specific 
investments. These investments cannot be moved to another location. Human asset 
specificity is relevant because knowledge is needed to manage wildlife and 
landscape. There degree of uncertainty for the farmer is low because this kind of 
transaction is clear and easy to monitor. The frequency of the transaction is 
recurrent and often once a year. 
3. Maintenance of wildlife and landscape transactions 
Under maintenance transactions, farmers are obliged to maintain, specifically, one 
or more 'wildlife and landscape elements', such as hawthorn hedges, windbreaks, 
pollard trees, or ponds. Site specificity is important because the investments are 
located in a certain area, although alternatives are available. Further, physical 
specificity is relevant because special equipment for maintenance is needed. 
Human specificity is also relevant because maintenance requires special skills. 
Uncertainty is moderate, given the influence of natural conditions on the task to 
perform. Frequency of the transaction is recurrent and once or a few times a year. 
4. Products delivered 
The reward for 'nature production' depends on the results, i.e. on the 'products 
delivered': for example, a payment per clutch of eggs of a certain rare meadow 
bird species, or a payment proportional to the number of rare plant species found 
in a field. The farmer is partly or completely free in the choice of wildlife and 
landscape management. Hence, he can choose a type of management that fits his 
circumstances best. This means that payments for products delivered is more than 
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a change of incentives compared to management contracts. Site specificity is 
important because investments are needed to create better circumstances for 
species, with the expectation of a larger variety of species or more animals per 
species. Physical asset specificity is relevant because special equipment is used for 
this kind of transaction, like equipment to protect birds from grazing cows. Human 
asset specificity, compared to the other transactions, is much more important 
because knowledge about species and their behaviour is required. The frequency 
of a transaction is recurrent and often a few times a year. Uncertainty in these 
transactions is relatively higher compared to the management and maintenance 
transactions because the results partly depend more on ecological factors, over 
which control is incomplete. 
Combinations of these transactions within one transaction are possible. This means a complex 
combination of management transactions, maintenance transactions and transactions based on 
product delivered, within one transaction. It is not presumed that the list of transactions is 
complete; however relevant categories of possible transactions are given. Table 3.1 summarises 
the transactions with respect to the characteristics of the transaction. 
Table 3.1: The characteristics of wildlife and landscape management transactions 
Transaction Characteristics of transaction 
Asset specificity Uncertainty Frequency 
Preservation present, but low low Recurrent, once a i year 
Development moderate low Recurrent, once a i year 
Maintenance high low Recurrent, few times a year 
Products delivered high high Recurrent, few times a year 
The selection of an appropriate institutional arrangement from a transaction costs economics 
point of view is based on asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of the transaction. 
Characteristics of wildlife and landscape management transactions are given in Table 3.1. 
Preservation transactions or simple maintenance transactions could be governed by market 
arrangements because of their low degree of asset specificity. However, location specificity 
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relevant for both parties is present. Therefore, hybrid contracts governing these transactions are 
expected with a neo-classical contract. 
For management transactions like 'grassland bird management' the degree of asset 
specificity (site, physical and human) is much higher compared to preservation transactions. 
Frequency and uncertainty are relatively low. Hybrid institutional arrangements can be expected. 
For transactions based on products delivered the degree of asset specificity, based on site, 
physical and human specificity is higher. Uncertainty for these contracts is much higher 
compared to the management transactions. Also here hybrid institutional arrangements can be 
expected. Institutional arrangements in the form of hybrid arrangements go hand in hand with 
contracts that are both significantly incomplete (to facilitate efficient co-ordination of 
interdependent assets in an uncertain environment) and highly complex (because of the autonomy 
of the property rights among partners). 
Many environmental co-operatives have an agreement with the government to achieve 
certain targets, and agreements with individual farmers to carry out tasks. The type of 
institutional arrangement varies among and within the co-operatives. Some institutional 
arrangements focus on individual plots of land or individual farms, while other institutional 
arrangements focus more on common property resources like landscape and watershed 
management. These contracts can be characterised as combinations of the transactions in Table 
3.1. Therefore it is expected that these contracts be governed by hybrid institutional 
arrangements. 
In the preceding chapter (Table 2.2) four key elements for contracts are derived: (1) 
Relevance of the identity of parties; (2) Contract duration: discrete exchange or indeterminate 
duration; (3) Degree of completeness; and (4) Enforcement procedures. These key elements are 
discussed with the objective of being able to characterising the contract type for wildlife and 
landscape management contracts. The identity of the parties is relevant to wildlife and landscape 
management contracts. In the first place, a contract is often tied to a specific location that is 
owned or leased by a farmer. Second, the person of the farmer is important for those types of 
contracts that build on learning by doing. Also the willingness of farmers to conclude contracts 
makes the identity of the farmer relevant. The duration of the contract is in general moderate. A 
contract of 5 or 6 years is common. The contracts are incomplete. Not all possible contingencies 
are in the contract. The written documentation is important because it gives the basis of the 
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transaction. Norms and values are less important in relations with the government than in 
contracts between individual farmers and environmental co-operatives. Finally, enforcement 
procedures are formal. The regulation contains special procedures for situations in which the 
parties to the contract do not fulfil the terms of the contract Additionally, a special committee is 
set up to deal with conflicts. 
Figure 3.1 illustrated the diversity and complexity of the relationships for managing 
wildlife and landscape. Looking at the characteristics of the contract, most contracts for wildlife 
and landscape management are neo-classical contracts. 
3.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter is concerned with identifying an appropriate institutional arrangement for wildlife 
and landscape management transactions between contractors like government, large wildlife and 
landscape management organisations and individual farmers. The framework (Figure 3.1) in this 
chapter illustrates the complexity of the relations between environmental co-operatives, 
governmental agencies, and individual farmers. These institutional arrangements are determined 
by the individuals and groups, the institutional environment, and by resource allocation and 
employment. In their turn these institutional arrangements influence individuals and groups, the 
institutional environment, and resource allocation and employment. Measurement problems pose 
a problem to wildlife and landscape management contracting. The cost of measuring wildlife and 
landscape management means that incomplete contracts will be signed and that the wants of 
contractors like the government cannot be fully specified. 
From New Institutional Economics and the attributes of wildlife and landscape 
management it follows that hybrid arrangements for combining agriculture and wildlife and 
landscape management, can be expected. The market, with prices as the only co-ordination 
mechanism, will fail due to the attributes of wildlife and landscape management. Due to the 
relation between institutional arrangements and contracts it follows that the contract is a neo-
classical contract. This means that the asset specificity is high enough to create mutual 
dependency among the contracting partners. Contracts will be incomplete and adjustments to 
contracts are important, as is the duration of the contracts. Other means of co-ordination are 
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necessary besides prices and hierarchy. Because of incompleteness, disputes will be frequent and 
are less likely to be solved by formal procedures. 
With hybrid arrangements there are many possible mechanisms that all belong to the 
family of hybrid arrangements. This makes it necessary to extend the analysis of contractual 
arrangements for managing wildlife and landscape and to fill in the gaps in the design of hybrid 
arrangements and neo-classical contracts. The remaining part of this thesis focuses on different 
aspects of contract design. 
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Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The traditional methodology of mainstream economics consists of rules for good scientific 
research with a view to theory appraisal. These rules act as means of demarcating science from 
non-science, as well as providing economists with the criteria by which to recognise the best 
theory. Further, these rules require that theories be tested against the facts; the traditional 
methodology literature consists of debate about the nature and role of the rules for testing (Dow, 
1997: 75). However, "No one methodology can elicit all the complexity, heterogeneity, and 
kaleidoscope of the economy. (...) Individual economists have the opportunity, even the 
authority, to pursue economics as they see it" (Medema and Samuels, 1996: 3). The search for 
independent standards for economic theorising continues, even though some researches accept 
the possibility that there may not be just one set of standards for all economics (cf. Dow, 1997: 
78). The current literature on theory appraisal in economics and economic methodology in 
general is quite eclectic. This means that one focuses on the methodology economists practice, 
making use of whatever tools philosophers of science have had to offer that appear to be well-
made and apt for the job (Hausman, 1989: 125). This is comparable to the view of Varian, that 
the methodological promise of dentistry and economics is similar - we value what is useful (cf. 
1996: 238). Dow observes that most of the work in methodology over the last ten years has 
consisted of methodological analysis of what economists do and how they argue. The current 
state of mainstream economic methodology in general reflects a polarisation of positions on the 
role of methodology: it either prescribes what good science should be, or it describes the 
methodology implicit in economic theorising (cf. Dow, 1997: 78-80). 
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Paying attention to methodological issues is relevant for this thesis because several theories 
and methods are combined within one research project. In this thesis, methodology is not used in 
the sense of prescribing good science because this seems not (yet) possible, however, the 
methodology applied is described on the basis of the research process of the project. 
Section 4.2 starts with an overview of the research process of the whole project. Within the 
research process the main theoretical orientation was an important guide. The sources of primary 
data were two mail surveys: (1) a survey among individual farmers on contractual arrangements 
for wildlife and landscape management; and (2) a survey among environmental co-operatives in 
the Netherlands. Section 4.3 discusses the evaluation of mail surveys in general terms. The first 
reason for addressing both surveys in this chapter is to discuss their evaluation in a coherent way. 
A second reason is that the evaluation in this chapter makes it unnecessary to discuss the same 
issues concerning the surveys every time the results are used. The contractual arrangement 
survey is discussed in Section 4.4 in more detail. Section 4.5 evaluates the survey among 
environmental co-operatives. This chapter ends with conclusions and a summary in Section 4.6 
4.2 Research process 
As addressed in the introduction to this chapter, the analysis of wildlife and landscape 
management in the agricultural sector was split into two main empirical areas: 
1. Contractual arrangements for wildlife and landscape management between 
individual farmers and the government or large private wildlife and landscape 
preservation organisations (private contractors); 
2. The role of environmental co-operatives in managing wildlife and landscape in 
agricultural areas. 
Contractual arrangements between individual farmers and the government or private contractors 
were analysed to get insight in the decision to contract and the design of contracts. Research on 
environmental co-operatives was conducted to gain insight into the way groups of farmers 
organise and govern themselves for managing wildlife and landscape collectively. The research 
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process of the project - developed for analysing both empirical objects - is described in Figure 
4.1. 
Stage 1: 
The development of an initial conceptual 
framework for an institutional economics analysis 
i 
r 
i 
Stage 2: Analysis of empirical objects 
Contractual arrangements Environmental co-operatives 
between contractors and 
individual farmers 
Stage 3: final analysis 
Figure 4.1: Outline of research process 
The research project started with the development of an initial conceptual framework for 
analysing institutional arrangements. During the research project the initial framework was 
adapted, extended and revised. The main theoretical orientation for the conceptual framework 
and the thesis is New Institutional Economics. The choice for New Institutional Economics is 
justified because the topic of research is to analyse of different institutional arrangements for 
wildlife and landscape management. Consistent with New Institutional Economics this study 
focused on transactions and the way these transactions are governed within institutional 
arrangements. Neo-classical production theory is a minor building block in of this thesis. Within 
the neo-classical framework several standard assumptions are made that conflict with New 
Institutional Economics, such as the rationality of choice makers or the underlying determinism. 
However, the approach can be justified by its focus on the way the technology influences the 
decision to transact within given institutional arrangements. In fact the basic determinant of the 
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form of exchange is the choice of structure which reduces most combined transaction and 
production costs (cf. North, 1986:231 and cf. Saussier, 2000a: 381; cf. Williamson, 1985: 61). 
The objective of the second stage of the research process (Figure 2.1) was to elaborate 
further the initial framework and to apply and extend the framework to these two empirical 
objects: 
1. Contractual arrangements; 
2. Environmental co-operatives. 
The research process in the second stage consisted of four steps for both empirical objects: 
1. Adaptation and refinement of initial conceptual model 
2. Refinement of research methods; 
3. Data collection and processing; 
4. Analysis of results and conclusions. 
The main method applied in this thesis is a "literary approach" (see e.g. De Alessi, 1990:11-13 
and Furubotn and Richter, 1990: 1) combined with statistical methods using data from mail 
surveys. A literary approach is based on theory and makes use of close reasoning. Scholars using 
the literary or verbal approach tend to incorporate substantial descriptive detail into their analyses 
of organisational or institutional problems (Furubotn and Richter, 1990: 1). A less formal 
approach is consistent with a large part of the research tradition in New Institutional Economics 
(e.g. Whinston, 2001: 184; Williamson, 2000b: 49; Menard, 2001: 87). Much of New 
Institutional Economics uses close reasoning; but much of it has also so far resisted 'full 
formalisation' (Williamson, 2000b: 49). When it comes to the analysis of the global rules 
underlying the organisation of transactions, there are almost no mathematical models, although 
rigorous frameworks of analysis exist on which predictions can be based and measurements 
developed (Menard, 2001: 87). This is both a benefit and a cost (Williamson, 2000b: 49). 
The benefit of a literary approach is that New Institutional Economics has never lost 
contact with real phenomena. The costs are of two kinds: New Institutional Economics is more 
difficult to teach; and logical lapses and/or extensions go undetected in the application of less 
formal analysis (cf. Williamson, 2000b: 49). However, a literary presentation that is worked out 
carefully and precisely, or that relies on a suitably formal derivation already found in the 
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literature can be as rigorous as the circumstances demand (cf. de Alessi, 1990: 12). A more 
formal presentation does not mean that the analysis is necessarily more rigorous. The relative 
usefulness of the literary and the formal approaches depend, in part, on the problem at hand and 
the audience (cf. de Alessi, 1990: 13 and Furubotn and Richter, 1990: 3). Moreover, Furubotn 
and Richter (1990: 3) state that there is reason to believe that different methodological 
approaches can be mutually supportive. This thesis attempts to incorporate the results of 
approaches using more formal reasoning. 
For the analysis of contractual arrangements a literary approach combined with data from a 
mail survey was useful for several reasons. The first reason was that at the moment the research 
process started, little was known about these contractual arrangements from a transaction point of 
view. Mainly, the number of farmers involved, the area and location under contract were known. 
The main determinants of transaction had to be investigated; these are often however difficult to 
measure. A second reason was that the available formal models are often very abstract and 
depend on many strict assumptions. 
Adapting the conceptual framework to the arrangement of environmental co-operatives 
lead to a literary approach combined with a mail survey mainly for three reasons. The first reason 
was related to measurement problems of the attributes of environmental co-operatives, which 
have may attributes making their governance structure complicated to model mathematically in 
full detail. The second reason was that there were no primary data sources available that could 
provide insight into the diversity of environmental co-operatives on a large scale. Most sources 
available were studies based on a small number of cases and there were almost no studies 
focussing on similarities and/or differences between environmental co-operatives. A third reason 
was that specific kind of data requirements for a New Institutional Economics approach made it 
difficult to use existing sources. Existing sources often neglect institutional aspects of 
governance structures. 
A second method was a Tobit model concerning the decision to contract by individual 
farmers. The third method of research for analysing contractual arrangements was a formal model 
consisting of supply and demand equations for inputs and outputs based on a neo-classical 
production theory and especially its dual form (e.g. profit function) framework. The application 
of static duality theory under price certainty is well developed in the literature (e.g. Boots, 1999, 
Chambers, 1988: 281; Oude Lansink, 1997, and Thyssen, 1992). The purpose of the modelling 
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work was to determine the consequences of the possibility of concluding contracts for wildlife 
and landscape management. The availability of a panel data source, provided by LEI, allowed us 
to identify dairy farmers' behaviour at the micro level and to check theoretical assumptions. 
Econometric techniques to analyse panel data were used. Further, a simulation model was used to 
simulate the co-operation of farmers in contracting for wildlife and landscape management. The 
simulations were used to analyse the potential effects on profit and the use of inputs resulting 
from wildlife and landscape management. 
The final stage of the research project was an analysis integrating the theoretically 
structured insights regarding the research questions raised in the subsequent chapters. The major 
conclusions of the total research project were drawn in this phase of the project. 
4.3 Surveys as a tool for analysing institutional arrangements 
One of the main tools used in this thesis is the mail survey. In general, questionnaire surveys 
gather 'facts' like prices, quantities of goods bought, incomes, revenues and so forth. Surveys are 
often conducted by a national statistics agency or may be specially designed by an investigator to 
address a particular question1. One of the main uses of surveys is 'Confronting theory with 
evidence": theory testing and 'anomaly generation'. For many of the issues relevant to the 
management of wildlife and landscape there does not exist a market. In contrast to revealed 
preference data, stated preference data involves choices by economic agents evoked in 
hypothetical markets (cf. Hensher et al., 1999: 198). For instance, questions on the reasons and 
motives for the foundation of co-operatives indicated that were no revealed preferences available. 
The surveys in this thesis were mainly applied to the methodological use of measurement 
(Boulier and Goldfarb, 1998: 11). This means measurement of facts of economic life (e.g. the 
number of farmers involved in wildlife and landscape management). Much of what applied 
economists do is measure things, including often exquisitely fine parameters said to stem from 
In general economists do not like using questionnaire surveys as a basis for doing empirical work (cf. McCloskey, 
1983:514 and cf. Carson etal., 1999: 1). Economists are trained to study behaviour by watching what people do 
(usually in markets), not by listening to what they say (Blinder, 1991: 90). In other words: economists have a 
strong bias in favour of estimates that are inferred from observed action, the revealed preference paradigm, as 
opposed to the stated preferences (Carson, et al., 2000: 5). 
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some maximising model. Measurement plays an important role with respect to transactions and 
therefore in the New Institutional Economics. However, measurement is not an easy task: 
researchers are confronted with measurement problems similar to those of contracting parties. 
The problems and costs of measurement pervade and significantly affect all economics 
transactions (Barzel, 1982: 48). The surveys had to deal with all kinds of measurement 
problems. 
In order to develop useful survey questions good prior information was needed. Prior 
knowledge about the wildlife and landscape management by farmers was collected from multiple 
sources including annual reports, journal articles (secondary sources), farm accountancy data 
(primary source), contract data (primary source), and discussions with experts (secondary 
source). Secondary sources were also used either to add or check information. However, it 
should be kept in mind that lack of prior information and secondary sources are among the 
reasons for conducting surveys in the first place. 
Although there is no explicit method for developing a survey and questionnaire in 
general, design is important for data quality (for survey design see: Churchill, 1999: 329; 
Dillman, 1991:233; Korzilius, 2000: 16). Questionnaires are often not developed step by step but 
rather involve some iteration and looping (cf. Churchill, 1999: 329 and Korzilius: 2000: 17). The 
approach applied in designing the questionnaires followed Churchill (1999: 329), which implies 
that successive steps were taken in developing the surveys. Evaluation of the mail surveys in this 
thesis involved the following considerations (see also Dillman, 2000: 11): 
1. Sampling error (Churchill, 1999: 572; Dillman, 1991:227); 
2. Non-sampling error (Churchill, 1999: 604); 
a) Validity (Churchill, 1999: 452; Korzilius, 2000: 25) or measurement error 
(Dillman, 1991:228); 
b) Non-observation; 
• Non-coverage error; 
• Non-response error. 
Sampling errors (Churchill, 1999: 572) refers to the variability in response. The sampling error is 
the difference between observed values of a variable and the long-run averages of the observed 
values in repetitions of measurement. Sampling errors result from heterogeneity of the survey 
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measures among members of the population. It is attributable to the fact that certain members of 
the population are deliberately excluded by selection of members for which responses are 
obtained (Dillman, 1991: 227). Sampling error is usually reduced by the simple expedient of 
increasing the sample size. Questions about the representatives of interview samples are relevant 
for all data users - also for economists who use data without caring about the source of the data. 
Validity or measurement error is the first of the non-sampling errors to be discussed. 
Validity refers to whether survey respondents are answering the question the interviewer is trying 
to ask. Validity has two aspects: truthful answers and thoughtful answers. Measurement error 
refers to the discrepancy between underlying, unobserved variables (whether opinions, 
behaviours, or attributes) and the observed survey responses (Dillman, 1991: 228). Measurement 
error results from the process of observation. Measurement error may result from the respondent 
characteristics (e.g. their inability to provide accurate information or some motivation - for 
giving inaccurate information) or characteristics of the question or the questionnaire. If 
respondents have reasons to conceal the truth or mislead the interviewer, this objection limits the 
usefulness of interviews. However as long as people are not pathological liars, interviews may 
elicit useful information (Blinder, 1991: 90). This problem of truthful answering is also 
emphasised by Carson et al. (1999) by raising the following question with respect to surveys: 
what are the strategic incentives and how should they influence responses? The following types 
of surveys can be distinguished (cf. Carson et al. 1999: 3): 
A Consequential 
If the survey results are seen by the interviewee as potentially influencing actions 
of a business or government, and the agent cares about the outcome of that action, 
then the interviewee should treat the survey question as an opportunity to 
influence those actions. In the case of a consequential survey question, economic 
theory applies and the response to the question should be interpretable using 
mechanism design theory concerning incentive structures. 
2. Inconsequential 
If the survey responses are not seen as having any influence on the decision of a 
business or government, or the interviewee is indifferent to all possible outcomes 
of the agency decisions, then all possible responses by the interviewee will be 
perceived as having the same influence on the final outcome. In the case of an 
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inconsequential survey question, economic theory makes no predictions about the 
nature of the responses to the survey given by the interviewee. 
The survey on contractual arrangements and the survey on environmental co-operatives are 
assumed to be inconsequential surveys because it is not likely that the interviewee considers the 
answers to both surveys to have influence on the decisions of the government. This implied that 
only minor attention was paid to incentive structure following our survey. Further, Blinder 
(1991) argues that the problem of thoughtful answers is more severe than the problem of truthful 
answers. Blinder (e.g. 1991: 91) believes that more pointed questions, posed in plain "English" 
(for this thesis Dutch), can elicit useful answers. 
Two different non-observation errors are distinguished: non-coverage and non-response. 
Non-coverage errors arise because some members of the population are not covered by the 
sampling frame and therefore have no chance of being selected for the sample (Dillman, 1991: 
227). For some research areas it is difficult to find an up-to-date listing of the population. For 
instance, it is difficult to find a list containing all farmers involved in wildlife and landscape 
management. Non-coverage is an important point of attention when judging surveys. 
Non-response error is one of the well known problems of surveys. Non-response error 
stems from the fact that some of the members of the sample population do not respond to the 
survey questions (Dillman, 1991: 228). A lot of research on improving mail surveys has focused 
on response rates. However, a low response rate does not necessarily entail non-response error, 
i.e. a discrepancy between the frequency of a population characteristic and that estimated by the 
survey that occurs because some people did not respond. Those who respond to a survey may not 
differ in any measurable way from those who do not respond. However the general assumption is 
that the higher the response rate the lower the potential non-response error and therefore the 
better the survey (Dillman, 1991: 229). Many procedures and techniques are available to increase 
response rates; e.g. financial incentive, material incentives, follow-up reminder, questionnaire 
design, etc. 
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4.4 The contractual arrangement survey 
This section deals with the survey among individual farmers in the Netherlands in 2001. The 
farmers in the sample concluded contracts with the government or environmental co-operatives 
for wildlife and landscape management in 1999. The survey was carried out among farmers in the 
Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) of the Agricultural Economics Institute (LEI) in the 
Netherlands. Only farmers were selected who were in the FADN-system in 1999. The reason for 
using this procedure was that a FADN-system change in 2000 resulted in a discontinuity in farm 
data. A second reason for surveying these farmers was that the regulation on wildlife and 
landscape management changed in 2000, which meant that 1999 was the last year of the old 
system of wildlife and landscape management contracting. Contracts concluded before 2000 were 
still running in 2001, hence the questions raised in 2001 were still relevant and farmers were still 
familiar with the system of contracting. Finally, in terms of contract design it is less important to 
be able to aggregate for the whole population of farmers managing wildlife and landscape in the 
Netherlands. For reasons of potential sampling errors it would have been better to have a large 
sample. But a larger sample would have been at the cost of having less information about each 
farm because a general survey among farms contracting for wildlife and landscape would have 
been necessary. This trade-off resulted in the choice of the relatively small sample and more 
available information, at cost of more precise answers. 
In 2001, 32 farms were available for a survey. This is a rather small number of farms 
(potential non-coverage error), did not contribute the reliability of the answers for the total 
population of farmers managing wildlife and landscape. However, a number of reasons justified 
the decision to survey these farmers. First, a lot of information on economic variables was 
already available for these farms in the FADN, ranging from the number of animals to investment 
data. Measuring these variables in a survey would have meant a large investment. Further, it was 
not needed to ask questions for classifying the farmers. Beyond this, with help of the FADN it 
was still possible to compare farms participating in wildlife and landscape management and those 
which were not. The second argument is that the governmental agency responsible for 
administering and monitoring wildlife and landscape management contracts (DLG) allowed us to 
retrieve the contract data for the farmers involved. 
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The survey was carried out the period July 2001 - September 2001. Professional 
interviewers personally interviewed individual farmers. The survey was discussed and analysed 
by interviewers in order to avoid their misunderstanding the questions to be asked. After a 
positive assessment by experts in the field of wildlife and landscape management contracting, the 
questionnaire was tested. All the planned surveys were conducted. Hence, non-response errors 
were not a major problem. 
In order to increase the validity a highly structured questionnaire was used. The survey 
consisted of three major parts: a general part, a specific part on wildlife and landscape 
management at the farm level, and a specific part on wildlife and landscape management 
contracting. These three parts consisted of questions that logically belonged together. The first 
part contained questions on the opinions of farmers on wildlife and landscape management, 
characteristics of the farmland parcels, and questions about risk and risk strategies. The first 
questions on wildlife and landscape management in the agricultural sector in general were meant 
to attract farmers' attention to the questionnaire. The second part, at the farm level, consisted of 
questions on labour input, investments, knowledge and education, and information. This part 
ended with a question on the risk attitude towards wildlife and landscape management. Part three 
consisted of questions on the specific types of wildlife and landscape management applied on a 
farm. 
These questions on risk attitude are based on Coble et al. (1999). The farmers were asked to 
rate the importance of sources of income risk in their farm decision making on Likert-type scales 
ranging from one (not important) to five (very important). Nine potential sources of risk were 
included in our survey. In order to analyse how farmers perceive risk of a changing compensation 
for wildlife and landscape management compared to other sources of risk. To analyse sources of 
income risk for income from wildlife and landscape management we asked farmers to rate the 
importance of sources of risk related to the financial compensation from wildlife and landscape 
management compensation. Farmers were asked to rate their attitude to source of risk on similar 
Likert-type scales. This question was asked because whether farmers perceive wildlife and 
landscape preservation as an alternative for other strategies to reduce income risk at farm level. 
Assessing answers as to truthfulness and thoughtfulness enhanced credibility. For the 
purpose of encouraging truthful answers the questionnaire was pre-tested among experts in the 
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field of wildlife and landscape management and individual farmers. The highly structured 
questionnaire prevented deviations from the central research concepts. 
The design was to a large extent descriptive. A descriptive research study is typically 
concerned with determining the frequency of events or the relationship between variables (cf. 
Churchill, 1999: 99). The reason for this design was the focus on measurement of elements of the 
contractual relation like the number of hours worked or the investments carried out Mainly 
multichotomous questions were used with often an "other" category for adding by the 
respondents alternatives that were not listed. This meant that the respondents were asked to 
choose the alternative most closely related to their position on the subject In order to avoid 
obtaining the "other" category as an answer - making the question useless - it was tried to use an 
exhaustive list of alternatives. When the answers for the other category indicated that the number 
of categories, was not sufficient these "other" answers were incorporated into the analysis. For a 
minor number of topics dichotomous questions were used. The reason for using multichotomous 
and dichotomous questions was that quantification of the results is easier. 
In a number of questions people were asked for their attitude towards contractual 
arrangements in general; risk attitude and strategies; and information availability. The approach 
was self-reporting, in which people are asked directly for their beliefs or feelings. For these 
questions an itemised rating scale was used (Churchill, 1999). The farmer had to select from five 
categories and labels were attached to the different categories ranging from totally unimportant to 
very important. An extra category was added for those cases in which farmers would had no 
opinion. 
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4.5 The environmental co-operative survey 
This section deals with the mail survey of environmental co-operatives in the Netherlands in 
1999. The survey was one of the first and most intensive surveys of environmental co-operatives. 
In the middle of 1999 the addresses of 81 environmental co-operatives were traced by using 
information from the government and farmers' organisations. Also according to the opinion of 
experts on environmental co-operatives this was the total number of environmental co-operatives 
in the Netherlands. By using several sources and by consulting experts the non-coverage error 
was reduced. Fourteen organisations were left out because they were being analysed by other 
researchers and/or at the moment of mailing had been recently visited. It was expected that these 
organisations would be biased in their answers due to a the recent survey and to their greater 
informational bias, since they were taking part in a research project. Of these 14 organisations 6 
were randomly drawn from the total number of environmental co-operatives2. Eight organisations 
were taking part in a governmental experimental program on environmental co-operatives. 
However, looking at the organisation forms, year of formal foundation, and number of members 
no indication was found that the eight organisations biased our results. Ultimately, the mailing 
list consisted of 67 environmental co-operatives managing wildlife and landscape. All these 
organisations were mailed to; hence no sample was used of these 67 organisations. 
The survey was sent to the environmental co-operatives at the beginning of April 1999. 
A small financial compensation was paid for the farmers' time filling out the questionnaire. 
Further, two (follow-up) letters were sent in order to try to improve the response rates. A first 
letter to remind the organisations of the questionnaire was sent at the end April 1999. A second 
reminder was sent in mid-May 1999. When looking at the organisations mailed to, the response-
rate was 61 % (number of completed interviews with responding units/number of mailed 
organisations mailed to). The non-response can be partly be explained by the following factors: 
1. A number of addresses proved not to be correct (10%); 
2. Some associations replied that their organisation was not really active, so that they 
were not able to fill in the questionnaire (5%). 
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No indication was found that the sample was not a random and representative sample of 
the whole population due to these two factors. Mailing all environmental co-operatives reduced 
sampling errors. This was manageable due to the fact that the number of co-operatives was rather 
small (81 organisations). This meant that it was impossible to make a judgement about an 
appropriate sample size. 
The design of the survey was to a large extent descriptive. A descriptive research study is 
typically concerned with determining the frequency with which something occurs, or the 
relationship between two variables (Churchill, 1999: 99). Further, the survey can be characterised 
as a cross-section. The reason for this design was that there were no good alternative primary 
sources available giving characteristics of these organisations, the number of people involved, the 
way they are organised, etc. 
The survey contained several sections addressing different topics. The questions within 
the topics were chosen in such a way that the topic formed a logical group of questions. The 
survey started with questions on reasons for starting and its objectives, based on the explanations 
from New Institutional Economics. These questions were formulated in such a way that they 
were easily understandable as well as interesting for the farmers because they could tell about 
what they do. The next category of questions was general economic indicators: the organisational 
structure and activities of the environmental co-operative. These questions at the beginning of 
the questionnaire because they were an essential objective of the survey because this type of 
information was not known before. The questionnaire continued with questions on the motivation 
of the members and the help that the organisation gets from external sources. These questions 
were meant to give more insight into organisational problems. To examine the activities and 
contractual arrangements questions on monitoring and sanctions were asked. Since financial 
resources are important questions were asked about the funding of the organisation and its 
activities. Finally the organisations were asked about their co-operation with the government and 
other organisations and how they see their own role in relation to their members and the 
government. 
To measure all kinds of characteristics of environmental co-operatives mainly 
multichotomous questions were used (Churchill, 1999: 342-349). These close-ended answers 
increase the comparability of the answers. An open-ended "other" category was included for the 
respondents' own alternatives that were not listed. This means that the respondents were asked to 
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choose the alternative most closely related to their position on the subject. In order to avoid 
obtaining the "other" category as the answer (making a question useless) it was tried to provide 
an exhaustive list of alternatives. The answers to the "other" categories are mentioned in the 
results when significant. For a minor number of topics dichotomous questions were used 
(Churchill, 1999: 349-350). 
In four questions people were asked for their attitude toward specific elements of the 
environmental co-operative. The approach was self-reporting, in which people are asked directly 
about their beliefs or feelings regarding the reasons for founding the organisation, the importance 
of several activities and tasks, and the factors important for the success of the organisation. For 
these questions an itemised rating scale was used (Churchill, 1999: 404). The representative of 
the environmental co-operative had to select from 5 categories and labels were attached to the 
different categories ranging from totally not unimportant to very important 
4.6 Summary and conclusions 
This thesis focuses on land use in which agriculture is combined with managing wildlife and 
landscape. The objective of this thesis is to analyse the design of contractual arrangements for 
wildlife and landscape management by farmers. The methodology applied in the thesis is 
illustrated by the research process of the project. The research process consisted of three stages: 
(1) development of an initial theoretical framework and conceptual model for institutional 
analysis; (2) the analysis of empirical objects; (3) a final analysis. The empirical areas of this 
thesis were (1) a direct relation between individual farmers and public and/or private contractors 
and (2) an indirect relation between farmers and public and/or private contractors. An important 
method used in this thesis is a literary approach combined with statistical tools using data from 
mail surveys. The surveys were evaluated taking into account the sampling and non-sampling 
errors. Other methods were formal models concerning the decision to contract and the 
consequences of contracting at the farm level. 
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CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR WILDLIFE AND 
LANDSCAPE MANAGEMENT INVOLVING INDIVIDUAL 
FARMERS 

Chapter 5 
Wildlife and landscape management: individual contracting 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the design of contracts involving individual farmers is analysed. Contract design is 
the way the contract is set up: what incentives, degree of completeness, contract duration, etc. 
The existing literature on wildlife and landscape contracting focuses on factors explaining the 
decision to conclude contracts, e.g. Crabtree et al. (1998: 312); Beedel (2000: 120-121); Wenum 
(2002: 69); and Wynn et al. (2001: 78). These studies normally contain a single equation 
covering several aspects that are thought to be relevant to the decision to contract. They often 
focus more on characteristics of farms and farmers and less on institutional issues. This chapter 
addresses the decision to contract more from the perspective of institutional economics. 
The first question to be analysed is which institutional characteristics at the farm-level 
influence the decision to contract for wildlife and landscape management. Following transaction 
cost economics, this decision to conclude contracts depends on the following key dimensions of a 
transaction: asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency (see Section 3.4). If a contractual 
arrangement is not appropriate - given these key-elements - a transaction will not take place. In 
this chapter the focus is on asset specificity given the measurement problems concerning the 
other two dimensions for farms who do not manage wildlife and landscape. The main source for 
data used for this question is the Dutch Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). 
A second question examined in this chapter is how to characterise contractual arrangements 
for wildlife and landscape management. The actual choice for an institutional arrangement is 
analysed in more detail. Special attention is given to the complexity of the transaction and the 
sources of transaction costs. Data are used from a survey on wildlife and landscape management 
by farmers, combined with data from the FADN. 
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The questions are analysed separately because the fanners who do not sign contracts are 
relevant to the first question but not to the second. Section S.2 examines the decision to contract, 
as well as that of not to contract, on the part of farmers. The second question concerning actual 
transactions is analysed in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 discusses the empirical model and data for the 
decision to contract Sections 5.6 and 5.7 assess the results concerning both research questions. 
The chapter finishes with a summary and conclusions in Section 5.8. 
5.2 The decision to contract 
In the period before a contract is concluded the parties to the contract have no obligations to each 
other and are free to conclude a contract or not. Parties to a contractual arrangement will choose 
to contract if the expected gains from doing so are greater than those of organising the transaction 
in some other way (cf. Masten and Saussier, 2000: 2; Masten, 1996: 47). Besides the choice of an 
institutional arrangement (organisational mode) it needs to be decided whether a transaction 
should be carried out given the characteristics of the farm (technology mode). Technology and 
organisational modes ought to be treated symmetrically within modelling; they are decision 
variables whose values are determined simultaneously (cf. Williamson, 1985: 89). Chapter 6 
concentrates additionally on issues related to co-operation. 
The choice of concluding wildlife and landscape management contracts on a farm is a 
revealed preference that can be observed. However, alternative institutional arrangements that are 
not chosen are not observable, as are the transaction costs of alternative institutional 
arrangements. Thus, even if the transaction costs could be adequately measured, the costs that 
would occur if the same transaction were governed under an alternative arrangement cannot be 
observed (cf. Masten, 1996: 45). The same is true for farmers who did not choose managing 
wildlife and landscape: it is impossible to know what the transaction costs would be if they 
decided in favour of managing. Therefore the choice for managing wildlife and landscape has to 
be related to observable dimensions of a (potential) transaction. 
Analysing the decision to contract, it is focused on specific investments. Depending on the 
level of specific investments (or sunk costs) made by the different parties to institutional 
arrangements, parties are "locked in" to different degrees after concluding the contract. Specific 
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investments cannot easily be transferred to service alternative partners, so they are less valuable 
if the relationship is discontinued. Depending on the degree of asset specificity, the expropriation 
of the residual income of one party by another is quite conceivable. The question is whether the 
contractual safeguards protecting specific investments of farmers are large enough to protect 
these investments against potential ex post expropriation of the residual income. The same is 
relevant for governmental agencies, environmental co-operatives and others: protecting 
investments against expropriation of residual income by farmers. 
A transaction for wildlife and landscape management should involve less specific 
investments if the farm is already well-adapted to the transaction or when farmers have 
knowledge that makes them relatively better able to carry out the transaction. Following 
transaction costs economics, the benefits of a contracting arrangement are expected to increase 
with the value of relationship-specific investments. Higher levels of asset specificity make the 
market less attractive as institutional arrangement. This means that the design of a contractual 
arrangement should be tailored to the transaction of the government (or environmental co-
operative) and farmers want to conclude. 
Asset specificity is difficult to measure and proxy variables are often used in empirical 
research (cf. Shelanski and Klein, 1995: 338). The approach in this chapter tries to overcome this 
problem by using an alternative approach. Asset specificity for wildlife and landscape 
management are examined indirectly by using farm characteristics as explaining factor. These 
farm characteristics determine the need for specific investments when a farmer would conclude a 
contract It is assumed that variation in (potential) specific investments is related to variation in 
the need for adaptations in case of wildlife and landscape management given the farm 
characteristics. For farmers who are actually managing wildlife and landscape the farm 
characteristics are an indirect approximation of asset specificity. If wildlife and landscape 
management fits the farm characteristics few asset specific investments will be needed. 
A contract opportunity should be available to individual farmers willing to conclude 
contracts. In other words: a contracting partner is needed to set up an institutional arrangement 
for managing wildlife and landscape. Regions in which contracting opportunities are available 
can be called contracting regions. Governments or environmental co-operatives establish the 
locations and borders of these regions. Opportunities for contracting are created in regions by 
governmental agencies, environmental co-operatives, and or others such as provincial 
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administrations. Contracting regions are expected to be located in regions where the 
opportunities for wildlife and landscape management are better. However, there may also exist 
farmers with similar production circumstances but outside these regions, who can manage 
wildlife and landscape as well as farmers within them. A second aspect is time. Contracts can 
only be concluded when a contracting party has created the possibility. Before this point in time 
contracts for wildlife and landscape management concluded with the government or 
environmental co-operatives cannot be observed. In the course of time supply of wildlife and 
landscape management contracts should increase due to new possibilities opened by contracting 
parties. This means that wildlife and landscape management on farms is partly driven by the 
supply of contract possibilities. Time and region are taken into account in our empirical model. 
5.3 After a contract for wildlife and management has been concluded 
The objective of this section is to develop elements relevant for describing transactions. These 
elements are used to characterise wildlife and landscape management transactions. The following 
elements of wildlife and landscape management are examined in this chapter: 
1. incomplete institutional arrangements; 
2. specific investments for wildlife and landscape management; 
3. property rights to wildlife and landscape; 
4. uncertainty and risk; 
5. transaction costs. 
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Incomplete institutional arrangements 
Following the transaction costs approach, an incomplete contract will be concluded. According to 
Saussier (2000b: 192) in his definition of feasible completeness, one contract is more complete 
than another if it gives a more precise and complete definition of the transaction and of the means 
to carry it out. An upper limit can be imagined as the complete contract which specifies how to 
perform the transaction in every cconceivable case. The degree of incompleteness for wildlife 
and landscape contracts of a standard institutional design depends on the transaction at stake. In 
other words, for a simple transaction the same contract design is more complete than for a more 
complex transaction. 
Incomplete contracting will lead to benefits and costs. Writing and accepting incomplete 
contracts means that the costs and benefits are equal at the margin. There is a trade-off between 
the marginal cost of writing a more complete contract, and writing a more incomplete contract. 
The advantages for the government or environmental co-operatives of writing more complete 
contracts for wildlife and landscape management are: (1) given the involvement of specific 
investments, a reduced exposure to the opportunism of the other party; and (2) savings on 
repeated renegotiating costs (cf. Saussier, 2000b: 193). This implies that the parties to a contract 
are exposed to more opportunism in contracts involving more specific investments, compared to 
contracts with less specific investments, in a contract with the same institutional design. The 
more the contract specifies the transaction, the smaller the probability that the contract will be 
renegotiated (Saussier, 2000b: 193). 
Analysis of the transaction to determine the degree of completeness cannot be done without 
looking at the complexity of the transaction at stake. The design of contractual agreements 
depends in part on the degree of complexity and uncertainty associated with the transaction. The 
more complex the transaction the harder it becomes to describe fully and accurately the 
responsibilities of each party in a contract, and the more difficult it will be to assess whether 
those obligations have been fulfilled (cf. Masten, 1996: 14). Complexity will increase if more 
types of transaction are handled by one arrangement. If contracting partners only trade one 
uniform good or service the institutional arrangement will be less complex than in situations 
where combinations of transactions are governed implying one big transaction. Data on 
organisational form and contract terms is only useful to the extend that they can be matched with 
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Aspects related to the collection of the data are discussed in chapter 4. 
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data on attributes of transactions (cf. Masten, 1996: 48). However the problem of matching data 
is sometimes difficult to solve given joint production and in addition the potential involvement of 
farmers in more than one arrangement1. 
Property rights to wildlife and landscape 
Important with respect to wildlife and landscape contracting is the distribution of property rights. 
This means that it depends on the property rights to wildlife and landscape who the owner of 
investments in wildlife and landscape shall be. The question is who has the residual control rights 
to wildlife and landscape on farmland (see Table-2.1). If the residual control rights are more in 
the hands of the society than the farmers, investments are specific by definition. When a farmer 
invests in an asset for which he does not posses all the residual control rights, he will be 
confronted with a potential hold-up problem concerning these investments. 
Uncertainty 
The contracts offered by the Dutch government and environmental co-operatives for wildlife and 
landscape preservation have fixed contract duration which is known to both parties when the 
contract is formally concluded. Contract duration for these governmental contracts is not an 
outcome of negotiations between the parties to a contract. However, given the provision of 
different kinds of services within these contracts (differences in asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency) contract theory would suggest contracts with varying contract duration. Following 
contract theory, some transactions are expected to be less appropriate for contracting 
arrangements because of unattractive contract duration. The duration of a contract can be 
analysed as an optimisation process in which costs and benefits of additional length are traded-
off at the margin (Saussier, 1999: 5). A long-term contract involving specific assets of one party 
leads to a reduced exposure to the opportunism of the other party. Further, a longer-term contract 
leads to savings on negotiation costs. On the other hand longer-term contracts lead to a greater 
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risk of being trapped in a bad contract. This problem is more serious the greater the uncertainty 
concerning the transaction. 
Transaction costs 
Institutional arrangements involve transactions costs. In this section ex ante and ex post 
transaction costs are distinguished (Williamson, 1985: 20). The first are the costs of drafting, 
negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement. The second, ex post transaction costs, include the 
running costs of the institutional arrangement. Transaction cost hypotheses require data on 
organisational form as well as detailed information about the character of transactions as the level 
of uncertainty associated with exchange, the complexity of products and processes, and the extent 
to which assets needed for production are specific to the particular relation (Masten, 1996:47). In 
the empirical section it was tried to show the differences of transaction costs between different 
transactions. 
5.4 Empirical model and data: the decision to contract 
Contracting for wildlife and landscape management is assumed to be dependent upon specific 
investments, the region of the farm, and time. Contracting is a censored variable because 
"wildlife and landscape management" has zero values if no wildlife and landscape is managed 
and has only positive values in case of wildlife and landscape management. Because of this 
censored characteristic the following Tobit model is estimated (cf. Baltagi, 2001: 212; Verbeek, 
2000: 340): 
yl=xuP + f*,+ou (1) 
where "i" indexes individual farmers such that z=l,2,3,...,N; and, "t" indexes the year such that 
t=1990, 1991, 1992, ... , 1999. The variable^ represents the quantity of wildlife and landscape 
management for those farmers who are involved in transactions. The matrix xu contains data on 
the observable explanatory variables (including a constant term) of the model for farm i in the 
year t. The variables of this matrix are given in Table 5.1. The variable yu is not observed when 
no wildlife and landscape is managed. For those farmers who do not manage wildlife and 
69 
Chapter 5 
landscape y'u is set to zero. The observed random variable yu is related to the latent variable y*„ 
by 
yu=Q ifyl^° 
The following equation is estimated 
v JxitP+Mi+»it ify*t>0 ( 3 ) 
* 1 o 
The independent variable yu is wildlife and landscape management. The error term vb is 
independent over time and farms and captures stochastic disturbances. The unobservable random 
farm effects (//,) do not vary in time and capture relevant unobservable variables and time-
invariant factors that characterise farm i. They are assumed to be normally distributed with zero 
means and variances of <r2 and cr*ft (Verbeek, 2000: 340). It is assumed that there is no 
relationship between the explanatory variables and the error terms. It is further assumed that 
there is no dynamic feedback from the past and future realisations of explanatory variables to the 
current realisations of wildlife and landscape management. In order to assess the importance of 
the explanatory variables marginal effects (cf. Greene, 1997: 963-964) are calculated for the 
expected value of wildlife and landscape conditional on being positive (uncensored) and the 
marginal effect for the probability of being uncensored. 
Data 
Data on specialised dairy farms covering the period 1990/91 - 1999/00 are from a stratified 
sample of farms keeping accounts on behalf of the Dutch Agricultural Economics Research 
Institute (LEI) farm accounting system. The stratification is based on economic farm size, age of 
the farmer, region, and type of farrning. Annual data on participating farms are available. In the 
sample (very) small farms and non-specialised farms are not represented. Data are used from 
Dutch dairy farms that have more than 50 per cent of their Dutch standard gross margin (sgm) 
from dairy farming2. The farms usually remain in the panel for about five years, so the data set 
forms an incomplete (or unbalanced) panel. 
2 
See CBS/LEI Landbouwcijfers 2000 for norms on sgm for different products 
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The data set used for estimation is built up in the following way. First, those farmers are 
selected who manage wildlife and landscape. Second, farmers who are not managing wildlife and 
landscape during the estimation period are added. These farmers are not selected randomly, but 
in order to increase the probability that the farmers have the opportunity to manage wildlife and 
landscape, only those are selected who are located in a municipality in which farmers actually 
manage wildlife and landscape. Farmers are at least two yi jars in the set The data set used for 
estimation contains 1489 observations on 302 farms. Of the se farms 190 did not manage wildlife 
and landscape at all in the period 1990/91-1999/00. Table 5 
for estimation for the year 1999/00. 
1 gives an overview of the data used 
Table 5.1: Overview of data used for estimation (n=128, prices of1991), 1999 
Mean Mean StdErr. 
1.34 2.85 
4.27 1.69 
41.41 15.99 
42.79 22.95 
50 11.66 
5.48 3.42 
79.39 8.80 
215.81 68.57 
0.094 
0.41 
0.21 
0.23 
0.14 
0.094 
0.23 
0.43 
0.15 
0.14 
0.87 
0.41 
0.52 
0.81 
Wildlife and landscape management (1000 €) 
Milkproduction per ha (1000 €/ha) 
Labour input (100 hours) 
Land input (ha) 
Age farmer (number of years) 
Non agricultural land (% non agricultural land/total land) 
Specialisation level dairy farming (Dutch standard gross margin (sgm) dairy 
farming/sgm total) 
Nitrogen use per ha (kg/ha) 
Dummy for soil type peat (1 if peat) 
Dummy for soil type clay (1 if clay) 
Dummy water drainage (1 if moderate or bad) 
Dummy Friesland (1 if farm is located in province Friesland i 
Dummy Zuid-Holland (1 if farm is located in province Zuid- Holland) 
Dummy Overijssel (1 if farm is located in province Overijss^l) 
Dummy sheep (1 if present on farm) 
Dummy beef cattle (1 if present on farm) 
Dummy low productive cows (1 if applies to dairy stock) 
Dummy environmental programs (1 if participating) 
Dummy quality producing programs (1 if participating) 
Dummy successor for certain (1 if yes) 
Dummy agricultural education (1 if yes) 
Dummy roughage purchases (1 if yes) 
Source: F ADN, * Estimations are carried out with guilders 
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The dependent variable "wildlife and landscape management" is equal to the financial 
compensation farmers receive. It is assumed that wildlife and landscape management can be 
expressed in kilo fodder unit milk (kFUM) (energy content of dairy fodder). Using the price for a 
kFUM the dependent variable was made real. Wildlife and landscape management contracts lead 
to a decrease in production of grass expressed in kilo fodder unit milk per ha (kFUM, energy 
content of dairy fodder; Heinen, 1997: 3). Transactions differ in the reduction of the production 
of grass because they differ in prescriptions for managing wildlife and landscape. For example, 
there are five contracts possible for reproduction periods possible that differ in the date the 
nesting period ends: June 1, June 8, June 15, June 22, and June 30. The starting date is the same 
for all these contracts: April 1. As the meadow bird reproduction period gets longer the decrease 
in kFUM is larger; hence the more "wildlife and landscape management" is produced. The 
financial compensation per kFUM can change every year, also for contracts that were concluded 
in previous years. The differences in operating inputs per contract are not corrected and it is 
assumed that differences in operating inputs can also be expressed in kFUM. 
For farm characteristics related to asset specificity the following proxy variables are used: 
1. Farm characteristics for site specificity: 
• Dummy for soil type peat and dummy soil type clay. 
The majority part of the farms had a soil type of sand, followed by clay and 
peat. Soil types influence the need for specific investments because the 
possibilities for wildlife and landscape management depend on the soil type. If 
the soil is better adapted to a way of farming including wildlife and landscape 
management less specific investments are needed. 
• Non agricultural land. 
Non-farmland like farmyard, paths, roads, forest land, etc. as a share of total 
land holdings are expected to increase the probability that farmers have land 
that is fitted for wildlife and landscape management. 
• Nitrogen use per ha. 
Nitrogen fertiliser intensity indicates a more intensive way of producing and 
therefore more investments are needed to manage wildlife and landscape and 
therefore a negative sign is expected. 
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and landscape management because 
• Dummy water drainage. 
Farmers conclude more wildlife and landscape management contracts on land 
where drainage is moderate or bad. If laid drainage is moderate or bad less 
specific investments are needed to svdtch from the current production 
technology to wildlife and landscape management. 
2. Farm characteristics for physical asset specificity: 
• Specialisation level dairy farming. 
A higher level of specialisation in dairy farming means more specific 
investments in order to switch to wildlife ; 
the adaptation needed will be larger. 
• Dummy low productive cows. 
Low producing cows makes that less specific investments are needed and 
switching would be easier. 
• Milk production (1000 €) per hectare. 
At high production intensities, the possibility of feeding roughage from 
grassland with wildlife and landscape management agreements to young stock 
and dry cows restricts the amount of wililife and landscape management. At 
high stocking rates, the possibility of gracing cows during the growing season 
restricts the area with management agreements (cf. Haan et al., 1996: 23). 
3. Farm characteristics for human asset specificity: 
• Dummy environmental programs and dummy quality producing programs. 
Both variables are meant to signal experience with contracting and this makes 
the decision for wildlife and landscape maiagement easier. 
4. Farm characteristics for dedicated assets: 
• Dummy roughage purchases. 
Buying roughage indicates already a shortage of feed, making more adaptation 
on farm level necessary. 
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• Land. 
Grassland for grazing must remain available during the growing season (cf. 
Haan et al., 1996: 23). More land means more land for grazing and fewer 
problems of fitting in wildlife and landscape management on a farm. A positive 
sign is expected. 
Other variables in the model are related to time; location and farm characteristics: 
1. Year dummy for the years 1991 to 1999. The dummy for 1991 has a value of 1 if 
the year is 1 and has a value zero elsewhere. The other dummies for years are 
calculated in the same way. 
2. Dummies Friesland, dummy Overijssel, and dummy Zuid-Holland 
These dummies are meant to express regional differences for contracting. These 
dummies have a value of 1 if for a specific province and are 0 elsewhere. In order 
to prevent correlation with soil types, provinces are used for regional differences 
and appointing areas for wildlife and landscape management by farmers is a task 
of the provinces. 
3. Dummy sheep and dummy beef cattle 
Dummies for the presence of beef cattle (grazing) and sheep are added to analyse 
complementarities or substitutes to wildlife and landscape management. 
4. Labour 
5. Age 
6. Dummy agricultural education 
The dummy has a value 1 if a farmer has an education in agriculture. 
7. Dummy successor for certain 
The dummy has a value of 1 if a successor exists for certain. 
5.5 Results: the decision to contract 
In this Section the results of the Tobit model (Equation 3) on the decision to contract will be 
presented. The estimation results are presented in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2: Tobit estimates of wildlife and landscape rhanagement model, random effects, 
1990-1999' 
Parameter Estimate Std. Err. Parameter Estimate Std. Err. 
3.34 Constant** -15.23 
Farm characteristics for site specificity: 
Dummy soil type clay -0.33 
Dummy soil type peat* 1.84 
Non agricultural land** 0.24 
Nitrogen use per ha** -0.013 
Dummy water drainage** 4.05 
Farm characteristics for physical asset specificity: 
Specialisation level dairy 
farming 0.037 
Dummy low milk-
productive cows -0.22 
Milk-production per ha -0.18 
Farm characteristics for human asset specificity: 
Dummy environmental 
programs -0.50 
Dummy quality producing 
programs -0.60 
0.83 
1.11 
0.064 
0.0034 
0.66 
0.035 
Farm characteristics for 
Dummy roughage 
purchases* 
Land** 
Provinces: 
Dummy Friesland** 
Dummy Overijssel 
Dummy Zuid-Holland 
assets: 
1.36 
0.079 
-2.30 
-1.43 
-1.13 
Time: 
Dumnr 
Dummy 
Dummy 
Dumm» 
Dumm' 
Dummy 
Dummy 
Dumm 
1991 
1992* 
1993** 
1994** 
1995** 
1996** 
1997** 
1998** 
0.89 
0.11 
0.65 
0.76 
0.58 
0.22 
Dummy 1999** 
Other variables: 
Age 
Dummy successor 
for cert lin* 
Dumnry agricultural 
education* 
Labour 
Dummy sheep 
Dummy beef 
cattle*^ 
0.86 
1.18 
0.89 
0.0099 
2.27 
4.31 
4.40 
5.77 
6.95 
7.91 
9.15 
10.88 
-0.022 
1.14 
1.12 
1.13 
1.14 
1.15 
1.16 
1.19 
1.28 
1.38 
0.028 
-1.36 0.068 
1.34 
-0.00011 
0.49 
-1.80 
0.58 
0.00029 
0.67 
0.47 
Source: FADN, * variable significant at.10 level, ** variable significant at 0.01 level 
The discussion of Table 5.2 starts with those variables that are not significant at a 1% level. The 
variables related to physical assets are not significant for a % level indicating that the level of 
specialisation in dairy farming is not an explaining factor for managing wildlife and landscape. 
Also the presence of low productive cows is not significant. Milk-production per hectare, 
indicating the possibilities of fitting in wildlife and landscape is not significant different from 
zero for a 1% level. This lead to the conclusion that wildlife and landscape does not depend 
significantly on physical asset specificity. The variables firm characteristics for human asset 
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specificity were not significant either. This means that familiarity with contracting for other 
purposes do not imply that more contracts for wildlife and landscape management are concluded. 
The availability of labour seems not to influence the decision to contract (here and in the 
following statements significance of the 1% level has been used for delmnining whether or not a 
variable had a clear inference). The coefficient of the presence of sheep does not indicate that 
sheep are either substitute or complement for wildlife and landscape management. Age has no 
influence of wildlife and landscape management. An agricultural education seems to have a 
positive effect on the decision to conclude contracts but not at a 1% significance level. The 
presence of a successor for certain has a negative sign. This sign can be explained by relative 
short time horizon of the farmer knowing that he/she has a successor. 
The stability of the estimates is checked using different numbers of quadrature points for 
the Gauss-Hermite quadrature procedure. Some estimates of coefficients were relatively unstable. 
The model is estimated again excluding variables that were not significant for a 1% level3. Table 
5.3 gives the results for this second estimation. 
Table 5.3: Tobit estimates of restricted wildlife and landscape management model, random 
effects, 1990-1999 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Marginal effect 
expected value 
Marginal effect 
probability 
Constant** -18.42 1.73 
Farm characteristics for site specificity: 
Non-farmland** 0.19 0.064 0.043 0.0057 
Nitrogen use per ha** -0.010 0.0034 -0.0023 -0.00030 
Dummy water drainage** 4.82 0.70 1.15 0.15 
Farm characteristics for dedicated assets: 
Land** 0.13 0.019 0.029 0.0038 
Provinces: 
Dummy Friesland -0.20 0.93 -0.043 -0.0058 
Time-
Time trend** 1.22 0.091 0.27 0.036 
Farmer characteristics: 
Dummy beef cattle** -2.10 0.49 -0.46 -0.061 
Source: F ADN, ** variable significant at 0.01 level 
Estimating the model while excluding variables at a level of significance of 10% lead to non-stable estimates. 
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dummies and P is the coefficient of 
% level of significance (Wald test, 
trend variable because of the higher 
Comparing the results of Table 5.3 to the results of the first estimation in Table 5.2 shows that 
the signs of the coefficients did not change. An alternative: to the dummies for the subsequent 
years is a time trend variable. The time dummies in the model were tested whether they result in 
a different effect: 
H0:a,=a2-p = a3-2p = a3-3p = a4-4p = a,-5p=A6-6p = a7-7p=as-Sp 
H, := not true 
where ctj (i -1.....7) are the coefficients for the subsequent 
the time trend. The null hypothesis is not rejected at a 1 
zl =3.89 ). This results in a choice for a model with a time 
degrees of freedom. Checking the stability of the estimates using different numbers of quadrature 
points for the Gauss-Hermite quadrature procedure shows that the stability of the estimates 
improved, however, the coefficient for Dummy Friesland was still relatively unstable implyinlg 
that the results should be interpreted with care. However, the signs of both estimations are 
consistent The marginal effects in Table 5.3 are the effects for the expected value of wildlife and 
landscape conditional on being positive (uncensored) and the marginal effect for the probability 
of being uncensored. 
Farm characteristics related to site specificity are irrportant for the decision to manage 
wildlife and landscape: the variables non-farmland, nitrogen use per hectare, dummy water 
drainage differ significantly from zero for a 1% level of significance. Farms with relatively more 
non-agricultural land are more likely to conclude wildlife and landscape management contracts. 
The probability increased with about 0.0057 when the share non-farmland increases with one per 
cent (column 5, Table 5.3). If a farm is already managing wildlife and landscape one additional 
per cent non-agricultural land leads to an increase in wildlif 3 and landscape of about € 43. High 
levels of nitrogen use indicate higher production of roughage; per hectare. Wildlife and landscape 
management will lead to an extra reduction of roughage prxluction for high levels of nitrogen 
use per hectare compared to lower levels. If wildlife and landscape management implies no 
nitrogen use, the effect for high levels of nitrogen per hectare is larger and will lead to more 
difficulties fitting in a contract resulting in a decrease of the probability with 0.0003. 
From Table 5.3 it follows that moderate or bad water drainage leads to more wildlife and 
landscape management: about € 1150. In case of moderate o|r bad water drainage the probability 
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of wildlife and landscape management increases by 0.15. Switching to wildlife and landscape 
management is easier if water drainage is bad because fewer adaptations on farm-level are 
needed. The positive sign for land is explained by the fact that more land means more 
opportunities for fitting in wildlife and landscape management on a farm and therewith more 
wildlife and landscape management: an additional hectare increases revenue by € 29. The effects 
of an extra hectare are rather small (marginal probability effect is 0.0038). 
From the model follows that farm characteristics related to specific investments are 
important for the decision to conclude contracts. In contradiction to the expectation formulated in 
Section 5.2 the region is not important. Looking at a level of significance of 1% the coefficient 
for the Dummy Friesland was no longer different from zero. The others were not significant in 
the first model. This lead to the conclusion that the distinguished regions are not important for 
concluding contracts. 
However, time is important for wildlife and landscape management following from the 
dummies for the subsequent years. The probability to conclude contracts increases with the years 
and the amount of wildlife and landscape managed. It is expected that the dummy represents the 
increase in contracting opportunities due to the activities of governmental agencies and the 
origination of environmental co-operatives. Another important explanation is that farmers 
changed their attitudes towards wildlife and landscape management. 
Beef cattle are a substitute for wildlife and landscape management given the negative sign 
for this coefficient. These cows are expected to compete for the same land for their feed. 
5.6 Results: after a contract for wildlife and landscape management has been concluded 
Before going into details concerning the results of the survey among individual farmers involved 
in wildlife and landscape management, farms in the survey are described, based on of the 
FADN4. The 32 farms surveyed are compared to all farms in the FADN managing wildlife and 
landscape because the 32 farms are part of it. In 1999, the whole FADN set contained about 90 
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farmers managing wildlife and landscape. Table 5.4 gives ar overview of general characteristics 
of the farms in the sample. 
The average compensation of the sample is about € 20Û0. This compensation is lower than 
the average compensation for all farmers in the F ADN producing wildlife and landscape (circa € 
2900). The compensation received varies between € 200 and i 
a percentage of the milk-output differs among farms. For tpe 32 farms this percentage ranges 
from about zero to more than 31%. 
Table 5.4: Characteristics of farms in the mail survey compared to all farms in the FADN 
managing wildlife and landscape (prices 1991, , 1999s 
Mean Standard devia tion Min Max 
Average compensation received 
(€ 1000) 
• 90 farms 2.9 3.9 0.01 18.9 
• 32 farms 2.0 2.2 0.2 9.5 
Average compensation received 
as percentage of milk output 
• 90 farms 6.3 10.5 0.02 63.4 
• 32 farms 3.7 5.7 0.08 31.6 
Farmland (ha) 
• 90 farms 42.3 20.7 7.2 103.0 
• 32 farms 44.7 21.5 15.8 103.0 
Average number of cows 
• 90 farms 76 36 13 224 
• 32 farms 81 41 36 224 
Age 
• 90 farms 47 11.1 28 77 
• 32 farms 48 10.8 29 68 
Source: FADN 
The farms in the survey sample are on average larger than the 
the FADN. The average age of the farmers surveyed was 48 
for differences between the 32 farms and all 90 farms for the 
the compensation as a percentage of milk output shows that 
average farm size of all 90 farms in 
and ranges from 29 to 68. Testing 
average compensation received and 
these values are larger for the 90 
The average compensation differs with Table 5.1 for reason of sampling, 
not manage wildlife and landscape: about 50 per cent did not manage wildlife 
Table 5.1 consists also farmers who do 
and landscape in 1999. 
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farms (t-test on averages, Ho: no difference and Hj: positive difference, probability level: 0.0503, 
leading to a rejection of Ho). Testing on differences between the 32 surveyed farmers and the 90 
farmers revealed no differences for farmland, average number of cows and the age of the farmer. 
The 32 farms are representative although the level of compensation is below average. About 30% 
of the farmers knew already that they would have a successor. This percentage can partly be 
explained by the relatively young age of some farmers making this question for those farmers not 
(yet) relevant. Non of the 32 farmers had recreational activities. A large majority of the farmers 
was involved in a chain label program. 
Incomplete institutional arrangements 
The results of the survey show that farmers are involved in different institutional arrangements 
for wildlife and landscape management at the same time. Looking at the contracting parties, three 
categories of arrangements can be distinguished: central governmental agencies (DLG-contracts), 
environmental co-operatives, and other parties. These categories are given in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Institutional arrangements for wildlife and landscape management by farms 
categorised by the parties involved other than farmers (n=30), 1999 
Contracting partner Number of 
farmers involved 
One contract partner Average 
compensation (€) 
Governmental agencies 20 13 1855 
Environmental co- 12 9 1280 
operatives 
Other partners 8 3 581 
Source: questionnaire data 
The majority of the farmers in the sample was involved in a contractual relationships with Dutch 
governmental agencies within the national regulation of wildlife and landscape management (20 
farmers). A smaller number of farmers was involved in an environmental co-operative. The 
group of "other partners" was rather diverse, ranging from provinces to wildlife and landscape 
conservation organisations. The average financial compensation for farmers involved in an 
institutional arrangement with other parties was less than half of the average compensation for 
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the other two contracting partners. Many farmers were involved in an institutional arrangement 
with only one contracting partner. 
Looking at the type of arrangements, four main transactions were distinguished in Chapter 
3: preservation, development, maintenance and products delivered. Table 5.6 gives the results for 
these transaction categories in our sample. A single contracting arrangement can consist of more 
than one of these transactions. The category "other transactions" consists of transactions that 
could not be attributed to a single category. 
Table 5.6: Transaction types for wildlife and landscape management categorised according 
to contracting arrangements (n=30), 1999 
Transaction Number of farm© •s Number of farmers involved in 
involved this transaction only 
Preservation 8 1 
Development 
• Delay of first cut of grassland 7 2 
• Field margin management 8 1 
Maintenance 4 0 
Products delivered 5 1 
Other transactions 7 2 
Total 30 7 
Source: questionnaire data 
I 
Table 5.6 illustrates the diversity of contracting types. The majority of the farmers was involved 
in several transaction types at the same time. Several transactions within one arrangement has 
consequences for the arrangement and the related contracts because the arrangements have to 
deal with the differences in attributes of the transactions. Combining contracting partners and 
transaction types results in Table 5.7. 
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Table 5.7: Transactions and contracting parties for wildlife and landscape management 
(n=30), 1999 
Transaction Preservation Development Maintenance Products Combinations 
Contracting partner delivered 
Governmental 
agencies 1 4 0 1 7 
Environmental co-
operatives 0 5 0 0 3 
Other partners 0 2 1 0 6 
Source: questionnaire data 
Table 5.7 (column 2) shows that farmers were involved in respectively 4, 5 and 2 transactions for 
development of wildlife and landscape with government agencies and environmental co-
operatives. Further, combinations of transactions were relevant for farmers involving all the types 
of contracting partners distinguished ("combinations", last column of Table 5.7). Farmers can 
conclude different types of contracts with more than one contracting partner. This increases the 
complexity of the contractual relation. 
Categories of specific investments 
Concerning physical asset specificity the main question is whether farmers buy special 
equipment for wildlife and landscape management that cannot be used for other purposes. The 
assets can be distinguished with respect to the degree of asset specificity. This means that farmers 
could buy equipment that is used for special species - e.g. nest protection equipment - or for 
several types of wildlife and landscape management like fencing posts and wire. For fencing 
posts and wire the degree of specificity changes if they are actually in use at a farm and can only 
be removed at a certain costs. Some investments can be characterised as physical assets 
specificity while others are dedicated assets. 
Special equipment was bought that can be used for maintenance of landscape elements in 
wildlife and landscape production contracts: small mowers for grass (8 farmers); chain saw/tree 
pruner (6 farmers); nest protecting material (5 farmers); and fencing material (4 farmers). The 
level of the investment ranges from about € 100 to about € 700. Adaptation of existing machinery 
82 
Individual contracting 
is observed less often (6 of 32 farmers). Adaptations mentioned were investments in existing 
fertiliser spreaders, field sprayers and game protection equipment on mowers. These investments 
range in the degree of asset specificity. Generally, the investments in physical assets and 
dedicated assets are not large and their degree of specificity is low. 
The investments in human capital analysed in this chapter take the form of an increase in 
knowledge using several sources. Twenty-two out of 32 farmers mentioned that their knowledge 
increased after having signed a contract. Learning by doing was the most important source, in 
terms of the number of farmers, of increased knowledge mentioned by al the farmers with respect 
to meadow birds, plants, and other animals. Learning by doing can only occur when farmers take 
a large share of the work in wildlife and landscape management transactions. Twenty-four 
farmers out of 32 replied that they perform tasks for wildlife and landscape management. These 
tasks range from meadow bird protection to maintenance of landscape elements. The majority of 
the tasks was performed by the farm family. On average these farm families worked 26 hours per 
year (22 farmers, st. dev. 27). Only three farmers replied that paid personnel was used for these 
tasks. Finally, 9 farmers had volunteer help for several tasks. The most important task of 
volunteers was marking nests. 
Alternative sources of knowledge with respect to meadow birds were the volunteers and 
professional journals (about 60% of the farmers). Courses and personal contacts were relatively 
less important. With respect to knowledge about plant species professional journals, volunteers 
and courses were relatively important (between about 30% and 50% of farmers surveyed). Only a 
few farmers mention that their knowledge about mammals, amphibians, and reptiles increased. 
Learning by doing and professional journals were equally important with respect to knowledge 
about government regulation (about 75%). 
The attributes of the parcels are important with respect to the usefulness for both dairy 
farming and wildlife and landscape management. The main soil type of the farms in the sample is 
peat land or peat land in combination with clay. About 8(1% of farmers had parcels located at 
more that 1 km from their farm and a large number had parcels with water disposal problems 
(Table 5.8). Fewer farmers (circa 20%) had parcels in river basins, not suited for dairy cattle and 
located near to wildlife and landscape areas. When we look at parcels used for wildlife and 
landscape management many farmers use parcels located 
difficult to access (circa 30%), having an irregular form (circa 35%) or much relief (circa 30%). 
more than 1 km away (circa 60%), 
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However, where attributes are relevant for farmers' parcels used for wildlife and landscape 
management, the percentage of parcels fitting these attributes is much higher than the percentage 
of parcels in total: the average scores are in all cases higher for the parcels used for wildlife and 
landscape management. This means that parcels used for wildlife and landscape management 
have a high percentage of attributes representing that the land less attractive for a way of farming 
without wildlife and landscape management. The scores for irregular form and relief do not differ 
significantly (Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests, not different at a 1% level). 
Table 5.8: Scores for site attributes for parcels (n=29, standard deviation between brackets), 
1999* 
Parcels in general Parcels used wildlife 
and landscape 
Number Average Number Average 
of farmers score of farmers score 
Located in wildlife and landscape 
management area 18 2.1 (1.4) 
Located on more that 1 km distance of the 
farm 23 2.3 (1.3) 17 4.1 (1.5) 
Difficult to access on paved roads 13 2.5(1.9) 9 4.0(1.7) 
Located in river basins 5 1.4 (0.9) 4 3.5 (1.9) 
Not suited for dairy cattle 9 2.4 (1.6) 9 3.6 (1.8) 
Located near to nature conservation area 8 1.9 (1.4) 8 4.5(1.4) 
Irregular form 18 2.3 (1.4) 10 2.8 (1.7) 
Much relief 13 1.5(0.7) 9 1.8(1.5) 
Ditch water level is relatively high 24 2.6 (1.6) 
Water disposal is problematic 17 2.3 (1.5) 
Parcels are surrounded by other wildlife and 
landscape management parcels 15 2.8 (1.4) 
Source: Questionnaire data 
* The attributes are ranked in 5 equal groups from 0-20% to 80-100% of the parcels. The 
number of farmers refers to farmers who have a positive ranking 
Because direct measurement was not possible within this project the farmers were asked for their 
opinion on the results of wildlife and landscape management. Obviously it is important to realise 
that strategic answers are possible. On the other hand alternative measurement is almost 
impossible without large scale and costly approaches. The first aspect is the nutrient content of 
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the soil. About 40 per cent of the farmers in the sample said that the nutrient level decreased. 
About 60 per cent the farmers said mat the nutrient level die. not change. For plant species, about 
80 per cent of the farmers thought that the number of plant species increased or remained the 
same. From this group, half thinks that the number of plants increased. For meadow birds, 25 per 
cent said that the number of birds increased after the contract was concluded. About one third did 
not know or said that the number of meadow birds decreas :d. The remaining farmers think that 
the number of birds remained the same. The farmers judge the results of wildlife and landscape 
management positively. It should be kept in mind that the factor time was not taken into account. 
Property rights 
Income from wildlife and landscape 
their neighbours. They also did not 
With regard to property rights, farmers in the sample have no doubt about ownership of wildlife 
and landscape. Property rights or changes in property right! ¡ are not perceived as a major source 
of uncertainty for transactions. Farmers replied that they are the only persons who have 
something to say about wildlife and landscape on their farm, 
management is not considered contingent on decisions of 
consider their decisions to have been forced by others. Further they have the opinion that wildlife 
and landscape management fits within their farming objectives and this issue was easy to 
determine. Finally, a large majority of the farmers in the sanple (90%) expects that they can use 
the parcels now under contract for farming in a convention: 1 way after the contract ends because 
they expect to have the right to do so. These expectations illustrate farmers' opinions concerning 
the ownership of property rights. It needs to be said that tliese questions are not comparable to 
any kind of measurement, but are attitude questions. However, the message resulting from mese 
questions is clear: farmers have the opinion that they possess a large share of the property rights. 
Further, non-farmers have not been asked for their opinions 
to analyse a potential conflict of interests and consequences 
on these issues, so it was not possible 
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Uncertainty and risk 
From the survey it follows that farmers do not perceive the compensation for wildlife and 
landscape as having a large impact on their total farm income risk. In Table 5.9 the sources of 
risk and average scores are given for the farms in the survey. The number of observations used 
for calculations differs among the sources because farmers had the option to mark "not known" 
for every source of risk. 
Table 5.9: Ranked potential effects of sources of risk on total farm income risk and income 
from wildlife and landscape management, 1999 
Source Total farm income Income from wildlife and 
landscape management 
Milk-price 4.5(1.2) 2.6 (1.8) 
Environmental regulation 3.6(1.2) 3.1 (1.6) 
Price inputs 3.5(1.0) 2.2 (1.4) 
Production technology 2.9 (1.3) 
Animal welfare regulation 2.7(1.2) 
Financial compensation wildlife and landscape 
management 1.8(1.0) 
Regulation of wildlife and landscape 
management 2.2 (1.3) 3.0 (1.6) 
Non-agricultural developments in area where 
farm is located 2.4(1.4) 2.3 (1.2) 
Development in official wildlife and landscape 
areas in neighbourhood of farm 2.8 (1.3) 
Existing situation for wildlife and landscape in 
area of farm 3.4(1.4) 
Policies of nature conservation organisations 2.9 (1.7) 
Management on farms in neighbourhood 1.7 (1.0) 
Environmental co-operatives 2.3 (1.4) 
Source: Questionnaire data 
* The number of observations ranges between 26 and 31 because of the number of farmers who 
mention "I do not know". The average scores on a 5-Likert scale ranging from no effect at all to 
a large effect are given (standard deviation between brackets) 
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Compared to other sources of income risk, the consequences )f changing prices and regulation of 
wildlife and landscape management are perceived small. As can be expected for dairy farms the 
perceived risk of changes in milk-prices on the total farm income was rated highest because milk 
production is the main activity (average ranking of 4.5). Changes in the prices of inputs and 
environmental regulation are perceived as more important soirees of income risk. 
Focussing on the income from wildlife and landscape management it can be observed mat 
farmers feel a great effect following changes in the existing situation of wildlife and landscape in 
their working area (average ranking of 3.4, Table 5.9, column 2) and changes in the regulation of 
wildlife and landscape (average ranking 3.0). Less importan: sources are changes in the price of 
inputs, changes in the management of farmers in the neighbourhood, non-agricultural 
developments in the area and changes within environmental co-operatives. The rankings of 
sources of risk differ between the total income and the income from wildlife and landscape 
management. Changes in regulation of wildlife and landscape is perceived as more important for 
the income from wildlife and landscape compared to the total farm income (average ranking of 
3.0 for income from wildlife and landscape management cor 
Table 5.9). 
Table 5.10 concerns strategies for coping with income 
listed, but the focus is on wildlife and landscape management 
Table 5.10: Possible effects of strategies for coping wi 
standard deviation between brackets), 1999* 
lpared to 2.2 for total farm income, 
risks. A number of strategies were 
compared to alternative strategies. 
th total farm income risk, (n=30, 
Strategy Possil le effect I do not know 
Producing against lowest cost 3.3 
Working off farm 2.9 
Long-term contracts with fixed prices 2.3 
Building up financial reserves 2.2 
Investing outside agriculture 2.1 
Wildlife and landscape management 2.1 
Producing other agricultural products 1 i 
Producing regional products 1 i 
Producing recreational products 1A 
Other 2.8 
(1.1) 1 
(1.5) 2 
(1.4) 2 
(1.1) 5 
(1.2) 11 
(1.0) 1 
(1.0) 3 
(0.9) 4 
(0.8) 3 
(2.1) 28 
Source: Questionnaire data 
* The average scores of 5-Likert scale are given, ranging fro n no effect to very great effect 
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Looking at the average possible effect in Table 5.10, producing at lowest cost is considered a 
much more successful strategy for coping with income risk at the farm level than wildlife and 
landscape management (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, they are positively different at a 1% level). 
Wildlife and landscape management is not seen as a successful strategy for coping with income 
risk at all. Producing at lowest cost as a relevant strategy is comparable to other studies 
(Meuwissen, 2000: 28 and Patrick et al. 2000: 3). Investing outside agriculture, maintaining 
financial reserves, and fixed-price contracts for delivering products are considered as equal 
relevant compared to managing wildlife and landscape. Diversification to another farming type, 
producing regional products and offering recreational services were perceived as less important 
among farmers concluding contracts for wildlife and landscape management. Changes in 
financial compensation for wildlife and landscape management is not considered an important 
source of income risk at the farm level. This can be explained by to relatively small share of the 
wildlife and landscape compensation in total income for a large number of farmers. 
Transaction costs: information and labour 
The majority of the farmers collected information needed for concluding contracts (about 60% of 
the farners in the sample). A majority of the farmers had no major problems finding information. 
Further, these farmers did not rank information as extremely complex or very clear. Finally, 
information was also not ranked as very relevant or very irrelevant For the majority of the 
farmers in the sample - depending on the type of management - knowledge increased. Collecting 
information is just one aspect of the transaction costs involved in wildlife and landscape 
management 
88 
Individual contracting 
Table 5.11: Transaction costs before concluding a contract (n=25, standard deviation between 
brackets), 1999 
Average time involved Number of farmers 
(hours) 
Collecting information about possibilities 1.8 (2.8) 14 
within region 
Analysis possibilities regulation government 1.9 (3.0) 8 
Analysis of opportunity costs 1.0 (2.1) 9 
Negotiations/conversation 2.2 (1.8) 18 
Finalisation contract 2.1 (1.6) 23 
Total transaction costs 7.7 (8.6) 25 
Source: Questionnaire data 
From Table 5.11 it can be concluded from the average time involved before concluding a contract 
that transaction costs are relevant to wildlife and landscape ttansactions. When external labour is 
needed the costs could rise considerably. After a contract is concluded contracts remain 
substantial. Table 5.12 gives an overview of the transaction costs after the contract has been 
concluded. ! 
Table 5.12: Yearly transaction costs after the contract is Concluded (n=25, standard deviation 
between brackets), 1999 
Average time involved 
(hours) 
Number of farmers 
Administrative tasks 
• of results 
• of labour input 
Consultation 
Total 
oi (2.0) 
1.4(4.5) 
O.f (1.1) 
2.f (6.8) 
10 
6 
6 
11 
Source: Questionnaire data 
The most often mentioned task was administration of results (10 farmers, table 5.12). However, 
this task did not take much time. Excluded from this category is time spent on labour input like 
demarcating nests and maintenance. The farm family is mainly responsible for the administrative 
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Other results of the survey concern counting numbers of species and administrative tasks. 
About 50% of the farmers acquired information by counting numbers per species and kind of 
species (16 farmers). Counting the number of birds is relevant for monitoring and presenting 
results. Of the farmers who counted the numbers of species, the farmer him(her) self did work 
(more than 75%), sometimes in combination with volunteers or paid personnel. Of the 13 who 
count plants, 75% counts 3 times per year or less. Birds are counted more often. Seven of nine 
farmers who count birds count 3 times per year or more. About 60% of the farmers who count 
birds or plants also count the number of plants or birds per species. Other animals are often not 
counted (only 1 positive observation). For wildlife and landscape production contracts counting 
means an increase of transaction costs compared to management contracts. 
J. 7 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter focuses on institutional arrangements for wildlife and landscape management in 
which individual farmers are involved. The results of a Tobit model show that farm 
characteristics were important for the probability of contract conclusion and for the amount of 
wildlife and landscape management Especially farm characteristics related to present or earlier 
site-specific investments determine the probability of concluding contracts for wildlife and 
landscape management. External production circumstances (water drainage and the portion of 
non-farmland) played an important role. If farm characteristics are well adapted for wildlife and 
landscape, less specific investments are needed to manage wildlife and landscape. The number of 
contracts and the revenue per contract increase in time due to changing attitudes of farmers and 
more opportunities for contracting. There were no differences between the regions. The empirical 
analysis provides a number of quantitative results. They should be handled with care, because 
estimations were not very stable. 
After a contract has been concluded the characteristics of a transaction and contractual 
arrangement can be analysed. A survey among individual farmers was developed concerning 
wildlife and landscape management. Elements of this survey were the number of arrangements, 
the complexity of an arrangement, property rights and transaction costs. Most farmers had only 
one relation with a contracting party (governmental agency, environmental co-operative, nature 
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institutional 
ro 
conservation organisation, etc.). The majority of the farmcs 
transaction type at the same time (preservation, development, 
These transaction types were concluded with one of the three 
this chapter. Different transaction types within one  
arrangements complex. Using institutional arrangements of 
design make the contracts differ in the degree of completeness, 
stake. More incompleteness results in an increased exposure 
Physical specific investments were used, although 
result is comparable to the results of the Tobit model 
learning-by-doing was important for most farmers. Compared 
allowed directing the measurement more towards the 
Parcels used for wildlife and landscape management 
attributes representing attractiveness for wildlife and 
knowledge were the help of volunteers and professional journal! 
as an extra party to the contractual arrangement increase!! 
opinion that they owned a large share of the property right! 
landscape management was not considered an important 
was also not considered an important strategy for coping 
and landscape management was not an important factor for 
From the survey results that counting species is a time-consutmni 
counted. 
: source 
; with 
were involved in more than one 
maintenance, products delivered), 
contracting parties distinguished in 
arrangement make these 
a more or less similar institutional 
, depending on the transaction at 
opportunism. 
were not large or specific. This 
asset specificity in form of 
to the Tobit model, the survey 
of human asset specificity, 
a relatively high percentage of 
management. Sources of 
s. The involvement of volunteers 
the complexity. Farmers had the 
with respect to land. Wildlife and 
of risk for total farm income. It 
income risks on a farm. Wildlife 
reducing income risk at farm level. 
Lg task, depending on the species 
thuy 
Fuman 
relevance 
hai 
landscape 
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Chapter 6 
The Role of Transaction Costs and Bargaining Power in 
Management1 
Wildlife and Landscape 
6.1 Introduction 
There is a growing literature on the management of wildlife and landscape2 (e.g. postponing the 
mowing of grass to protect brooding meadow birds) by farmers. The literature focuses on the 
decision whether or not to manage (Brotherton, 1989; 
Wossink, 2001), characteristics of producers and non-producers (Morris and Potter, 1995; 
Beedell and Rehman, 2000) and the role of transaction costs in this decision (Dorward, 1999; 
Falconer and Whitby, 1999; Falconer, 2000). Literature is also dealing with farmers co-operating 
in the management of wildlife and landscape. MacFarlane (1998: 594) argues for linking farmers' 
land together to create localised, but meaningful, "conservation estates" where management 
practices are coherent across cadastral boundaries. Hodge (2001: 108-109) concludes that there is 
scope for the creation of new organisations taking common management decisions. Falconer 
(1999a: 9; 2000: 391) mentions the idea of farmer networks and environmental co-operatives 
respectively to save on transaction costs when managing wildlife and landscape collectively. 
Lacking in the literature are empirical farm models 
decisions of individual farmers whether or not to manage wildlife and landscape, how much to 
produce and whether or not to co-operate. Moreover, the literature has concentrated on the role of 
(ecological) scale advantages and transaction costs reduction as the main arguments to co-operate 
This chapter is written in co-operation with Jack Peerlings. 
In real world situations farmers sign contracts with government or natijre 
follow certain actions that improve wildlife and landscape. Throughout 
production is continuous, which is given the large range of type of contracts 
organisations in which they agree to 
tjhis paper we will assume that this 
not a very restrictive assumption. 
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paying no attention to the possible bargaining power (countervailing power) of e.g. 
environmental co-operatives. 
Objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical and empirical model for analysing the 
decisions of individual farmers whether or not to manage wildlife and landscape, how much of 
these services to produce and to co-operate in order to reduce transaction costs and build up 
bargaining power. The model is applied to Dutch dairy farmers as the main users of agricultural 
land in the Netherlands. 
To reach the objective a micro-econometric model for Dutch dairy farming, which includes 
the management of wildlife and landscape, is specified and estimated. The model is then applied 
to a small group of farms to analyse whether or not and to what extent they will manage wildlife 
and landscape in case of: (1) no co-operation; (2) co-operation where co-operation reduces 
transaction costs and (3) co-operation where co-operation reduces transaction costs and leads to 
a higher price for wildlife and landscape management because of an improved bargaining 
position compared to individual supply. 
Section 6.2 describes the theoretical model. Section 6.3 discusses the empirical model, data 
and estimation. Simulations and results are given in section 6.4. Section 6.5 summarises the main 
results and provides some conclusions. 
6.2 Theoretical Model 
In this section a theoretical micro-economic model for wildlife and landscape management is 
developed. This model includes individual decisions whether or not to manage wildlife and 
landscape and to co-operate by means of an intermediary organisation which we will denote as an 
environmental co-operative. 
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Model of wildlife and landscape management 
Here a micro-economic model of wildlife and landscape management in dairy farming is 
presented. It is assumed that dairy farming is characterised by joint production of multiple 
outputs. Given the milk quota system it is assumed that milk production is fixed in the short run. 
Moreover, management of wildlife and landscape is assumed fixed in the short run because 
contracts, which determine the level op management, have to be concluded for a period of five 
years in the Netherlands. Inputs are assumed variable jjr fixed in the short run (quasi-fixed 
inputs). It is assumed that farmers maximise profits given the level of prices and quantities of 
quasi-fixed outputs (milk and wildlife and landscape management) and quasi-fixed inputs. The 
short term, dual profit function nh (p, zk ) for farmer h is given by 
«•»(P»z*) = m a x W * \ T { z h , y h ) , p > 0 \ h = l i ..,H (1) 
where ^profit for farmer h; yh vector of (variable) netputs for farmer h (if an individual netput 
yu > 0 it is an output, i f y u < 0, it is an input); zh vector of quasi-fixed netputs for farmer h (if 
a specific netput z M > 0, it is a quasi-fixed input, whereas if z M < 0, it is a quasi-fixed output), 
p vector of netput prices, T technology set. 
It is assumed that the profit function is continuous and twice differentiable. Furthermore, 
profits are non-negative, non-decreasing in output prices, non-increasing in input prices and 
convex and linear homogenous in prices. It should be lealised that profits do not equal farm 
income. Farm income equals profits plus revenue from milk and wildlife and landscape 
management minus the paid costs for fixed inputs (e.g. interest) plus income from outside the 
farm (which are all assumed fixed here). The supply or demand functions yu(p,zh) for netput i 
of farmer h is given by (Hotellings' lemma): j 
dp, 
h = 1,...,H and (2) 
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The shadow price s t e (p, zh) of quasi-fixed input or quasi-fixed output k of fanner h is given by: 
- = 5 M (/>,zJ h = 1,...,H and k = 1,...,K (3) 
The shadow price for wildlife and landscape management is equal to the marginal costs of 
management and differs over individual farms. 
The above model shows profit, netputs and shadow prices of dairy farmers managing 
wildlife and landscape(management can also be zero). Next we investigate what would happen if 
management of wildlife and landscape is no longer fixed. In other words would the farmer in that 
case produce these services or not and how many services would be produced? 
No co-operation 
Suppose farmers are faced with the choice whether or not to manage wildlife and landscape. 
Management will be positive if profit in case of producing these services is higher than without 
this management. The optimal level of management will be determined in the point where 
marginal costs of managing wildlife and landscape equals the price. 
We assume that wildlife and landscape management is demanded by the government or 
nature organisations and that it is either completely price elastic; the price is given (w,), or 
depends on the price (demand is price elastic). If demand is price elastic the inverse demand 
function is given by: 
*,(*,') = (4) 
where w, price (compensation paid) for wildlife and landscape management, zf demand for 
wildlife and landscape management and zhi management of wildlife and landscape by farmer h. 
Wildlife and landscape management contracts involve transaction costs (Falconer and 
Whitby, 1999: 67; Hanley et al., 1999: 72; Hodge, 1991b: 375). In this paper we only deal with 
the transaction costs paid by farmers. Examples are the costs of negotiating with the government 
or nature organisations, administration of the contract, and monitoring and administrating results. 
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These costs have to be distinguished from the public transaction costs like administrative costs of 
operating the contract for the government (Falconer, 1999b: 71-73) or the private transaction 
costs of nature organisations. Private transaction costs for farmers can be separated in fixed and 
variable costs. Fixed transaction costs depend only on the decision to contract Examples are the 
cost of gaining information on possible contracts, administrative tasks, and management 
decisions like at what price does wildlife and landscape management becomes profitable. 
Variable transaction costs depend on the level of management and are here assumed to be 
constant per unit of wildlife and landscape management produced (proportional to management). 
Examples of variable transaction costs are the costs of auditing, monitoring and reporting species. 
The possibility to manage wildlife and landscape results in the following profit 
maximisation problem on farm level: 
^ ( ^ z I . w P c * » c * ) = m a x f e * ( / ' » z A . z * i ) + w 1 z 4 1 - c A z M - C 4 } h=l , . . . ,H (5) 
where 
£ft(P>Zft>zJ = m a x W* \ z l> z hi>p} h=l , . . . ,H (6) 
The first order condition is given by 
d^iP^Uwi>ck>Ck) .... „ , dgkiP^Lzm) dzhl dzM 
= 0 h=l , . . . ,H (7) 
where z| quasi-fixed inputs and outputs excluding wildlife and landscape management for farmer 
h, Ch fixed transaction costs for farmer h (only dependent on the decision to contract), ch 
variable transaction costs for farmer h per unit of wildlife and landscape management 
gh(p,zeh,zhl)\s the restricted profit function defined as profits given a certain level of wildlife 
and landscape management 
In the profit maximising optimum (equation 7) price ( w 1 ) equals marginal costs of 
producing wildlife and landscape management. Marginal costs consist of the variable transaction 
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costs per unit of management and the loss in restricted profit if management of wildlife and 
landscape increases by one unit. 
From the first order condition the supply function of wildlife and landscape management 
can be derived 
*M =/(/>> Wi.zJ.c») h=l , . . . ,H (8) 
Notice that the level of management is independent of fixed transaction costs. 
However wildlife and landscape management is only produced if profit increases. So 
xt>x¡ h=l , . . . ,H (9) 
where K\ is profit with no wildlife and landscape management. 
Notice that fixed transaction costs do influence profit and therefore the decision whether or not to 
manage wildlife and landscape. 
Co-operation leading to a reduction in transaction costs 
Here we assume that farms co-operate in an environmental co-operative in order to reduce (fixed) 
transaction costs. Although a co-operative leads to extra fixed transaction costs (membership fees 
for the co-operative, administration of the co-operative and enforcement costs) there can be an 
overall reduction compared to the situation where farmers sign an individual contract because 
fixed transaction costs like negotiation costs for a contract, search costs, etc. can be shared. In the 
model we assume fixed transaction costs for a member of the co-operative to be a downward 
sloping function of the fixed transaction costs in case of no co-operation and the number of 
members of the co-operative. This is off course rather arbitrarily but a more general function 
could be used. The profit maximisation problem for an individual farmer h is equal to the profit 
maximisation problem in equations (5) and (6) but Ch is now replaced by 
dk (C N) 
Cf™ = kh(Ch,N),—*———-<0 where N is the number of farms participating in the co-
dN 
operative. Notice that the first order condition (equation 7) does not change. So the farmer 
produces the same amount of wildlife and landscape management whether or not he is a member 
of the co-operative. However, given that fixed transaction costs are now lower it could be the 
case that more farmers manage wildlife and landscape (equation 9). This result does not depend 
Individual farmers contracts 
3 We use the symbol H here to indicate all members of the co-operative. We do not know this number in advance. 
Empirically we calculate profits of the co-operative for all possible number of members, the optimal number is 
where profit of the co-operative is largest 
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on whether the price of wildlife and landscape management is constant or not (equation 4). If the 
price is variable and more farmers manage wildlife and landscape the price will go down 
affecting the decision whether or not to join the co-operative and the amount of wildlife and 
landscape managed. So price, management level and the decision to join the co-operative or not 
are mutually dependent. 
Co-operation leading to bargaining power 
Besides a reduction in fixed transaction costs a co-operative could provide bargaining power 
(countervailing power). When there is one co-operative that co-operative is unlikely to take the 
price of wildlife and landscape management as given. The co-operative will recognise its 
influence over the price, and chooses that level of price and output that maximises overall profits 
of its members. In other words the co-operative will act like a monopolist. For the government or 
nature organisations it is attractive to deal with the co-operative instead of a group of individual 
farmers because dealing with a single party leads to a reduction in (public) transaction costs. So, 
the co-operative maximises total profit of its members not only deciding on what amount to 
produce but also taken into account the effect of management on price. Moreover, also the 
number of participants is variable affecting management, price and profit. Substituting the 
inverse demand function in equation 5 and summing over all members of the co-operative H 3 
leads to the following profit maximisation problem for the co-operative: 
{ H f H "\ H H H \ 
lgh(P,4^hl) + wA Zzhl ]x-£zhi-I.chzhl \ (10) 
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The first order conditions are given by: 
= 0 h=l , . . . ,H (11) 
Rearranging gives: 
3 g * ( l > . * î . * M ) = 0 h=l , . . . ,H (12) 
N 
where (21 z w ) inverse demand function. 
Equation 12 shows that all farmers joining the co-operative have the same marginal costs. Further 
rewriting gives (see e.g. Varian, 1992: 234): 
Equation (13) indicates that the price is a mark-up over marginal costs (the nominator is equal for 
the members of the co-operative), where the mark-up depends on the elasticity of demand of 
wildlife and landscape management by the government and nature organisations. In case of a 
monopoly farmers achieve an extra profit compared to the case in which they only co-operate to 
reduce fixed transaction costs. When goes to mfimty the mark-up goes to zero and the price 
will be equal to the price in the situation of no bargaining power. Farmers face a flat demand 
curve (infinitely elastic demand). For < 1 marginal revenue is negative, so it can not possibly 
equal marginal costs. We assume extra profit (rent) is divided over the members of the co-
operative using the share in total wildlife and landscape management. Again we assume that 
h=l , . . . ,H (13) 
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fanners only enter the co-operative if profit is larger than in case of no wildlife and landscape 
management (see equation 9). Important to note is that individual farmers could increase profit 
by producing more (see Van an, 1992: 304). However, we assume that the government or nature 
organisations do not want to deal with individual farmers (because of high transaction costs) 
which effectively will prevent this over-production. 
6.3 Empirical model 
In this section the shadow price equations for wildlife and landscape management of individual 
farms in a representative sample of Dutch dairy farming are determined using a micro 
econometric profit model (empirical version of the theoretical model described by equations 1-3). 
The inverse shadow price equations are then used to derive optimal supply of wildlife and 
landscape management. Micro econometric profit models have been applied frequently in the 
agricultural economics literature (see Shumway, 1995, for an overview). This also holds for the 
dairy sector in The Netherlands (Boots et al, 1997; Helming et al, 1993). Models of Dutch dairy 
farming have to take into account that individual dairy farms have operated under a supply quota 
since 1984. 
Dairy farming is modelled assuming that farms produce three outputs; milk ( z M ) , which 
is subject to a supply constraint, wildlife and landscape (z ( l ] ) , which is also subject to a supply 
constraint (long term contracts), and a composite of other outputs (e.g. beef) (qhl). Three 
variable inputs are assumed; purchased feed (qh2), dairy cattle(qh3)and a composite of other 
inputs (qM). Furthermore, four quasi-fixed inputs are distinguished; labour ( z M ) , land ( z M ) , 
buildings ( z M ) , and machinery ( z J 5 ) . The model also includes a time trend (z A 6 ) representing 
technology. 
The symmetric normalised quadratic (SNQ) form is used as the empirical specification 
(Kohli, 1993; Oude Lansink and Stefanou, 1997) of the restricted profit function (see equation 1). 
The SNQ is a flexible functional form that allows for negative profits and for curvature 
conditions (convexity in prices) to be imposed globally. Another advantage is that the estimation 
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results do not depend on the choice of a numeraire netput (as is the case for the also frequently 
used normalised quadratic). The SNQ profit function (for all farmers h) takes the following form: 
«fcOv,,*»,) = í.amvu +iw~1I¿a(ív(,vy, + ¿ tr.vfc, +¿wi Zp^z^z^ (14) 
where 7tH (v f t, zm) profit of farmer h in year t, v„ price of netput i in year t, z m quasi-fixed input 
or quasi-fixed output k of farmer h in year t. Symmetry is maintained by requiring a¡j=aji and 
4 
Pkn=Pnk- Linear homogeneity in prices is imposed by the termw=^0,v a , where 0¡ are non-
negative constants determined as the average shares of netput / (/=1,..,4) in total costs plus 
revenues. Additional restrictions = 0 (vi = 1,..,4) have to be imposed, in order to identify 
all parameters ay. 
Netput equations (r=l,..,4 and for all farmers h: see (3)) are derived using Hotelling's lemma 
9* + w - 1 ¿ a j / v f , - i^w- 2 i ia i ; v„v + i/^z^ + ^ ^ 1 1 ^ * (15) 
Shadow price equations (k=0,..,6 and for all farmers h: see (3)) are derived taking the first order 
derivative of the profit function with respect to the quantities of fixed outputs and inputs: 
4 6 
1=1 »=0 
Notice that shadow prices between farms only depend on differences in the level of quasi-fixed 
inputs. Assuming the management of wildlife and nature variable the supply function can be 
derived by taking the inverse of the shadow price equation (14) and replacing the shadow price 
by the market price (w l ) . The supply function of wildlife and landscape management is given by: 
4 6 
~ h=l , . . . ,H (17) 
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See CBS/LEI Landbouwcijfers 2000 for norms on gross margins for different products 
5 The authors thank Stijn Reinhard for providing the methods for aggregating data. 
6 Prices in the paper are given in euros. However, the research was done in guilders. 
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The market price is either constant or is determined by equating demand and supply. In the 
simulations we assume a constant elasticity demand curve, hence \ed | is constant 
Data and Estimation 
Data on specialised dairy farms covering the period 1986/87 - 1999/00 come from a stratified 
sample of farms keeping accounts on behalf of the Dutch Agricultural Economics Research 
Institute (LEI) farm accounting system. The stratification is based on economic farm size, age of 
the farmer, region, and type of farming. Annual data of participating farms are available. The 
data set used for estimation contains 6203 observations on 1237 farms. In the sample (very) small 
farms and non-specialised farms are not represented. Data is used from Dutch dairy farms that 
have more than 50 per cent of their Dutch standard gross margin from dairy farming4. The farms 
usually remain in the panel for about five years, so the data set forms an incomplete (or 
unbalanced) panel5. Data for the average farm in 1999/00 are given in Table A. 1 in the Appendix. 
If prices at the farm level are available in the FADN, they are used to calculate price 
indices6. If prices are not present in the FADN, price indices are borrowed from CBS/LEI-DLO 
(2000). In this study we used implicit quantity indices. Implicit quantity indices are obtained as 
the ratio of value to price index and therefore quantities are in prices of a specific year, 1991 is 
the base year. The price index used in this study is the average of the multilateral Tornqvist price 
index over the farms for every year. This price index varies over the years but not over the farms, 
implying that differences in the composition of a netput with respect to quality are reflected in 
the quantity (cf. Reinhard, 1999:25). 
In the model two supply-constrained outputs, one unconstrained output, three variable 
inputs and five quasi-fixed inputs are distinguished. The first constrained output is milk (milk 
quota).The second constrained output is wildlife and landscape management The variable 
wildlife and landscape management is based on the decrease in production of grass expressed in 
kilo fodder unit milk per hectare (kFUM) (energy content of fodder). The price used in the 
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simulations is based on the financial compensation for wildlife and landscape management. The 
compensation is based on (Heinen, 1997: 3): 
• the decrease in production of grass expressed in kilo fodder unit milk per hectare 
(kFUM) (energy content of fodder) ; 
• the increase in labour input in hours per hectare; 
• the change in operating costs (e.g. lower fertiliser expenditures) is deducted. 
The production of grass differs under different contracts because of prescriptions set by the 
government or nature organisations. For example, in The Netherlands there are five contracts for 
nesting periods possible that differ in the date the nesting period ends: June 1, June 8, June 15, 
June 22, and June 30. The starting date is the same for all these contracts: April 1. When the 
nesting period gets longer the decrease in kFUM will be larger and more wildlife and landscape 
management. The financial compensation per kFUM can change every year, also for contracts 
that were concluded in previous years. 
The unconstrained other output is an aggregate of revenues from marketable crops, beef 
and veal, pigs, poultry and other farm revenues. The three variable inputs are purchased feed for 
cattle, dairy cattle and other input. Purchased feed contains purchased concentrate and roughage. 
The price index of dairy cattle is calculated as the multilateral Tdrnqvist price index of the 
revaluation of the dairy livestock. The revaluation of the livestock equals the difference in value 
of livestock at the start-balance and end-balance of each year. The other input is a composite of 
feed for animals other that dairy cattle, seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, contract work, veterinary 
services, fuel, energy, other cattle and other variable inputs. 
Quasi-fixed inputs are labour, land, buildings, and machinery. Labour consists of total 
family labour measured in hours. Land is measured as the total area of farmland in hectares. A 
Tornqvist price index is used to aggregate the price indices of the components of capital stock. 
The characteristics of the data are summarised in Table A. 1. 
Using data from a non-representative survey under Dutch dairy farmers (30 farmers) we 
assume fixed transaction costs to be € 175 and the variable transaction costs 4% of the 
compensation paid to farmers. Fixed transaction costs were measured as labour costs (hours 
times wage level of workers in agriculture) of concluding a contract with the government. 
Elements are costs for gathering information about wildlife and landscape management contracts, 
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costs of analysing opportunities and negotiation costs. The variable costs were measured as 
labour costs of monitoring and administrative tasks (e.g. reporting to the government or nature 
organisations). Falconer (2000: 388) reports similar results. 
The system of equations (15) is estimated with additive error terms included prior to 
estimation. Every farm is assumed to have a farm-specific intercept, reflecting differences in 
farm characteristics (e.g. management quality and soil quality). A fixed-effects model explicitly 
accounts for this assumption. The necessary transformation for such a model can also be applied 
to an incomplete panel, like our data set (see Thijssen, 1992). The profit function is not estimated 
along with the netput equations, since the intercepts of the netput equations appear as slope 
coefficients in the profit function. Including the profit function during estimation requires direct 
estimation of all farm-specific intercepts. Note that all parameters of the profit function and 
shadowprice equations are identified in the netput equations. 
Error terms may be correlated across equations. Therefore, the estimation technique used is 
SUR (Johnston and Dinardo, 1997, 318-320). The covariance matrix of residuals used in 
estimating the system is corrected for the difference in the number of observations (Judge et al., 
1988, p.462). The estimation results can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix and show that 
about half of the parameters are significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent significance 
level. 
6.4 Simulations and results 
Supply equation wildlife and landscape management 
Table A.3 in the Appendix presents the supply equation of wildlife and landscape management 
(equation 17). Supply of wildlife and landscape is increasing in price (wj). The coefficients of the 
netput prices are negative. So other output is a substitute for wildlife and landscape management. 
Higher feed prices make the management of wildlife and landscape less attractive because a 
higher production of these services leads to less roughage production on the farm and more 
purchased feed demand. Supply of wildlife and landscape management is negatively related to 
the milk quota level, so an increase in milk production leads to a decrease in supply. The 
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estimates for land, labour, and machinery imply that larger amounts of these quasi-fixed inputs 
on the farm result in higher supply of wildlife and landscape management. Larger amounts of 
buildings result in a lower supply of wildlife and landscape. One could conclude that the main 
inputs for wildlife and landscape management are land and labour. 
Simulations 
In the base simulation individual farmers decide whether or not to manage wildlife and landscape 
given that the price of the services is fixed. Farmers manage wildlife and landscape only if profit 
increases (equation 9). Farmers supply services till the point where marginal costs equal the price 
the government or nature organisations offer. The price is assumed to be €0,30 for every farm. 
Moreover, we assume fixed and variable transaction costs equal among farmers. So the base 
simulation represents the situation where wildlife and landscape management is variable. The 
simulation is performed using equations 9, and 17 and an equation to calculate profit. Profits are 
calculated as the value of variable outputs minus inputs plus the revenue form wildlife and 
landscape management minus transaction costs. Because these equations are mutually dependent 
a search algorithm (in GAMS) was used to solve the set of equations. 
In the first simulation farms co-operate in order to reduce fixed transaction costs. It is 
expected that this leads to more farms producing wildlife and landscape management. However, 
the price, and therefore marginal costs, does not change which implies that the level of 
management of farms already managing wildlife and landscape in the base run does not change. 
We assume fixed transaction costs for an individual farmer to be equal to his initial fixed 
transaction costs divided by the number of farmers participating in the co-operative. 
The second simulation is identical to the first except that in this simulation we no longer 
assume perfectly price elastic demand but a downward sloping constant elasticity (assuming that 
the price elasticity of demand equals 4) of demand function for wildlife and landscape 
management. 
The third simulation is identical to the second simulation but farms co-operate not only to 
reduce fixed transaction costs but also to achieve bargaining power (see equation 13). 
During the simulations input and output prices are held constant This seems realistic 
because wildlife and landscape management is relatively small compared to milk production. 
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Farms are selected for an area where farmers actually manage wildlife and landscape. In the 
model, the effects are determined for 12 individual farms in the sample for the year 1999/00 all 
located in the areas Krimpenerwaard, Alblasserwaard, and Vijfherenlanden in the province of 
South-Holland in The Netherlands. Given the regional differences environmental co-operatives 
act regionally therefore we did not take the representative sample for the Netherlands, although 
we used this sample to estimate the model. 
The simulations describe the effects on management of wildlife and landscape, farm 
profits, the number of farms managing wildlife and landscape and transaction costs. 
Results 
In a situation where farmers can share fixed transaction costs (simulation 1) 1 extra farmer will 
manage wildlife and landscape (see Table 6.1). Wildlife and landscape management increases 
with 23% which is only due to the management by the extra farmer. Profit for all farmers 
managing wildlife and landscape increases due to the reduction of transaction costs for farmers 
participating in the environmental co-operative. 
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Table 6.1: Wildlife and landscape management under different scenarios for 12 individual 
farms, located in the areas Krimpenerwaard, Alblasserwaard, and 
Vijfherenlanden, 1999/00. Results of the scenarios compared to the base run. 
Co-operation 
Wildlife and landscape 
management 
(€ 1000) 
Price wildlife and 
landscape management (€) 
Number of farmers 
managing wildlife and 
landscape 
Transaction cost per unit 
of wildlife and landscape 
management 
(€ 1000) 
Base run: Simulation 1: Simulation 2: Simulation 3: 
no co- Base run plus simulation 1 simulation 2 
operation reduction fixed plus elastic plus bargaining 
transaction costs demand power 
1.7 
0.30 
2 
0.052 
+23% 
0 
3 
-24% 
+9% 
-2% 
-19% 
+5% 
-22% -16% 
Source: own calculations 
In the second simulation the government has an elastic demand for wildlife and landscape 
management and neither farmers nor government have market power. Under this simulation 
price, wildlife and landscape management and number of participating farmers are lower 
compared to a situation with a fixed price but higher than in the base run. A reduction in 
transaction costs leads to extra farmers participating and therefore to extra management. This 
increase in management leads to a lower price, and therefore, less management which partly 
offsets the management increase caused by the reduction in fixed transaction costs. 
In the third simulation the environmental co-operative has monopoly power. In case of 
monopoly farmers are able to set a mark-up above their marginal costs. In case of a monopoly 
farmers produce less wildlife and landscape management compared to the other simulations. 
However, profit is higher. The price is higher than the price in the base run. The results in this 
simulation depend on the assumption that the government or nature organisations only do 
business with the environmental co-operative in a specific area and not with individual farmers. 
At the given market price two farmers extra would like to manage wildlife and landscape and 
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Sensitivity analysis 
This section contains two sensitivity analyses. First, the outcomes of the base run are determined 
for two alternative levels of fixed transaction costs: 20% lower transaction costs and 20% higher 
transaction costs. Second, the outcomes of the base run are determined for two alternative prices 
of wildlife and landscape management: 20% lower prices and 20% higher prices. The results of 
both sensitivity analyses are given in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: Effect of different levels of fixed transaction costs and prices of wildlife and 
landscape management on production and profit 
Production wildlife and landscape Profit (€ 1000) 
management (€ 1000) 
Transaction Prices Transaction Prices 
Farm Base cost Base costs 
number run -20% +20% -20% +20% run -20% +20% -20% +20% 
1 0.53 197.8 197.9 
2 0.87 66.1 66.5 
3 0.84 0.84 0.84 1.63 257.1 257.1 257.1 258.7 
4 0.91 0.91 0.91 1.70 140.3 140.3 140.3 142.0 
5 85.7 
6 26.5 
7 1.20 121.6 122.7 
8 25.2 
9 75.9 
10 107.7 
11 0.51 76.7 76.7 
12 0.84 129.8 130.1 
Source: own calculations 
* For production only positive values are given andfor profit only values different from the base 
run 
Lower (higher) fixed transaction costs make it more (less) attractive for individual farmers to 
manage wildlife and landscape. With 20% lower fixed transaction costs or with 20% higher 
transactions costs still 2 farmers manage wildlife and landscape. Forming an environmental co-
operative to share fixed transaction costs is more (less) attractive with high (low) transaction 
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costs. Notice that the level of fixed transaction costs does not influence the production level but 
does influence profits. 
Lower (higher) prices result in fewer (more) farmers managing wildlife and landscape and 
lower production per farmer. There are two reasons for this. First, with lower (higher) prices less 
(more) farmers can earn back the fixed transaction costs resulting in less (more) farmers joining 
the co-operative. Second individual farmers produce more (less) wildlife and landscape 
management at higher (lower) prices. Farm profits increase with higher prices and decrease with 
lower prices. 
6.5 Summary and conclusions 
Objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical and empirical model for analysing the decisions 
of individual farmers whether or not to manage wildlife and landscape, how much of these 
services to produce in a situation with and without co-operation from other farmers. The 
motivations for co-operation analysed are: (1) reduction of transaction costs and (2) building up 
of bargaining power. The model is applied to Dutch dairy farmers as the main users of 
agricultural land in the Netherlands. 
The reduction of fixed transaction costs makes it attractive for farmers to form an 
environmental co-operative in case of a fixed price for wildlife and landscape management. 
Therefore more wildlife and landscape management is produced. However price - and therefore 
marginal costs - do not change, so if a farmer already produced wildUfe and landscape 
management before the co-operative existed, his production does not change, but his profit does. 
If demand is no longer perfectly elastic (price is endogenous) an increase in wildlife and 
landscape management leads to lower prices offsetting part of the wildlife and landscape 
management and profit increase caused by lower fixed transaction costs. However, if the 
environmental co-operative acts as a monopolist, an improved bargaining position leads to a 
decrease in the management of wildlife and landscape and higher prices, but also to a smaller 
number of farmers producing wildlife and landscape management. This situation could still be 
socially optimal, compared to a situation without the co-operative, because of a potential 
reduction in public transaction costs or transaction costs of nature organisations. The latter result 
110 
Individual farmers contracts 
shows the importance of the entrance policy of the co-operative: who can become a member and 
under which conditions? 
Results of our study are obviously subject to some qualifications. First, the model is a 
short-term model. Changes in technology, for example, are not accounted for. Moreover, welfare 
analysis is not possible because the model does not contain consumer benefits and transaction 
costs of the demanders of wildlife and landscape management. Extending the model in this 
direction could be worthwhile in future research. Notwithstanding these qualifications the model 
presented is a powerful tool for the study of wildlife and landscape management and the motives 
for forming environmental co-operatives. 
I l l 
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Appendix 
Table A.l: Data for average specialised dairy farm in the Netherlands in 1999/00 
Variable Unit Average Standard deviation 
Output: 
98 • Milk 1000 '99 Euro 162 
• Wildlife and landscape 1000 '99 Euro 1 2 
• Other output 1000 '99 Euro 41 57 
• Variable input: 
30 • Feed input 1000 '99 Euro 36 
• Cattle input 1000 '99 Euro 3 3 
• Other 1000 '99 Euro 35 25 
Quasi fixed inputs: 
• Labour hours 4242 1609 
• Land ha 41 23 
• Capital buildings 1000 '99 Euro 204 121 
• Capital machinery 1000 '99 Euro 87 60 
Source: FADN 
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Table A.2: Estimation results 
Parameter Estimate t-ratio parameter estimate t-ratio 
Yio -0.2003 8.70 CI22 9.1895 2.61 
Yn -0.6195 -1.07 Ct23 -0.3603 0.00 
Y12 8.0099 5.33 CX33 24.8803 0.00 
Yl3 1.2708 6.42 ßoo -0.0001 -1.36 
Yl4 0.0680 6.51 ßoi 0.0003 -0.17 
Yl5 0.0966 4.26 ß02 0.0035 1.10 
Yl6 1.0741 2.64 ß03 0.0006 1.85 
Y20 -0.2208 -18.29 ß04 -0.001 -3.44 
Y21 -0.7135 -2.12 ß05 0.0003 6.17 
Y22 -0.5852 -0.70 ß06 0.0037 3.23 
Y23 0.5789 5.51 ßll -0.0085 -0.29 
Y24 -0.0219 -3.79 ßl2 0.2133 1.36 
Y25 -0.0105 -0.84 ßl3 0.0195 1.27 
Y26 1.3815 5.94 ßl4 -0.0012 -1.10 
Y30 -0.0117 -21.17 ßl5 0.0037 1.26 
Y31 -0.0480 -2.63 ßl6 -0.0646 -1.23 
Y32 0;0222 0.53 ß22 -1.7309 -4.69 
Y33 -0.0322 -6.52 ß23 0.02155 0.73 
Y34 -0.0007 -2.48 ß24 0.0067 3.63 
Y35 -0.0004 -0.58 ß25 -0.0037 -0.96 
Y36 0.0529 4.90 ß26 -0.0124 -0.14 
Y40 -0.0419 -5.88 ß33 0.0056 1.69 
Y41 -0.3837 -1.85 ß34 0.0005 2.11 
Y42 4.0726 8.10 ß35 -0.0015 -4.37 
Y43 -0.9008 -14.47 ß36 -0.0165 -1.61 
Y44 -0.0021 -0.60 ß44 0.00003 2.03 
Y45 -0.0223 -2.94 ß45 -0.0002 -5.96 
Y46 -0.3920 -2.52 ß46 0.0011 1.46 
a n 0.0487 0.01 ß « 0.0001 1.50 
0tl2 -0.6087 -0.20 ß 5 6 -0.0024 -1.48 
0.4379 2.61 ß<56 -0.0384 -0.80 
Observations 
Farms 
Period 
6203 
1237 
1986/87-1999/00 
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Table A.3 presents the supply equation of wildlife and landscape management (equation 17). 
Notice that this equation is not directly estimated but the coefficients are from the estimated 
netput equations. 
Table A.3: Supply equation wildlife and landscape management for dairy farms in the 
Netherlands 
w , Vl v 2 V3 V4 Zo z 2 Z3 Z4 z 5 Z6 
Supply 2844 -1762 -2029 -136 -1091 -0.82 532 20 -3 6 -40 
Source: own calculations 
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Chapter 7 
Environmental co-operatives: a new institutional arrangement for farmers 
7.1 Introduction 
Environmental co-operatives are a relatively new phenomenon in Dutch agriculture. Slangen 
(1993; 1994) analysed the possibility of groups of farmers (clubs) managing wildlife and 
landscape. His studies had an economics background and were theoretically oriented. Others, like 
those of Corporaal (2000) and Oerlemans et al. (2001) were more practically oriented and 
focused on the activities and problems of environmental co-operatives. Other studies in the 
Netherlands were more or less case-studies, e.g. Hees et al. (1994); Renting, et al. (1994); 
Driessen et al. (1995: 94-108); and Seines (1999). These studies have a sociological, public 
administration and/or public policy background. 
Also outside the Netherlands the (potential) role of groups of farmers managing wildlife 
and landscape has been recognised. Hodge (1991a: 191-193; 1991b: 382) analysed the possible 
role of groups of people in managing of wildlife and landscape. The collective interests of these 
groups are more related to the public interest than those of private owners individually. While 
some elements of the countryside do approach the qualities of pure public good, such as in the 
case with its existence value, other elements are closer to private goods. In the case of the 
provision of countryside goods like wildlife, landscape or amenity, the problem of collective 
provision is that the good being produced cannot be restricted to the members of a 'club' (Dwyer 
and Hodge, 1996: 36). Hence the critical question is whether it is possible to exclude people from 
benefiting from something once it has been provided. The majority of the Conservation, Amenity 
and Recreation Trusts (CARTS) discussed by Dwyer and Hodge (1996:42-43) do not conform to 
the club "model". Compared to these CARTS, environmental co-operatives can have an extra 
dimension in the sense that they contract with individual farmers for the provision of goods and 
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services. These contracts have many private-goods characteristics and non-members can easily 
be excluded from the possibility of being contracted by the club. Falconer (cf. 1999a: 9; 2000: 
392) suggests that farmer networking could be important to the overall rurining costs of a 
scheme. Hodge (2001: 108) states that conditions should be established by which groups of 
landholders can agree to adopt a co-ordinated approach to resource management. In Australia, 
farmers organise themselves in Landcare group networks (cf. Sobels et al. 2001:266). Activities 
of these groups take place on private and public land and include meetings, field days and farm 
walks, property and catchment planning; applications for government funding; and conducting 
on-ground works such as tree planting, pest-animal and weed control and fencing to manage 
stock access to remnant vegetation and waterways, etc. (Sobels et al. 2001:266). 
This chapter contributes to the literature by making theoretically and empirically the first 
analysis of the diversity of environmental co-operatives as institutional arrangements in the 
Netherlands. Further, this study's approach differs from existing studies because of its focus on 
institutional aspects of groups of farmers managing wildlife and landscape. A more general 
description of environmental co-operatives, i.e. their number, geographical distribution, 
relevance for agricultural land use, activities, and problems, is important for gaining insight into 
the relevance of this phenomenon. This implies that it is necessary to describe environmental co-
operatives and to answer the first basic question as to what environmental co-operatives are. The 
second question to be analysed in this chapter is why these co-operative arrangements originated 
in the Netherlands. To answer this question a number of explanations for the founding of 
organisations in general and an environmental co-operative in particular are discussed from a 
New Institutional Economics point of view in Section 7.2. The environmental co-operatives as 
"club" arrangement and the role of the institutional environment will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
These explanations together with the question of what are environmental co-operatives will be 
analysed empirically in Section 7.3. This chapter ends with a summary and conclusions. 
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7.2 Explanations for collective action among farmers 
An environmental co-operative acts as an intermediary between a service contractor (e.g. the 
government) and individual farmers (service providers). An intermediary is an economic agent 
that purchases from suppliers for resale to buyers or that helps buyers and sellers meet and 
transact (cf. Spulber, 1996: 135). Several explanations are possible for the development of 
environmental co-operatives from an institutional economics point of view. The following 
reasons for the development of environmental co-operatives are analysed in this chapter 
1. savings on transaction costs ; 
2. a way of coping with market failure; 
3. preventing of "hold-up" problems; 
4. building countervailing power, 
5. an alternative to government intervention. 
These explanations will be discussed from an institutional economics point of view in the 
remaining section. 
The first reason is the reduction transaction costs for the parties to an arrangement The 
alternative situation would be that farmers conclude contracts for wildlife and landscape 
management on an individual basis. According to transaction cost theory, there are three critical 
dimensions involved in a transaction, which are important for the level of the transaction cost: 
asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency (see Chapter 3). The first and most influential 
dimension is asset specificity, which has been already discussed in Chapter 3. The second 
dimension (uncertainty) relates to the assumption of human agents being subject to bounded 
rationality. Uncertainty reveals itself in the assumption of bounded rationality. Uncertainty is 
evident in wildlife and landscape management, e.g. in the population dynamics of grassland 
birds, in weather conditions, etc. The third dimension, frequency, involves the repetition of the 
same transaction. It is much easier to learn about prices, quality of products, etc. if there are a 
large number of people in the market and a large number of exchanges are take place. 
Transaction costs are high when an exchange depends on a specific person, location or 
physical assets. In these conditions, the ability to bargain is low and the chances for opportunism 
are high. Rules or institutional arrangements like environmental co-operatives, which also make 
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the activities of others more predictable, can reduce transaction costs. Asset specificity and 
uncertainty for wildlife and landscape management depend on the kind of transaction and range 
from low to high. Frequency of transactions in an environmental co-operative is low because the 
transactions are occasional. An organised form of co-operation in the form of an environmental 
co-operative can reduce the transaction costs of supplying the impure public goods wildlife and 
landscape. 
The second explanation for institutional arrangements such as environmental co-operatives 
is based on the problems of non-rivalry and non-excludability. Both are reasons for market 
failure. Typical for wildlife and landscape are non-rivalry and to some extent non-excludability 
because of incomplete delineation of property rights. An environmental co-operative as 
institutional arrangement can reduce the cost of delineating the property rights and help extract 
some income from the asset. Moreover, market failure creates an incentive for producers to react 
collectively. Farmers need an institutional arrangement as a supporting structure for co-
ordination and motivation. The increase in the income potential of an asset has another 
effecl/incentive on the behaviour of its owners. It increases the aggregate gains from co-operation 
among them, which in return is expected to lead to better delineation of the asset (Barzel, 1997: 
95). 
A third explanation for the emergence of environmental co-operatives as an institutional 
arrangement is that individual farmers need an institutional arrangement to countervail 
opportunistic behaviour and hold-up problems in their relation with public and private 
contractors for wildlife and landscape management. The core of the hold-up problem consists of 
asset specificity together with incomplete contracting. Asset specificity refers to the degree to 
which an asset is committed to a specific task, and thus can not be redeployed to alternative uses 
without sacrificing the greater part of its value. Williamson (1996: 59-60) distinguishes between 
six types of asset specificity. For environmental co-operatives the following three types are 
relevant: 
1. Site specificity, which refers to an asset that becomes committed to a particular 
use owing to its location. The land used for preserving wildlife and landscape, 
because of its 'use' but also because of its 'site', is asset-specific. Valuable areas 
for wildlife and landscape are immobile and local (i.e. tied to a particular area). 
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2. Physical asset specificity, such as an investment in machinery, equipment or land, 
and having a narrowly defined purpose; investments in land or in machines only 
used for wildlife and landscape management have a narrowly defined purpose, and 
are sunk investments. 
3. Human asset specificity that arises through learning-by-doing. Preserving wildlife 
and landscape is a process of learning-by-doing; it requires an investment in 
human capital and time. 
The hold-up problem arises in the situation where each contracting party worries about being 
forced to accept disadvantageous terms later, after it has sunk an investment, or worries that its 
investment may be devalued by the actions of others. The party that is forced to accept a 
worsening of the effective terms of the relationship once it has sunk an investment has been 
'held-up' (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 136). 
A fourth explanation is that an institutional arrangement can be used for developing 
countervailing power with respect to public and private contractors. If farmers pay more attention 
to wildlife and landscape they will sacrifice gains, on the one hand, from the specialisation in 
more regular or prevailing agriculture. On the other hand, the attribute wildlife and landscape is 
an impure public good or common good. It lies, according to Barzel (1997: 5), in the 'public 
domain'. However, the (opportunity) cost for the farmer to produce wildlife and landscape is a 
private cost and the benefits of the attribute wildlife and landscape is an impure public good. This 
means that the property rights are different and vaguely defined, which leads to conflicts over 
residual claims and decision control. 
The fifth reason explaining the foundation of environmental co-operatives is also connected 
with market failure. Traditionally, market failure forms an argument for government intervention. 
Even if there is a justification for government intervention, an analysis of this interference is 
necessary. Such analysis casts light on the functioning of the government itself; after all the 
government can also fail (for an overview of non-market failure, see e.g. Wolf, 1993). 
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7.3 Environmental co-operatives in the Netherlands 
This section deals with the results of the mail survey1. In the Netherlands, the total number of 
environmental co-operatives encountered was circa 80 in 1999. These organisations had about 
6600 farmer-members. The total area in use by the members of environmental co-operatives was 
circa 134 thousand ha in 1999. The size and regional distribution of co-operatives of 
environmental co-operatives in the Netherlands in given Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: Regional distribution of environmental co-operatives in the Netherlands (n—41), 
19992 
Province Area in use Area in use in % Number of Number of Members in 
(* 1000 ha) of total co-operatives farmer- % of total 
agricultural area members number of 
farms 
Drenthe 4 2 2 70 1 
Friesland 23 8 16 590 8 
Flevoland . . , . , 
Gelderland 4 1 12 330 2 
Groningen 7 4 6 200 1 
Limburg 15 11 6 30303 40 
Noord-Holland 27 15 12 530 6 
Noord-Brabant . . , 
Overijssel 2 130 1 
Utrecht 17 19 10 590 13 
Zeeland 3 1 4 70 1 
Zuid-Holland 34 18 12 1060 9 
Total 134 7 81 6600 6 
Source: Questionnaire data and LEI/CBS, 2000 
The provinces Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland and Friesland counted for more than 60% of the 
total area wildlife and landscape management in the Netherlands. The most important provinces 
for the environmental co-operatives in the Netherlands were Friesland, Noord- and Zuid-Holland 
(and Gelderland). However, with respect to the number of members, Limburg seemed to be very 
important, followed by Zuid-Holland. The figure for Limburg was biased because all the 
The survey itself is discussed Chapter 4. 
No questionnaires were returned from Flevoland and Noord-Brabant 
This figure can be biased because it depends on an outlier for an area where every farmer automatically a member. 
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members of the farmers-organisation in that area are also members of one co-operative. On 
average, 7% of the total agricultural area was in use by environmental co-operatives. With regard 
to the land use, environmental co-operatives were most important for provinces in the western 
part of the Netherlands (Noord-Holland and Zuid-Holland). The participation of farmers is 
largest in Limburg and Zuid-Holland. Table 7.2 gives an overview of land-use, size and 
corresponding numbers of environmental co-operatives aggregated in the Netherlands. 
Table 7.2: Size characteristics for environmental co-operatives (n=41), 1999 
Category of land Land-use Land-use in % of Number of Average land-use of 
(*1000ha) land-use co-operatives co-operatives (ha) 
agricultural sector 
Grassland 109 11 58 1901 
Maize land 5 2 36 143 
Arable land 16 2 15 1041 
Non-agricultural land 2 13 137 
Rest land 2 8 297 
Total 134 7 81 1654 
Source: Questionnaire data 
The largest part of the land in use by the co-operatives was grassland, followed by arable land. 
On 11% of the total area of grassland in the Netherlands, co-operatives are active, whereas on 
arable land environmental co-operatives were not that important. The average size per co-
operative was also large for grassland4. The total average size of environmental co-operatives 
was about 1600 ha. The data from the survey showed that in regions where co-operatives are 
located, on average of 50% of the area is in use by members of the environmental co-operative. 
About 10 percent of grassland used by farmers who are members of an environmental co-
operative was contracted under the 'Regulation Management Agreement and Nature 
Development'5. About 75% of the environmental co-operatives contracted individual farmers. 
These contracts ranged from maintaining hedges and farmland margin management to tolerating 
meadow birds and combinations all kinds of activities. This means that the co-operative served 
as a principal, concluding contracts with individual farmers. If farmers were receiving financial 
4 The averages are calculated per category of land. 
5 Mininsterie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij (1996) Regeling Beheersovereenkomsten en 
Natuurontwikkeling, Den Haag. 
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compensation for these contracts, funding also originated from resources other than the 
'Regulation Management Agreement and Nature Development'. This could be the environmental 
co-operative itself (earning by selling products or from membership fees), the local government 
or other organisations (like the EU). In the latter cases the environmental co-operatives function 
as an intermediary. It is remarkable to observe the extent of non-agricultural areas - having no 
official status as agricultural land - used by co-operatives. This shows that not all the co-
operatives restrict their attention to agricultural areas exclusively. Table 7.3 gives an overview of 
activities of environmental co-operatives for 1999. 
Table 7.3: Main activities of environmental co-operatives (n=40), 1999 
Activities Number of co-operatives 
Taking place In development 
1. Wildlife and landscape management on own land 29 5 
2. Recreational products 13 10 
3. Decrease negative environmental externalities 13 4 
4. Wildlife and landscape management for others 12 8 
5. Regional products 8 11 
6. Water management 4 14 
Source: Questionnaire data 
The most frequent activity is wildlife and landscape management on the farmers' own land, 
followed by recreational products, decreasing external environmental effects and wildlife and 
landscape management for others. Programs relating to water cleaning or water buffering are less 
important, although many organisations were making plans in that direction. Organisations 
carrying out rather more activities were on average older than those with one or no activities. 
About 60 percent of the organisations in our sample was involved in wildlife- and landscape 
management on their own land. They value this activity also as the most important activity in 
their daily business. The 'organisations' believe that enthusiasm for the activities and objectives 
also plays an important role in the decision to become a member. 
In 1999, the average age of environmental co-operatives in the Netherlands was 3 years. 
About 30% of the organisations were older than 3 years and about 20% were founded in 1998. 
This means that the phenomenon of environmental co-operatives was then relatively new for the 
Netherlands. Due to this short period of existence, many organisations and activities were still 
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developing. Table 7.4 gives an overview of the difficulties environmental co-operatives have to 
cope with. 
Table 7.4: Difficulties in organising activities in an environmental co-operative, ordered 
from the most frequently to the less frequently mentioned (n = 39), 1999 
Difficulty: Percentage of 
organisations 
1. Delays in getting financial support 69 
2. Government regulations need changing 46 
3. Not enough time available to develop activities from ideas 44 
4. No co-operation from non-agricultural organisations in working area 31 
5. No difficulties 15 
6. No support from members/participants 5 
7. Other problems 3 
Source: Questionnaire data 
Many environmental co-operatives saw financing as one of most severe obstacles to developing 
ideas into activities like wildlife and landscape management contracting. Other bottlenecks were 
the lack of available time to develop ideas, and government regulations. Table 7.5 gives an 
overview of the most important funding sources. There was a difference in financial sources for 
organisational activities like monitoring and meetings, and production activities like preserving 
wildlife and landscape. Remarkable is that the environmental co-operatives were dependent on 
local governments for a major part of there financial resources. The non-response to this question 
can be partly explained by the following reasons: (1) the organisations did not have a clear 
picture yet; (2) they were not able to distinguish between different sources; or (3) their funding 
sources were mainly project-related and therefore they had no overview for the whole 
environmental co-operative. 
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Table 7.5: Financial sources of co-operatives for di) fferent activities, 1999 (percentage) 
Organisational activities Production activities 
(n=26) 
40 
7 
16 
24 
13 
in=2Jl 
Members 
Non-government 
Central government 
Local government 
Activities 
5 
6 
36 
43 
10 
Source: Questionnaire data 
Founding an environmental co-operative 
Reasons for starting an environmental co-operative are given in Table 7.6. The reasons are 
ordered according to their ranking and Likert scores (see Churchill, 1999: 392-395). In the 
questionnaire, farmers were asked to rate reasons on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 is very 
important and 5 is totally unimportant. The reasons were mentioned in the questionnaire in non-
systematic order. For each reason the rank was calculated - ranging from 1 to 12 - per co-
operative, depending on the average Likert-score for that reason given by a co-operative. The 
mean ranks were calculated as follows (cf. Siegel, 1956: 166-173): 
where Rj = rank total for reason j 
rji = rank of reason j of co-operative i 
I = total number of environmental co-operatives 
The mean ranks indicate the order of importance for the different reasons. To analyse the 
answers of the answers on attitude questions non-parametric statistics were used. The analysis 
was applied to the relations within the whole set of alternatives. The null hypothesis is that the 
alternatives listed for a specific question are chosen equally. Friedman's two-way analysis of 
variance by ranks is used to decide whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis under a 5% 
level of significance (Siegel, 1956). The number of alternatives and clubs were large enough to 
apply these tests. For every club, the alternatives were ranked from 1 to k. Then a mean rank was 
calculated for every alternative. In the case that every alternative is equally distributed, the mean 
2 > , 
I 
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ranks will be equal. The Friedman test determines whether the ranks of the alternatives differ 
significantly. The test statistic is distributed approximately as a x2-distribution. 
Table 7.6: Importance of reasons for starting an environmental co-operative, measured on a 
5-Likert scale where 1 is very important and 5 is totally unimportant, ordered 
from most important to most unimportant (n=36), 1999 
Reason: Mean Std. dev. Mean Rank 
1. Contribution to the management of wildlife and landscape 1.9 1.1 4.06 
2. Reaction to whishes of society 1.9 0.8 4.26 
3. Being an interest group 2.1 1.2 4.93 
4. To generate extra income by managing wildlife and landscape 2.3 1.1 5.40 
5. Restrictions on farming opportunities resulting from the 
development of wildlife and landscape management areas 2.3 1.3 5.44 
6. Co-operation with fellow citizens 2.4 1.1 6.01 
7. To improve co-operation among farmers 2.5 1.0 6.32 
8. Knowledge transfer between farmers 2.6 1.0 6.64 
9. Restrictions on farming opportunities resulting from 
environmental regulation 2.9 1.3 7.25 
10. To generate extra income through the production of new 
products (like regional products) 3.7 1.2 9.10 
11. To generate extra income by offering recreational services on 
the farm 3.7 1.0 9.29 
12. Restrictions on farming opportunities caused by urbanisation 3.9 1.5 9.29 
Medians for alternatives differ significantly at a 1 percent level.Friedman test (Siegel, 1956:166-
173), x*= 120,601, 
Source: Questionnaire data 
The responses of the environmental co-operatives - given in Table 7.6 - are used as indicators for 
the relevance of the explanations for founding environmental co-operatives. The questionnaire 
contained an "other reasons" response to offer the co-operatives an opportunity to list reasons 
that were not presented in the questionnaire. However, the "other reasons" responses did not give 
an indication that the list of reasons mentioned in the questionnaire could be improved. 
The most important reason for starting a co-operative is to contribute to wildlife and 
landscape management. This answer could be biased by the fact environmental co-operatives 
might think that they should find this important (respondents are subject to strategic behaviour). 
However, also the second response in ranking indicates an argument for starting a co-operative 
that is not directly related to income, and this answer should be less sensitive to strategic 
behaviour. Being a pressure group is seen as important for the foundation of the co-operative. 
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Generating income and coping with restrictions resulting from the development of wildlife and 
landscape management areas are the fourth and fifth reason for environmental co-operatives. 
This means that compared to other reasons, generating income was not the most important. 
However, in comparing the medians for the first five reasons it appeared that they do not differ. 
This means that the importance of the first five reasons do not differ at a 5% significance level 
(Friedman's two-way analysis of variance by ranks, significant at a level of 17.3% or lower). 
Further, developments in urban areas are not seen as an important reason for founding an 
environmental co-operative. 
Table 7.7 lists the five different explanations discussed in Section 7.2 and reasons from 
Table 7.6 that are used for the measurement of explanations. The contribution to the management 
of wildlife and landscape, reacting to societal wishes, and the generation of extra income are 
proxy variables for aspects of supply and demand and therefore related to markets and market 
failures. Co-operation is interpreted as a way to prevent the government from threatening to hold-
up the rent by going to another farmer. Being an interest-group is a proxy for countervailing 
power because it represents the idea of having more power collectively. Co-operation with fellow 
citizens can reduce transaction costs. Knowledge transfer means that the farmers do not have to 
search for information individually; and it is therefore thought to reduce transaction costs. Co-
operation in order to cope with restrictions resulting from wildlife and landscape management 
areas can thought of as an alternative to government intervention. 
The criteria forjudging whether reasons are recognised by an individual environmental co-
operative as important was a Likert score of 2 or lower. This means that on average a reason is 
considered rather important or very important. When several reasons were aggregated into one 
new reason the following criterion was used: the aggregated reason was recognised as one of the 
elements of was recognised. The remaining reasons in Table 7.6 cannot be aggregated. 
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Table 7.7: Explanation, measurement and percentage of organisations recognising reasons 
for founding environmental co -operative (n=36), 1999 
Explanation Related to reasons in Table Recognition of 
7.6 explanation (%) 
1. A way of coping with market failure 1,2,4 92 
2. Preventing of "hold-up" problems 7 53 
3. Building countervailing power 3 67 
4. Savings on transaction costs 6,8 70 
5. An alternative to government intervention 5 64 
Source: questionnaire data 
Coping with market failures is an important reason for founding an environmental co-operative 
for a large majority of the environmental co-operatives. Building up countervailing power, 
savings on transaction costs and an alternative to government intervention was recognised by a 
majority of the organisations. Preventing hold-up problems was perceived as a reason for 
founding a club by half of the environmental co-operatives. It is important to realise that 
measurement of these reasons is difficult and recognition of a reason by an environmental co-
operative does not imply that they successfully perform the task suggested by the reason. 
7.4 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter a general description of environmental co-operatives cites the number co-
operatives, their geographical distribution, relevance for agricultural land use, activities and 
problems. In 1999 about 80 environmental co-operatives had about 6600 farmer 
member/participants and 1600 non-farmer member/participants. On average 6% of the total 
agricultural area is in use by environmental co-operatives. The average size of a single co-
operative was about 1600 ha. Most co-operatives were active in Northern and Western 
Netherlands. In regions where a co-operative is located, about 50% of fanners were members of 
an environmental co-operative. About 75% of the environmental co-operatives concluded 
contracts with individual farmers. These contracts ranged from mamtaining hedges and farmland 
margin management, to tolerating meadow birds or geese. The main activities of an 
environmental co-operative are producing impure public goods like wildlife and landscape. 
Important services were consultation with others on behalf of the members, and working as a 
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pressure group. Lack of financial resources, governmental regulation and available time were the 
main problems of the co-operatives. 
Five main explanations for the development of environmental co-operatives are discussed 
from an institutional economics point of view. The explanations are that they are a way to: (1) 
cope with market failure; (2) save on transaction costs; (3) build up countervailing power; (4) 
provide an alternative to government intervention; and (5) prevent hold-up problems. From the 
survey it follows that these explanations are recognised as reasons for founding environmental 
co-operatives. Ranked in order of importance, elements of these explanations were: contributing 
to wildlife and landscape management, reacting to societal wishes, being an interest group, 
generating income from wildlife and landscape, and restrictions on farming opportunities 
following the development of wildlife and landscape management areas. 
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8.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the influence of the institutional environment on the institutional 
arrangement of environmental co-operatives, which means that the institutional arrangement will 
be discussed in more detail. The chapter focuses on the characteristics of environmental co-
operatives and not on contractual arrangements for producing goods or services in which 
individual farmers are involved. The analysis addresses the following two aspects of the 
institutional environment influencing environmental co-operatives: 
• general legislation on organisation forms; 
• changes in the informal institutional environment (expressing the wish of society). 
The basic issue in this chapter is whether evidence can be found for a relation between the 
institutional environment and individual environmental co-operatives. The first question is how 
the institutional environment in the Netherlands restricts or encourages environmental co-
operatives in their choice of a design for their institutional arrangement. This leads in the first 
place to a discussion of the influence of the general rules in the Netherlands concerning juridical 
forms of organisations on environmental co-operatives. In the second place, the perceived 
influence by farmers of the norms in a society is analysed. 
In Section 8.2, relationships between the institutional environment and environmental co-
operatives are analysed: what is the role of general laws on organisations, and what (if any) is the 
influence exercised by the wishes of society? The second question in this chapter is how the 
institutional arrangement of environmental co-operatives can be characterised. This question 
focuses on the issue of whether the institutional arrangement can be characterised as a club 
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arrangement, and this is analysed in Section 8.3. In Section 8.4 the results are presented of a 
survey related to the two research questions discussed in this chapter. Section 8.5 gives a 
summary and conclusions. 
8.2 The institutional environment as determining factorfor institutional arrangements 
Over the past decades, economists have given increasing attention to the role of institutions in the 
operation of economic systems. Individuals, including the members of an environmental co-
operative, are subject to restrictions resulting from both institutional arrangements and the 
institutional environment. Individuals also influence the institutional environment through for 
instance the electoral process (cf. Williamson, 1994: 323). The institutions relevant to 
environmental co-operative members consist of external and internal institutions (institutional 
arrangement). In this section the focus is on the external institutional environment. 
Law and the judiciary are reflected in constraints that originate in the institutional 
environment (cf. Williamson, 1996: 327). From New Institutional Economics it follows that 
without regulation of the ways to become a legal entity, farmers would change their organisation 
form because legal restrictions would no longer be relevant to the objective of reducing 
transaction costs. The juridical form of the organisation has consequences for the relationships 
within the organisation. Environmental co-operatives are not free in the choice of a certain 
organisational form. In order to be a legal entity, farmers have to follow general rules and 
procedures prescribed by Dutch law. This means that the formal institutional environment 
restricts or encourages farmers in their choice of an institutional arrangement 
Informal institutions are the second building blocks of the institutional environment. For 
analysing changes in the informal institutional environment the reference level is used as an 
indicator of the existing informal institutional environment. Hanley et al. (1998:103) define the 
reference level of the environment as the level of the quality of the environment the society finds 
it should be. According to Hanneman (1999:75) people have relative rather than absolute 
preferences for items, and they judge a situation not in terms of absolute levels of attributes but, 
rather in relation to some reference level. This can be the status quo, the pre-existing level of the 
item, or it can be a norm or an expectation regarding the item's level. When a new factory, which 
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pollutes soil, water and air, is established, the reference level is the situation before there was 
pollution, before there was a factory. In practice, the determination of a clear reference level is 
often controversial (Slangen, 2001: 27-28). Different polluters have different opinions about the 
reference level in a society compared to consumers. 
Bromley and Hodge (1990: 208-209) have a somewhat different view of the reference 
level. They connect the reference level with the allocation of the individual property rights of the 
farmers, i.e. the allocation of the power these rights confer, between them and the government. 
This allocation can change with time. How do changes in the allocation of property rights come 
about? An important influence on the changes is the shifting of people's preferences. Shifting 
preferences lead to change in the optimal level of environmental quality. This means that with 
shifting preference the reference level also changes. The status quo property rights arrangements 
that have served agriculture so well, exist for historical reasons and may not necessarily be 
appropriate for the future. Shifting values and changing perceptions of the role of agriculture will 
surely bring about at least marginal shifts in property rights and policy entitlement (Bromley and 
Hodge, 1990:212). 
Under the influence of changes in the institutional environment the meaning of the 
protection of property rights is shifting. Farmers may say: it is my land, and therefore I have the 
property rights. Non-farmers may say: it is our environment. Because of the environment or 
environmental goods, public goods are taking an increasingly larger part of the agricultural land 
(including the amenities) and are becoming part of the public domain (cf. Barzel 1997: 5). This 
has consequences for the specification and protection of property rights, and with that the right, 
for the compensation of farmers. It should be stressed that for common goods, there are no 
individual rights, only common rights. For the survey the term "wishes from society" is used 
because "reference level" as a proxy variable was more difficult to operationalise. 
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8.3 The club as institutional arrangement 
As already argued in Chapter 3, the design of hybrid institutional arrangements involving groups 
of individuals deserves attention. Central within this thesis is the club arrangement. A club is a 
voluntary group of individuals who derive mutual benefits from sharing one or more of the 
following: production costs of activities and services, the members' characteristics (e.g., 
members have land, are farmers), or a good characterised by excludable benefits (Cornes and 
Sandler, 1996: 347). When production costs are shared and the good is purely private, the 
institutional arrangement is a private good club. The internal institutions consist of institutional 
arrangements (including norms and values) among the members of the environmental co-
operative. Internal institutions evolve from human experience and incorporate solutions that have 
tended to serve people best in the past. Examples are customs and good manners. Violations of 
internal institutions are normally sanctioned informally (Kasper and Streit, 1998: 31). When 
clubs grow, there are increasing problems of internal information and informal control. 
Organisation costs rise as more formal institutions have to be implemented (Kasper and Streit, 
1998: 182). Some of the internal institutions are unique for a environmental co-operative, others 
deviate from institutions outside the environmental co-operative or within other environmental 
co-operatives. 
A difference between the governance of a hierarchical organisation and an institutional 
arrangement of a club is that the authority within a club is not allocated from the top down, but 
from the bottom up (cf. Brink et a l , 1999: 3). The members of clubs constitute the highest 
authority; they delegate power to other levels within the organisation. In this respect, there are 
two ingredients to a constitution of a club (co-operative): (1) the allocation of control rights, or 
votes; and (2) the allocation of income rights, or shares (cf. Hart and Moore, 1998: 37). Under 
outside ownership (a firm) the outsider holds all shares and votes. In a profit-oriented club, votes 
are allocated across the membership; and in a non-profit club, the allocation of shares is 
irrelevant. The control rights are important for a club because - for a given size of club - the 
members will have to agree about how to produce jointly. 
Environmental co-operatives are not only a supporting structure for facilitating 
transactions, but also organisations consisting of contractual relationships. The members of an 
environmental co-operative mostly maintain the power of control (ownership) over their assets, 
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such as land and other marketable goods. In these cases the farmers have the residual control 
rights: the owner of the asset has the right to decide all uses of the asset in any way not 
inconsistent with a prior contract, custom or law. However, the autonomy of the property rights is 
only partial because wildlife and landscape are partly common property. The property rights can 
not be delineated completely. Because of these partial rights the residual rights control rights are 
not completely in the hand of the farmers. So they are not the only owners and therefore do not 
have complete power of control over the wildlife and landscape. 
The advantage of the club as institutional arrangement compared to other institutional 
arrangements is assumed to be caused by the internal institutions (institutional arrangement) of 
the club. Applying the transaction cost theory, it follows that at any moment in time there is a 
finite set of institutional opportunities and organisational forms that are efficient in a certain 
institutional environment. In analogy to Coase's argument for the firm, a club is formed if the 
transaction costs of obtaining services inside the club are larger than the corresponding 
transaction costs outside the club (cf. Ruys et al., 2000: 425). A number of elements of such a 
club arrangement deserve attention: voluntarily membership; sharing of (club) good; existence of 
non-members; exclusion mechanism; dual decision; and optimality. These points are discussed in 
more detail: 
• First, members choose to belong voluntarily a club arrangement because they 
anticipate a net benefit from membership. The utility or expected income jointly 
derived from membership and from the use of other goods must exceed the utility 
associated with non-membership status. Furthermore, the net gain in utility or 
expected income from membership exceeds or equals membership fees or toll 
payments (Cornes and Sandler, 1996: 347). 
• Second, clubs involve sharing the use of an impure public good, the use of the 
service of the club, and sharing in the benefits. Sharing often leads to a partial 
rivalry of benefits as more and more members crowd one another, detracting from 
the quality of the service received. Crowding and congestion imply that one user's 
utilisation of the club good, decreases the benefit or quality of service still 
available to the remaining users. As such, crowding or congestion depends on the 
measure of utilisation, which could include the number of the members, the total 
number of the members who use the club's facilities, or the number of visitors to 
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the areas or provisions of the club (cf. Cornes and Sandler, 1996: 348). A club can 
ration use effectively by means of internal institutions as long as the club is small, 
and when the people meet sufficiently frequently that they can exercise mutual 
internal controls over property use. 
Club congestion may assume diverse forms: long files, long waits, slower and less 
service, and in the case of wildlife and landscape, lower quality. As membership 
size grows, both costs and benefits arise: costs involve increased congestion, while 
benefits result from cost reduction owing to the sharing of the provision expense 
associated with the club good. The club will expand to the point at which these 
additional crowding costs just equal the benefits from lower fees (cf. Ricketts, 
2002: 398). By adding a cost offset to the benefits derived from expanding the 
membership size, crowding leads to finite membership. If the facilities of the club 
are subject to crowding, new members will, beyond a certain point, reduce the 
service flow experience by the established group. 
• A third distinguishing characteristic of a club arrangement is the existence of non-
members. For pure public goods, all individuals can be members without crowding 
taking place, so that non-members do not exist. For club goods, non-members of a 
given club have two options: They can join another club proving the same good, 
or they may not join any club offering the club good. If all individuals in the entire 
population are allocated among a set of clubs with no overlapping or non-assigned 
individuals, the population is partitioned into a set of clubs. The number of clubs 
then becomes an important choice variable. When, however, some individuals do 
not belong to any club supplying the club good, then the population is not 
partitioned (Cornes and Sandler, 1996: 349). 
• A fourth distinguishing feature of club arrangements is the presence of an 
exclusion mechanism, whereby non-members and/or non-payers can be barred. 
Without such an exclusion mechanism, there would be no incentives for potential 
members to join (external free-riding) and for members to pay dues and other fees 
(internal free-riding). The external free-riding problem is a common-resource 
problem occurring when property rights are non-tradable, insecure, or unassigned 
(cf. Cook and Iliopoulos 2000: 336). The internal free-rider problem is common 
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property problem. This occurs when new members obtain the same patronage and 
residual rights as existing members and are entitled to the same payment per unit 
of patronage. This set of equally distributed rights combined with the lack of a 
market to establish a price for residual claims reflecting accrued and present 
equivalents of future earning potential creates an intergenerational conflict (Cook 
and Iliopoulos 2000: 336). This means a disincentive to invest for existing 
members. The associated cost of operation and provision of an exclusion 
mechanism must be less than the benefits gained from allocating the shared good 
within a club arrangement. 
• A fifth distmgdshing attribute of club arrangements concerns a dual decision. 
Since exclusion is practised, members with user privileges must be distinguished 
from non-members. Moreover, the provision quantity of the shared good must be 
determined. Insofar as the membership decision affects the provision choice, and 
vice versa, neither can be determined independently. Club membership includes 
several aspects: number of other members, relevant characteristics of other 
members, relevant characteristics of a member in question, and institutional 
arrangements within the club (cf. Ellickson, 1999: 1187). For pure public goods, 
however, only the provision decision needs to be considered - the membership is 
the entire population (Cornes and Sandler, 1996: 350). 
• A final feature that differentiates club goods from pure public goods concerns 
optimality. In the case of club goods, members or firms can form clubs that collect 
tolls through an exclusion mechanism. Under a wide variety of circumstances, 
these clubs can achieve Pareto-optimal results without resorting to government 
provision (cf. Cornes and Sandler, 1996: 350). When the club decisions are 
represented as a co-operative action, the resulting outcome will be a Pareto 
optimum for the members. As noted earlier, members belong to a club because 
they perceive a net benefit from membership. This characteristic is not used for 
further analysis because Pareto efficiency will not be realised with non-rational 
decision-makers (e.g. Furubotn and Richter, 1997:457). 
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The main formal organisational forms following from the formal institutional environment in the 
Netherlands with bottom-up authority delegation are formal associations, foundations and legal 
co-operatives. These organisational forms are frequently used in the Netherlands. Formal 
associations and legal co-operatives have members whereas the foundation has no members in a 
legal sense. Power in a foundation is with the board of the foundation. A foundation can have a 
number of people financing the organisation, but they have no control over the organisation. A 
foundation can be founded by one person which implies that we should not speak of a club at all. 
Formal associations and foundations are not allowed to share profits among the members, 
whereas legal co-operatives are allowed to do this. However, it is difficult to determine profits 
within legal co-operatives. A formal association is an organisation, whose legal statutes is 
formalised by a notary. In the articles of formal associations the organisation name, municipality 
of its location, goals, obligations of members (or the way obligations can be imposed), as well as 
the way the board will be nominated, are listed. Dutch law requires that associations be founded 
by more than one person. Control rights in the form of voting are distributed formally in legal co-
operatives and legal associations. An important difference between associations and legal co-
operatives is the allowance to make profits and to redistribute them among the members, which 
creates an extra incentive for the legal co-operative and its members in the form of a joint 
income. 
From the characteristics of the three organisational forms it follows that the formal 
association and legal co-operative come closest to a club arrangement because of voluntary 
membership, sharing, non-members, exclusion mechanisms, and a dual decision. Although there 
exist general rules and procedures regarding legal forms, the institutional arrangements are 
heterogeneous. A foundation differs more from the club because it does not have real members 
and the users of the facilities of a foundation do not have to be members. The characterisation of 
environmental co-operatives will be addressed empirically in Section 8.4. 
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8.4. Club arrangements and the institutional environment of environmental co-operatives 
This section deals with the results of the mail survey concerning club arrangements and the role 
of the institutional environment1. Based on the definition and characteristics of clubs 
arrangements derived in Section 8.2 it is analysed to what extent the environmental co-operatives 
fit this definition and characteristics. Further, the influence of the institutional environment will 
be analysed empirically. 
The institutional arrangement of environmental co-operatives 
In most environmental co-operatives farmers are members voluntarily. In areas with 
environmental co-operatives, on average about 50% of the fanners are members of a co-
operative. This means that non-members are present in such an area. Important activities of 
environmental co-operatives are concluding contracts with individual farmers and acting as a 
pressure group. Such activities involve sharing of costs and benefits. Sharing may cause 
problems if the club shares the costs and the benefits are owned privately. In the case of 
marketable, regional and recreational products, such a trade-off would be possible. 
Non-members can be excluded from the benefits of the club accruing to contracting 
members. However, it is difficult to exclude non-members from activities like being in a pressure 
group. Being a pressure group is seen as one of the tasks of environmental co-operatives. The 
dual decision is important because the provision of contracts to the individual members is 
dependent on deciding to be a member. No direct evidence was found for congestion in our 
questionnaire. 
Exclusion within co-operatives is often carried out by excluding non-members from 
concluding wildlife and landscape management contracts with the environmental co-operatives 
or producing regional products. In the case of a pressure group, exclusion is more difficult. 
However, it also depends on the objectives of the pressure group. If the co-operative succeeds in 
decreasing the negative external effects of the production within an area, non-members will 
benefit from this reduction in the sense that they will have better opportunities in this area. 
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The members for a large part finance the organisation and activities, while the most 
important source for funding the activities are the central, regional and local governments. These 
funding relations make the relation with the government as a principal more complicated. The 
organisations also expect the government to fund their activities. Table 8.1 shows the 
characteristics of the institutional arrangements of environmental co-operatives. 
Table 8.1: Institutional arrangements of environmental co-operatives in the Netherlands (in 
number of organisations/persons) 
Organisation type Number Farmer-members Other members Total area 
or participants or participants (*1000ha) 
Formal association 53 3000 1400 107 
Foundation 18 900 200 18 
Legal co-operative 4 2700 0 
Remainder 6 
Total 81 6600 1600 134 
Source: Questionnaire data 
From Table 8.1 it follows that the majority of environmental co-operatives in the Netherlands are 
formal associations (67%) or foundations (25%). Another, less important, organisational form is 
the legal co-operative, and some organisations have no legal form. In Section 8.3 it is argued that 
the formal association and legal co-operative come close to a club arrangement. This leads to the 
conclusion that the majority of the environmental co-operatives in the Netherlands can be 
characterised as a club arrangement. 
In the Netherlands the approximate total number of farmers participating in organisations 
of farmers with the objective of conserving wildlife and landscape is about 6600. About 3000 
farmers are members of an environmental co-operative organised as a formal association. About 
1400 non-farmers participate in formal associations. The remainder category in Table 8.1 
consists of co-operatives that have no legal status. Differences between club arrangements have 
been found for voting rules, membership fees, types of memberships, etc. The allocation of 
control rights within environmental co-operatives, in the form of a voting system, is organised in 
several ways. The control rights are not always the same for farmers and non-farmers. Often, the 
voting right in a formal association is depends on being a farmer or not In about 50% of the 
This is the area in use by the co-operative and not by the members 
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cases every member has one vote, 40% of the associations have a voting system where every 
member with a farm has one vote. The boards of environmental co-operatives play an important 
role in the functioning of the organisation: they often initiate and carry out new activities. The 
two main institutional arrangements for environmental co-operatives (associations) in the 
Netherlands implies that the majority of the environmental co-operatives can not be involved in 
commercial activities. This means that redistributing profits among the members cannot be one of 
the motives for founding these organisations. 
The institutional environment 
In the preceding section it is argued that the preferences in a society are a proxy variable for the 
reference level in a society. Environmental co-operatives were asked for their reasons for 
founding the co-operative to preserve wildlife and landscape. Wishes from the society were an 
important factor for founding an environmental co-operative. These wishes from society were not 
measured directly, but farmers were asked whether wishes from society played a role as a reason 
for founding their environmental co-operative. They ranked this factor as second most important 
for founding their organisation. Ranked by importance, income was the fourth most important 
goal in founding a co-operative. The most important reason for founding an environmental co-
operative was that farmers wanted to contribute to wildlife and landscape management. Other 
important reasons for founding an environmental co-operative were to improve the protection of 
interests of the farmers and to have an organisation for communicating between the members and 
for co-operating with non-farmers in an area. It can be expected that there be a difference 
between the stated goals of the organisation and the goals of the individual farmers. For 
individual farmers, enthusiasm, income and an organisation that negotiates with the government 
were important reasons to become a member. Acting as an interest group is also seen as an 
important task for a co-operative. The reasons for starting an environmental co-operative which 
are formally stated in the foundation acts, are presented in Table 8.2 down in the foundation acts 
are presented in Table 8.2. 
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Table 8.2: Formal reasons for starting an environmental co-operative (put down in the 
foundation act), ordered from most important to most unimportant (associations 
and legal co-operatives, n=23), 1999 
Reason: Frequency 
1. To contribute to wildlife and landscape management 22 
2. Sustainability of the farms of the members 18 
3. To act as intermediary between members and government 16 
4. To improve contacts between farmers and non-farmers in the working area 12 
5. To generate income from wildlife and landscape management 11 
6. To contribute to the decrease of harmful effects of agriculture to environment 7 
7. An organisation for the development of new ideas 6 
8. To generate income from recreation 5 
9. To generate income from regional products 4 
10. To exchange experience between members 4 
11. Other reasons 3 
12. To Stimulate research 0 
Source: Questionnaire data 
Most of the organisations want to contribute to wildlife and landscape management and to 
contribute to the sustainability of the farms. They also view themselves as a "governance" 
structure between farmers and the government. Generating income is not always a reason to be 
stated formally (11 co-operatives out of 23, Table 8.2). Communication between co-operatives 
was an important source of ideas for new activities. Exchanging knowledge was not seen as an 
important reason for founding an environmental co-operative. Acquiring knowledge or exchange 
knowledge is also not seen as a main objective to be stated in the founding act or as a reason for 
farmers to become members of an environmental co-operative. The environmental co-operatives 
believe that it is important that the government offer better opportunities for self-regulation. They 
were convinced that they can achieve government objectives in the area of wildlife and landscape 
management in exchange for no extra regulation by the government. 
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8.5 Summary and conclusions 
The majority of environmental co-operatives in the Netherlands (circa 70%) are formal 
associations and or legal co-operatives. This means that the majority of the environmental co-
operatives have a club arrangement A minority of the clubs were organised as foundations 
(25%). A club can be defined as a voluntary group of individuals who derive mutual benefits 
from sharing one or more of the following: production costs of activities and services, the 
members' characteristics (e.g., members have land, are farmers), or a good characterised by 
excludable benefits. Further, the results of the survey show that in most environmental co-
operatives, members explicitly choose to join (voluntarily), and delegation of authority is from 
the bottom-up via voting. Environmental co-operatives use exclusion mechanisms whereby non-
members and/or non-payers can be barred from, for instance, individual wildlife and landscape 
management contracting. However, it is difficult to exclude people from the benefits of beloning 
to a pressure group. 
In order to become a legal entity environmental co-operatives have to follow the general 
rules and procedures in the Netherlands relevant to the institutional arrangement they want to 
choose. This means that the formal institutional environmental determines the institutional 
arrangement of environmental co-operatives. Although there exist general rules and procedures 
on organisational forms in the Netherlands, environmental co-operatives have different kinds of 
(formal) institutional arrangements. Differences between environmental co-operatives have been 
found regarding: objectives of the environmental co-operative, voting rules, membership fees, 
types of memberships, etc. Important is that environmental co-operatives, in the form of 
associations or foundations, are not allowed to redistribute profits among the members, whereas 
legal co-operatives may do this. 
The influence of the informal institutional environment as an argument for founding a club 
played a role for farmers. The reference level of wildlife and landscape is used as a proxy 
variable for the institutional environment. This level represents the quality of wildlife and 
landscape the society finds it should be. "Wishes from society" measures the perceived (by the 
farmers) reference level in a society. For farmers "Wishes from society" played an important role 
as a reason for founding environmental co-operatives. 
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Contractual arrangements within environmental co-operatives: design principles 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter concerns the analysis of factors (design principles) that contribute to the success of 
environmental co-operatives. Initially, self-organised resource regimes can draw upon locally-
evolved norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness and the likely presence of local leaders in most 
community settings (cf. Ostrom, 2000: 149). However, for long-term survival and success more 
is needed. In this thesis the comparative success of environmental co-operatives is examined to 
see whether these organisations cope with contractual arrangement failures and club organisation 
failures. The question is whether environmental co-operatives use design principles. In order to 
analyse this question contractual arrangement failure is split up into hidden information, hidden 
action, and the lack of commitment and trust. 
Section 9.2 deals with design principles for reducmg/limiting the problems resulting from 
institutional arrangement failures from a theoretical point of view. The design principles modify 
the quality of self-organising and self-governing. Section 9.3 looks at whether design principles 
are used in practice by environmental co-operatives. Section 9.4 consists of a summary and 
conclusions. 
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9.2 Design principles 
In a perfect contract every contingency is anticipated; the associated risk is efficiently allocated 
between the parties; all relevant information has been commumcated; nothing can go wrong. A 
perfect contract is also efficient if no transaction costs are involved. Each resource is allocated to 
the party who values it the most; each risk is allocated to the party who can bear it at least cost; 
and the terms of the contract exhaust the possibilities for mutual gain by co-operation between 
the parties (Cooter and Ulen, 1996: 186). If the contract is perfect, the parties do not need the 
government to regulate its terms (cf. Cooter and Ulen, 1996: 187). This also leads to a complete 
institutional arrangement (cf. Furubotn and Richter, 1997: 23). However, contracts are imperfect 
when the parties are irrational or transaction costs are positive. Contract failures are present if 
external constraints are necessary or if a contract is badly designed (Menard, 2000: 238). The 
institutional arrangement could solve the problem - e.g. norms and trust - and lead to a perfect 
institutional arrangement, similar to a perfect contract. However, institutional arrangements are 
also susceptible to failure. 
In this chapter design principles that contribute to overcoming institutional arrangement 
failures are derived from economic theory. The definition of design principles used here is: 
design principles are essential elements or conditions that help to account for the success of 
environmental co-operatives in producing goods and gaining compliance of generation after 
generation of farmers to the rules in use (cf. Ostrom, 1990: 90 and cf. Ostrom, 2000: 149-153). 
An example of a design principle is the use of individuals who actively monitor the behaviour of 
farmers. 
It is important to keep in mind that institutional arrangements are incomplete, and therefore 
they should be considered incomplete from the outset. That is, institutional arrangements should 
be sufficiently flexible and open-ended that they will be able to adapt swiftly and at low cost to 
new circumstances (Furubotn and Richter, 1997: 29). In the remaining part of this section design 
principles to deal with information asymmetries are analysed and the lack of credible 
commitment and trust. The framework of this chapter is given in Figure 9.1. As already stated, 
the focus is on contractual arrangements and environmental co-operatives. The institutional 
environment is analysed only when that is relevant to institutional arrangements. 
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Contractual arrangement 
failures 
(bilateral) 
Club organisation 
failures 
(multilateral) 
Design principles 
Reduce institutional arrangement failures 
Figure 9.1: Design principles employed for dealing with contractual and club organisation 
failures. 
The first row of Figure 9.1 relates to two main institutional arrangement failures distinguished in 
this chapter: contractual arrangement failures and club organisation failures. The following two 
types of contractual arrangement failures are distinguished: information asymmetries and lack of 
credible commitment and trust. Information asymmetries are split up into hidden action and 
hidden information. The way information is produced, transferred, and made credible are 
characteristic features of an organisation (Furubotn and Richter, 1997: 270). Information is not 
distributed equally to the partners in an institutional arrangement. However, information 
asymmetries are not a problem if people have congruent interests (Tirole, 1999: 764). To make 
promises trustworthy, credible commitments need to be established (Furubotn and Richter, 1997: 
276). Agreements can be made binding by courts, however if this is not possible private 
enforcement is necessary. Club organisation failures are derived from the elements of clubs 
mentioned in Section 8.2. Design principles offer ways to reduce contractual and club 
organisation failures. 
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Hidden information 
Hidden information can lead to adverse selection. In that case the environmental co-operative 
does not know if one of the (potential) members possesses private information which, if known to 
the environmental co-operative, would influence the attitude and conduct of environmental co-
operative towards this (potential) member. Further, after signing of the contract, hidden 
information means that it is impossible or difficult to observe the disutility of the farmer from 
effort (if effort is observable). 
Ways in which the problem of hidden information {ex ante) can be reduced are signalling, 
screening, and monitoring mechanisms ex ante. Signalling occurs when the better-informed party 
makes certain verifiable facts known, which, if properly interpreted, may indicate the presence of 
other unobservable but desirable characteristics. In signalling, the privately informed party takes 
the lead in adopting behaviour that reveals their information. For signalling to be effective, the 
receiver must believe that the signal is credible. That is, the observable characteristic must clearly 
point to the unobservable, desirable characteristic (FitzRoy et al., 1998: 247). A signal for the 
qualification of a potential member for his or her ability to preserve wildlife and landscape to the 
environmental co-operative could be his education. For example, did he follow a course in 
wildlife and habitats management? This means that the farmer has to take the initiative to follow 
a course. Screening refers to activities undertaken by the party without private information 
(principal) in order to separate different types of informed parties (agents) along some dimension. 
It is the uninformed party who undertakes activities in order to make the informed agents group 
or sort themselves into separate types. Screening means that one of the contracting partners 
demands certain elements in the set of observed characteristics that are correlated with 
unobserved but desirable elements. According to FitzRoy et al. (1998: 247), screening is a 
strategy sometimes available to an uninformed party that, if successful, will get the better-
informed party to reveal information. An example of a screening mechanism is the requirement 
of delivering a certain minimum quantity or following a course. 
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Hidden action 
Hidden action means that it is assumed that effort of the farmers cannot be observed by the 
environmental co-operative and hence it is not possible to cover effort in a contract. The kind of 
monitoring necessary is called effort monitoring (cf. Lyons, 1996:29). Hidden action is an ex post 
phenomenon. This problem can be resolved by monitoring and incentive contracts. In all known 
self-organised resource governance regimes that have survived for multiple generations, 
participants invest resources in momtoring and sanctioning the actions of each other so as to 
reduce the probability of free riding. For wildlife and landscape management, incomplete 
information in important and hence monitoring gives valuable information that can help parties 
take strategic decisions (cf. Ostrom, 1990: 96, and cf. Furobotn and Richter, 1997: 85). At the 
time of monitoring the farmer has not yet completed his action (Strausz, 2000: 339). Monitoring 
has to be distinguished from the verification of an agent's to-date performance (auditing), which 
takes place afterwards, when the other party decides, upon signals such as output reports, to 
check the agent's compliance (cf. Strausz, 2000: 339). Monitoring is meant to induce a farmer to 
go to a lot of effort. Monitoring costs depend on what rules are adopted and how contracts are 
crafted. However, when monitoring is difficult, farmers can alter their input, and with less-then-
perfect detection, momtoring can then become ineffective and must be repeated successively. 
One of the problems is that the (specialised) monitor himself may shirk (Furubotn and Richter, 
1997: 154). In case of hidden action monitoring is not perfect by definition. Incentive contracts 
make agents indirectly take the correct actions (those that would be contracted for if his actions 
were observable). Payment is made conditional on variables that are observable to induce farmers 
to make an effort. An alternative solution is to require posting of bonds to guarantee 
performance, which can be paid back if the performance is satisfactory or the targets are reached. 
Or the other way around: a farmer could be required to post "a bond" which he or she would 
forfeit if discovered shirking (cf. Ricketts, 2002: 187). In contrast to monitoring within the 
organisation monitoring from outside the organisation can have negative effects on the 
effectiveness of the organisation. Several recent experimental studies have confirmed the notion 
that external rules and monitoring can discourage co-operative behaviour (Ostrom, 2000: 147). 
147 
Chapter 9 
Commitment and trust 
An important element in co-ordinating and motivating members of an environmental co-
operative is commitment of the members to long-term contracts. Commitment means that a 
contract will be implemented if one of the parties to the contract wishes so (Laffont and Tirole, 
1993: 437). The agents restrict their future actions in advance by pledging that they will stick to 
the contract until some predetermined date. Nothing prevents the parties form agreeing to alter 
the initial contract. Commitment can be achieved by foreclosing the opportunity to run away 
(Cooter and Ulen 1996: 170). To use a military analogy: burning the bridge behind you 
forecloses the possibility to retreat. It is a signal that you are willing to fight. However, the 
contracts within the institutional arrangement 'environmental co-operative' are mostly 
incomplete and complex, which gives rise to the problem of imperfect commitment. Given that 
relationship-specific investments are not contracted incomplete contracts lead to hold-up 
problems. Changes in asset ownership can affect the severity of the hold-up problem (cf. Hart, 
1995: 87). Imperfect commitment refers to the inability of parties to bind themselves to follow 
through on threats and promises that they would like to make, but which, having been made, they 
would later like to renounce. Asymmetric information plays a very limited role in the analysis of 
hold-up problems. 
In general, communication facilitates co-operation. However, in situations that generate 
strong temptations to break mutual commitments or where there is a lack of common values and 
norms, an environmental co-operative cannot rely entirely on communication to sustain co-
operation. Communication or commitment only is not enough, should it be credible. The crux of 
the problem of bringing about credible commitment in an environmental co-operative is 
monitoring conformance to a set of its own rules, graduated sanctions (sanctions depending on 
the seriousness and context of the offence) and conflict-resolving mechanisms. These activities 
should be carried out at low cost. Ostrom (1990: 45) emphasises the importance of monitoring: 
without mutual monitoring, there can be no credible commitment; without credible commitment 
there is no reason to propose new rules. The costs and benefits of monitoring depend on the rules 
adopted in an organisation. Contingent self-commitments and mutual monitoring reinforce one 
another, especially when appropriated have devised rules that tend to reduce monitoring costs 
(Ostrom, 1990: 100). A difference in monitoring between hidden action and commitment is that 
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monitoring for hidden action is related to the content of the contract whereas monitoring in the 
case of credible commitment is addressed to both formal and informal rules. 
Monitoring can be performed by the environmental co-operative itself or an external 
supervisor (delegation) (cf. Strausz, 2000: 353). However, mutual monitoring or monitoring by 
volunteers reduces the costs. Farmers who violate the rules are likely to be assessed graduated 
sanctions, depending on the seriousness and context of the offence. If individuals are going to 
follow rules over a long period of time, there must be some mechanism for discussion and 
resolving what constitutes an infraction. The presence of a conflict-resolution mechanism does 
not guarantee that the farmers will be able to maintain the agreements. However it is difficult to 
imagine how any complex system of rules could ever be maintained over time without such a 
mechanism. Such a mechanism could be sometimes quite informal. Those who are selected as the 
leaders could be also the basic resolvers of conflicts (cf. Ostrom, 1990: 94 -101). Building an 
individual reputation within an organisation is another form of showing commitment to that 
organisation. However, according to Ostrom (1990: 93-94) it is clear from case studies that even 
in repeated settings where reputation is important and where individuals share the norm of 
keeping agreements, reputation and norms are insufficient by themselves to produce stable co-
operative behaviour over the long run. 
Nooteboom (1999: 25) emphasises - in a similar way as for commitment - the role and 
meaning of trust in transactions. Trust lowers the cost of search and monitoring, because trusting 
people are less secretive and more readily supply information. Trust reduces the costs of 
contracting and control because it diminishes fears of opportunism and builds acceptance of more 
influence among partners. In the case of trust, people will deliberate and renegotiate on the basis 
of give and take ('voice') rather than walk out ('exit') when conflicts arise. Often, trust based on 
friendship or kinship will not suffice as the basis for co-operation. Trust is nice and can work, but 
we have to take into account that trust may not always work (cf. Kreps, 1990: 580). There is 
some overlap for the sources of commitment and trust. Trust is closely related to social norms of 
behaviour, which is also an important element in commitment However, commitment can also 
be realised with more formal rules or foreclosing alternatives. Both can have the same effect: 
reducing hidden action. 
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Club organisation failures 
Club organisation failures differ from contract failures in the sense that they originate in group-
processes. Only two types of club arrangement failure will be discussed: inadequate sharing rules 
and lack of an exclusion mechanism. First, clubs involve sharing in the use of an impure public 
good, the use of the service of the club, and sharing in the benefits. Sharing often leads to a 
partial rivalry of benefits as a larger membership crowd one another, detracting from the quality 
of the service received. Crowding and congestion imply that one user's utilisation of the club 
good decreases the benefit or quality of service still available to the remaining users. As such, 
crowding or congestion depends on the measure of utilisation, which could include the number of 
the members, the total number of the members who use the club's facilities, or the number of 
visitors to the areas or provisions of the club (cf. Cornes and Sandler, 1996: 348). Club 
congestion may assume diverse forms: long files, long waits, slower and less service, and in the 
case of wildlife and landscape, lower quality. As membership increases, both costs and benefits 
grow: Costs involve increased congestion, while benefits result from cost reduction owing to the 
sharing of the provision expense associated with the club good. By adding a (transaction) cost 
offset to the benefits derived from increasing membership, crowding leads to finite membership. 
A second potential source of club organisation failure is the lack of an exclusion 
mechanism. For pure public goods, all individuals can be members without crowding taking 
place, so those non-members do not exist. For club goods, non-members to a given club have two 
options: they can join another club proving the same good, or they may not join any club offering 
the club good. In the case of non-members clubs need some kind of exclusion mechanism, 
whereby non-members and/or non-payers can be barred. Members can be excluded on a 
temporary basis in line with graduated sanctions. Without such a mechanism, there would be no 
incentives for members to join and to pay dues and other fees. The associated cost of operation 
and provision of an exclusion mechanism must be less than the benefits gained from allocating 
the shared good within an environmental co-operative. 
An analysis of the costs of erection, operation and provision of an exclusion mechanism is 
important. If, for example, exclusion is not perfect owing to cost considerations, then free riders 
may utilise the club good. Field research confirms that the temptation to free-ride on the 
provision of collective benefits is a universal problem (Ostrom, 2000: 138). The design of the 
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exclusion mechanism, in terms of penalties and fees, needs to account for providing the proper 
incentive to both members and free riders. An important question is whether - based on exclusion 
cost arguments - an exclusion mechanism should include monitoring. The institutional form of a 
club may be tied to exclusion cost consideration (Comes and Sandler, 1996: 350). 
Overview design principles 
Figure 9.2 gives an overview of ways or design principles to reduce the effects of contractual 
arrangement failures and club organisation failures based on the literature. The design principles 
are referenced by their general name. Some of these principles consist of different design 
principles that can be summarised under the given heading. Further, design principles are often 
complex mechanisms for which many variations exist or can be developed. 
Hidden 
information 
(ex ante/ex post) 
• Signalling 
• Screening 
Hidden action 
(ex post) 
• Monitoring 
(effort) 
• Incentive 
contracts 
• Posting 
bonds 
Lack of credible 
commitment/trust 
(ex ante/ex post) 
Monitoring 
Graduated 
sanctions 
Conflict 
resolving 
mechanisms 
Building an 
individual 
reputation 
Foreclosing 
alternatives 
Club organisation 
failures 
(ex post) 
• Cost offset for sharing 
• Exclusion mechanism 
(penalties, fees, and 
monitoring) 
Figure 9.2: General design principles which reduce the effects of information asymmetries 
and the lack of credible commitment and trust 
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In Section 9.3, the ways environmental co-operatives take into account the design principles in 
their organisation is analysed. This does not mean that it is assumed that the institutional 
arrangement is always the result of careful planning, but the analysis focuses on the existing 
situation with respect to the application of design principles. The use of these design principles 
involves (transaction) costs; i.e. monitoring and conflict-resolving mechanisms are not for free. 
9.3 Currently applied design principles 
This section deals with the results of the mail survey7. This section focuses on the application of 
design principles in environmental co-operatives in the Netherlands. The categories of design 
principles mentioned in Chapter 9.2 are discussed on the basis the survey. 
Screening and signalling 
Table 9.1 gives an overview of the types of requirements the environmental co-operatives used 
before a farmer can become a member. 
Table 9.1: Requirements for farmers for becoming member of an environmental co-operative 
(only associations and legal co-operatives, n—29) 
Requirement Number of environmental co-operatives 
Yearly contribution 17 
Yearly contribution plus payment per hectare 4 
Yearly contribution plus entrance fee 2 
Yearly contribution plus course enrolment 2 
Payment per hectare 1 
Payment per hectare plus entrance fee 2 
Non compulsory yearly contribution 1 
Source: Questionnaire data 
The survey itself is discussed in chapter 4 
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The majority of the organisations required a yearly fee. The average yearly fee was about € 20 
per year. Only two associations had an entrance fee. It is questionable whether these entrance 
fees are high enough to function as a screening device. A few organisations had a yearly fee of 
about € 45. The payments per hectare ranged from € 1 - € 2.5 yearly. The incentive resulting 
from these fees will be higher. Only a few organisations used a course as a screening device: 
farmers have to follow a specific course before they can become member. 
Monitoring 
Monitoring to reduce the problem of hidden action is important for the co-operatives: 85% of the 
associations and legal co-operatives has some form of monitoring activity. Table 9.2 gives an 
overview of parties responsible for monitoring within environmental co-operatives. 
Table 9.2: Parties responsible for monitoring of activities (only associations and legal co-
operatives, number of observations = 29) 
Monitor Number of environmental 
co-operatives 
Environmental co-operative (e.g. members, the board, employees) 24 
Non-members (e.g investors, police) 11 
Monitoring is under development 5 
No monitoring 1 
Source: Questionnaire data 
From Table 9.2 follows that the co-operative itself played an important role in monitoring. One 
third of the organisations use an external party as monitor. More than 80 per cent of the 
organisations perform monitoring (evaluation) for their investors. Less than 10 of the 
organisations did not perform any momtoring or evaluations. Table 9.3 gives an overview of 
types of momtoring takes place. 
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Table 9.3: Types of monitoring of environmental co-operatives (only associations and legal 
co-operatives, number of observations = 29) 
Type of measurement Number of co-operatives 
Measurement in the field only 4 
Collecting data from farmers only 4 
Both measurement in the field and collecting data 13 
No measurement yet, but in development 3 
No measurement, but judgement by external professionals 4 
No measurement 1 
Source: Questionnaire data 
Of the environmental co-operatives that collected data from individual farmers only four use 
judgements of professionals. And of the organisations which both measure in the field and 
collect data, nine use judgements of professionals. External professionals do most of the 
assessment. Table 9.3 illustrates that environmental co-operatives use different mechanisms for 
monitoring. The organisations that only apply collecting data and judgements from external 
professionals do not monitor during the activity of preserving wildlife and landscape. From Table 
9.4 it follows that the environmental co-operatives also rank monitoring as one of the important 
tasks they perform. The mean ranks indicate the same order of importance for the different 
reasons. The reasons are ordered according to their mean rank. The mean ranks in Table 9.4 are 
calculated as follows (cf. Siegel, 1956: 155-173): 
where Rj = rank total for reason j 
rji = Rank of reason j of co-operative i 
I = total number of environmental co-operatives 
The mean ranks indicate the order of importance for the different reasons. To analyse the 
answers on attitude questions non-parametric statistics were used. The analysis was applied to the 
relations within the whole set of alternatives. The null hypothesis is that the alternatives listed for 
a specific question are chosen equally. Friedman's two-way analysis of variance by ranks is used 
to decide whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis under a 5% level of significance (Siegel, 
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1956). The number of alternatives and clubs were large enough to apply these tests. For every 
club, the alternatives were ranked from 1 to k. Next, a mean rank was calculated for every 
alternative. In the case that every alternative were equally distributed, the mean ranks would be 
equal. The Friedman test determines whether the ranks of the alternatives differ significantly. The 
test statistic is distributed approximately as a ^-distribution. 
Table 9.4: Importance of different tasks of environmental co-operatives ordered from most 
important to least unimportant (only associations and legal co-operatives, n=23), 
1999* 
Factor Mean Rank 
1. Being a pressure group 3.74 
2. Development of new ideas 4.41 
3. The exchange of knowledge and experience among members 4.52 
4. Consultations with societal organisations (e.g. environmental groups) 4.54 
5. Monitoring of the performance of tasks 4.89 
6. Stimulate research 5.33 
7. Disperse knowledge from outside among the members 5.48 
8. Administrative tasks 5.59 
9. Exchange knowledge and experience with non-members 6.50 
Medians for alternatives differ significantly for a 1 percent level,Friedman test (Siegel, 1956: 
166-173), x2 = 22.0462 
Source: Questionnaire data 
Environmental co-operatives rate the protection of interests as the most important task they 
perform. Generating ideas and the exchange of knowledge and experience are also considered 
relatively important tasks. Monitoring and administrative tasks are not seen as key tasks of the 
environmental co-operatives. 
Commitment and trust 
Environmental co-operatives view the commitment of their members as one of the most 
important factors is a successful operation (Table 9.5). The mean rank is calculated similar to 
Table 9.4. It is considered one of the most important factors of success. 
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Table 9.5: Factors contributing to the success of environmental co-operatives ordered from 
most to least unimportant (only associations and legal co-operatives, n=23), 
1999* 
Factor Mean Rank 
1. Connnitment to the activities on the part of members 3.65 
2. Financial support from the government 3.94 
3. Activities that improve the opportunities for the members 4.15 
4. A common vision among the members about societal restrictions for area 4.62 
5. Having activities that improve the opportunities for the area 5.00 
6. Professional support for the organisation 5.10 
7. A common vision of the club with the government 5.48 
8. A common vision of the club with societal organisations 6.31 
9. Having a monitoring system and sanctions within the organisation 6.75 
Medians for alternatives differ significantly for a 1 percent level, Friedman test (Siegel, 1956: 
166-173), z2 = 51.328, 
Source: Questionnaire data 
External funding is ranked as the second most important factor for success, and activities that 
increase the opportunities of members as the third most important factor. Increasing opportunities 
for the members is a source of building in self-interest of the farmers in the co-operative. A 
common vision with other groups or organisations like the government is less important for 
success. Monitoring and sanctions are ways to increase credible commitment used by the co-
operatives. Table 9.6 gives an overview of the sanctions available within environmental co-
operatives. 
Table 9.6: Possible sanctions within environmental co-operatives (associations and legal co-
operatives, n=29), 1999 
Sanction Number of organisations 
Warnings 12 
Make names public of members who do not follow rules 1 
Financial penalties 7 
Temporary postponement of membership 3 
Permanent withdrawal of membership 6 
Temporary exclusion from activities 9 
No sanction available yet 7 
Source: Questionnaire data 
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Most of the co-operatives have the ability to use sanctions (75%), although many organisations 
are still developing (new) sanctions. The most important options for sanctions are warnings, 
followed by a temporary exclusion of activities, suspending members, excluding them from 
activities and imposing penalties. About 50% of those organisations that have the opportunity to 
use sanctions having the possibility of using sanctions have the opportunity to use more than one 
type of sanction. The possibility of using types of sanctions which differ in their level of 
punishment suggests the presence of graduated sanctions, which is important for achieving 
credible commitment 
Whether the sanctions are actually imposed is also important for judging the degree of 
commitment showed by one of the parties to the contract. About 30% of the organisations 
utilised sanctions. Several types of conflict resolving mechanisms are used by environmental co-
operatives. Often the board or the general membership meeting decides about sanctions in the 
case of a conflict with members. Other co-operatives have the possibility of establishing an 
arbitration committee. 
Design principles related to club organisation 
Important activities of environmental co-operatives are concluding contracts with individual 
farmers and being a pressure group. Such kinds of activities involve sharing costs and benefits. 
Sharing may cause problems if the club shares the costs, but the benefits are owned privately like 
marketable goods. In the case of marketable, regional and recreational products, such a trade-off 
is possible. Payments per hectare relate the use of the club facilities to the payment to be made 
(see Table 9.1) and can prevent congestion. 
The presence of non-members who benefit from the club can spoil the effects of the club. 
In most environmental clubs farmers are members voluntarily. In areas with environmental co-
operatives, on average about 50% of the farmers are members of a co-operative. This means there 
are non-members in such an area and exclusion mechanisms are necessary. Non-members can be 
excluded from the benefits of the club arising from the contracting-part However, it is difficult to 
exclude non-members from activities like being a pressure group. Being a pressure group is seen 
as one of the most important tasks environmental co-operatives have. Excluding non-members 
from concluding wildlife and landscape management contracts with the environmental co-
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operative is an external exclusion mechanism. Exclusion in the form of withdrawal of 
membership can be temporary or permanent (see Table 9.6). Another possibility is the a 
temporary exclusion from activities. 
9.4 Summary and conclusions 
Design principles employed for limiting the problems resulting from contractual arrangement 
failures and environmental co-operative arrangements are the main subject of this chapter. The 
contractual arrangement failures consist of asymmetric information, like hidden information and 
hidden action, and the lack of credible commitment and trust. Club organisation failures result 
from the lack of sharing rules, inefficient voting arrangements, and exclusion mechanisms. These 
problems influence the effectiveness and efficiency of self-organising and self-governing forms 
of co-operation for management of wildlife and landscape. In our research evidence was found 
for the application of design principles in the environmental co-operatives in the Netherlands for 
reducing: 
• Hidden information 
Design principles used to reduce the problems of hidden information are signalling 
and screening. In our empirical research evidence was found for the presence of 
screening and signalling. 
• Hidden action 
The problems of hidden action and hidden information can be resolved by effort 
monitoring and incentive contracts. An alternative solution is to require posting of 
bonds to guarantee performance, which can be paid back if the performance is 
satisfactory or if the targets are reached. The survey showed that monitoring plays 
an important role in environmental co-operatives, and that less attention is paid to 
the other possibilities. 
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• Credible commitment and trust 
Credible commitment and trust can be created in an environmental co-operative 
via monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict-resolution mechanisms, reputation 
and foreclosing alternatives. Evidence was found that most co-operatives have the 
possibility of using graduated sanctions. The observed use of sanctions can 
contribute to the establishment of credible commitments by the environmental co-
operative. There are several types of conflict-resolving mechanisms in use. Since 
co-operatives have existed for only a short time many organisations and activities 
are still developing. Due also to this, reputation building has not yet been possible 
for many organisations. 
• Club organisation failures 
Environmental co-operatives use exclusion mechanisms, whereby non-members 
and/or non-payers can be barred. These mechanisms work in the case of wildlife 
and landscape management contracting, but are less effective regard to their 
belonging to a pressure group. 
Summarising, most environmental co-operatives use all kinds of design principles which enable 
them to cope with hidden information, hidden action and club organisation failures, and help 
them to show credible commitments and trust with respect to wildlife and landscape 
management. 
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Chapter 10 
10.1 Introduction 
Central in this thesis is an analysis of wildlife and landscape management on Dutch farms. This 
chapter forms a synthesis of preceding chapters and gives an outlook on future research. 
Institutional arrangements for wildlife and landscape are discussed in Section 10.2. Section 10.3 
looks at future research concerning wildlife and landscape management. 
10. 2 Institutional arrangements for wildlife and landscape management 
In order to increase supply of wildlife and landscape by farmers in the Netherlands a number of 
organisations offer wildlife and landscape management contracts to farmers, like governmental 
agencies, environmental co-operatives, and provinces. Farmers can conclude these contracts 
voluntarily. The important question is how should these contracts look like, in other words, what 
design is appropriate for such contracts. Contract design is vital for all the parties to a contract 
because it determines the "what, where, when, how" of a transaction. 
One of the elements of appropriate contract design depends on the transaction at stake. It 
should be clear what kind of service or good is to be bought or sold. Following transaction cost 
economics, wildlife and landscape management transactions can be described in terms of asset 
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency. Asset specificity refers to the degree to which an assets is 
committed to a specific task, and thus cannot be redeployed to alternative uses without loosing 
the majority of its value. From the empirical analysis in this thesis it follows that asset specificity 
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is relevant; e.g. site specificity and learning-by-doing are important. Furthermore, transactions 
involve different degrees of uncertainty concerning, for instance, ecological aspects of wildlife 
and landscape and future governmental policies. Finally, the frequency of a wildlife and 
landscape management transaction is mostly yearly and recurrent. 
The transaction having been described, determining which institutional arrangement best 
fits the transaction is an important consideration. Institutional arrangements are meant to provide 
a structure within which its parties can co-operate or compete to obtain some added income that 
is not available outside this arrangement. A market arrangement with prices as the only co-
ordination mechanism will fail due to the attributes of wildlife and landscape management 
transactions, for instance due to the specific assets involved. Hierarchical institutional 
arrangements will only be relevant at high levels of specific investments, uncertainty and 
frequency. However, that is not the case for wildlife and landscape management by farmers. In 
line with New Institutional Economics and the attributes of the transaction it follows that hybrid 
arrangements are appropriate for these transactions. Hybrid arrangements consist of elements 
both of markets and hierarchies. However, other means of co-ordination are used besides prices 
and hierarchy, such as reciprocity and trust. 
The use of hybrid arrangements means that solutions that work well for transactions on 
spot markets will not work for wildlife and landscape management contracting by farmers. For 
instance, for transactions on markets the identity of the parties plays no role. However, identity 
is important for hybrid arrangements like wildlife and landscape management. Transactions for 
wildlife and landscape management differ in their attributes (asset specificity, frequency and 
uncertainty), implying that different types of hybrid arrangements are useful. An arrangement 
will fail to co-ordinate efficiently and effectively if the institutional design is not optimal for the 
attributes of a transaction. Possible problems are hidden action, hidden information and lack of 
credible commitment and trust. Design principles such as monitoring and graduated sanctions 
can be used to cope with these problems. Given the diversity of design principles different 
hybrid arrangements can be designed (or they evolve). This thesis shows that governmental 
agencies and others apply these design principles for wildlife and landscape management 
contracts. 
There is a trade-off between the costs and benefits of using ontractual arrangements 
designed to cope with attributes of a specific transaction, and the cost and benefits of using more 
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general types of contractual arrangements for all kinds of transactions. Policy makers should 
keep in mind that more complete contractual design involves higher costs compared to more 
incomplete contracts. The benefit of designing contracts to regulate every thinkable transaction 
contingency can burden farmers with high transaction costs, for instance in administrative costs, 
which makes contracts less attractive. This should be of relevance especially to policy makers 
who intend to govern wildlife and landscape in detailed and complex ways. 
Environmental co-operatives can function as an alternative to direct contracting by 
government agencies with individual farmers. They can perform (parts of) the tasks of the 
government or perform tasks of individual farmers collectively. By doing so both can save on 
transaction costs for wildlife and landscape management, depending on the transaction at stake. 
Most environmental co-operatives can be characterised as clubs which use all kinds of design 
principles to make credible to contracting partners their commitment to wildlife and landscape 
management. The institutional arrangements of environmental co-operatives vary for different 
organisations. 
List of conclusions 
At the end of this thesis a number of conclusions can be drawn. An enumeration of the most 
important conclusions of the research is listed below. 
• Wildlife and landscape management in agriculture is governed by hybrid 
institutional arrangements (contractual arrangements and environmental co-
operatives) that combine elements from markets, hierarchies and other modes of 
co-ordination. 
• Contractual arrangements for wildlife and landscape management are rather 
complex and incomplete arrangements. 
• Farm characteristics influence the decision to manage wildlife and landscape. 
These characteristics determine the need for specific investments for wildlife and 
landscape management. 
• Environmental co-operatives can be characterised as clubs. However, variations in 
their institutional arrangements can be observed. 
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• Environmental co-operatives are founded to cope with market failure, to save on 
transaction costs, to build up countervailing power, to form an alternative to 
government intervention and to prevent hold-up problems. 
• The institutional arrangement of environmental co-operatives is influenced by 
formal and informal rules in Dutch society (the institutional environment). 
• Environmental co-operatives regulate the institutional design of their organisation, 
which contributes to their ability to cope with (potential) institutional arrangement 
failures. 
• Contractual arrangements and environmental co-operatives are suitable 
arrangements for the provision of wildlife and landscape management by farmers. 
They help avoid institutional arrangement failures and offer an alternative to 
market failures and direct government intervention. 
10.3 Outlook on future research 
New Institutional Economics has provided a good theoretical basis for this thesis. The literary 
approach combined with surveys proved to be a useful approach for analysing institutional 
arrangements. The additional use of models was helpful in analysing wildlife and landscape 
management. Most of the data collected until now has not concerned transactions but been 
focused on production and related issues. In the Dutch Farm Accountancy Data Network no 
information was available on the kind of institutional arrangement farmers were involved with 
regarding wildlife and landscape management. Had this data been available, and for a longer 
period rnore formal models could have been developed. Hence, future research will benefit from 
data collection on these kinds of issues. However, collecting data on these issues does not mean 
that existing data on production issues is not relevant anymore, but additional collection of data 
on transactions would open more opportunities for combined research on technological and 
institutional aspects. The surveys used in this thesis were a main tool for data collection on 
transactions. They provided useful data for this thesis. In that sense they could form a starting 
point for more structured data collection on transactions for wildlife and landscape management. 
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Distmgrishing design principles is useful for analysing different contractual arrangements. 
Important issues are: what kind of design principles are used; how design principles work in 
practice; the consequences of differences between design principles, and how they interact with 
each other. In practice organisations use many different mechanisms for a range of institutional 
arrangement failures. Examples of design principles are signalling, screening, monitoring, and 
graduated sanctions. Empirical research based on surveys and detailed case-studies will 
contribute to a better understanding of these mechanisms. Moreover, the results of such research 
could lead to a better design of contractual arrangements for wildlife and landscape management. 
In this study of institutional arrangements for wildlife and landscape management it was 
necessary to make choices about the central focus. Thus an analysis of the demand for wildlife 
and landscape management by farmers, as well as an analysis of ecological aspects concerning 
wildlife and landscape, were left out. This thesis has concentrated rather on the supply side, 
especially on the institutional organisation. Research focussing on institutional aspects of wildlife 
and landscape management contributes to the study of wildlife and landscape because it helps to 
establish a link between supply and demand. This study has shown that contractual arrangements 
and environmental co-operatives are suitable arrangements for the provision of wildlife and 
landscape, and that they deserve further attention from the viewpoint of empirical science as well 
as of policy makers. 
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SUMMARY 
This thesis focuses on land use in which agriculture is combined with managing wildlife and 
landscape. The objective of this thesis is to analyse the design of contractual arrangements for 
wildlife and landscape management by farmers. The methodology applied in the thesis is 
illustrated by the research process of the project. The research process consisted of three stages: 
(1) development of an initial theoretical framework and conceptual model for institutional 
analysis; (2) the analysis of empirical objects; (3) a final analysis. The empirical objects were: (1) 
a direct relation between individual farmers and public and/or private contractors (contractual 
arrangement) and (2) an indirect relation between farmers and public and/or private contractors 
(environmental co-operatives). An important method used in this thesis is a literary approach 
combined with statistical tools using data from mail surveys. The literary approach is based on 
theory and makes use of close reasoning. The surveys were evaluated taking into account the 
sampling and non-sampling errors. Other methods were formal models concerning the decision to 
contract and the consequences of contracting at the farm level. 
Standard microeconomic theory focuses on the market as exclusive mechanism for co-
ordinating economic activities. However, when the economic environment significantly departs 
from the artificial neo-classical pattern the market will fail to produce Pareto-optimal outcomes. 
Then, an alternative to a market is government intervention. However, also the government often 
fails. Both kinds of failures are examples of institutional arrangement failures. New Institutional 
Economics is concerned with the question of which institutional arrangement is economically 
efficient under what circumstances. 
The basic elements of the framework for analysing wildlife and landscape management are 
the institutional environment and institutional arrangements. The institutional environment is the 
set of fundamental political, social, and legal ground rules that establish a basis for production, 
exchange and distribution and are concerned with composite levels of activities. The institutional 
environment depends on place and changes in time, and is defined on an aggregate level. 
In a society there exist all kinds of arrangements between individuals, individuals and 
groups, or between groups. An institutional arrangement is designed to provide at least a 
structure in which its members can co-operate or compete. Institutional arrangements can be 
formal and/or informal. Two of them can be distinguished as extreme poles: markets, and 
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hierarchical organisations. The areas of overlap between markets and hierarchical organisations 
give rise to hybrids. These hybrids use other means of co-ordination besides prices and hierarchy. 
Hybrids are co-ordinated and conducted by active forms of governance which emanates from the 
partners, and operate through authority. In order for authority to be efficient, it requires mutual 
consent and commitment. 
From the institutional economics analysis in chapter 2 it follows that the following 
characteristics are relevant to analysing institutional arrangements: 
1. The transaction; 
2. The influence of the institutional environment with respect to time, place and level; 
3. The instruments of an arrangement: incentive intensity, administrative controls and 
authority; 
4. Performance attributes: autonomy and co-operation adaptation; 
5. The role of contract law; 
6. The clarity of residual control rights; 
7. Type of contractual arrangement 
Differences among contracts correspond to the characteristics of the institutional arrangements in 
which they are embedded. Along with the differences in institutional arrangements, contracts 
differ in the following key elements: 
1. Relevance of the identity of parties; 
2. Contract duration: discrete exchange or indeterminate duration; 
3. Degree of completeness; 
4. Enforcement procedures. 
The characteristics of institutional arrangements and the key elements characterising contracts 
show that order can be brought into the array of available institutional arrangements and 
contracts. 
The third chapter is concerned with identifying an appropriate institutional arrangement for 
wildlife and landscape management transactions between contractors like government, large 
wildlife and landscape management organisations, and individual farmers. The framework 
developed in Chapter 3 illustrates the complexity of the relations between environmental co-
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operatives, governmental agencies and individual farmers. These institutional arrangements are 
determined by the individuals and groups, the institutional environment, and by resource 
allocation and employment. In turn these institutional arrangements influence individuals and 
groups, the institutional environment, and resource allocation and employment. Measurement 
problems with respect to the attributes of transactions pose a problem to wildlife and landscape 
management transactions. The cost of measuring wildlife and landscape management means that 
incomplete contracts will be signed and that the wants of contractors like the government cannot 
be fully specified. 
From New Institutional Economics and the attributes of wildlife and landscape 
management it follows that hybrid arrangements for combining agriculture and wildlife and 
landscape management can be expected. The market, with prices as the only co-ordination 
mechanism, will fail due to the particular attributes of wildlife and landscape management Due 
to the relation between institutional arrangements and contracts it follows that the contract is a 
neo-classical contract. This means that the asset specificity is high enough to create mutual 
dependency among the contracting partners. Contracts will be incomplete and adjustments to 
contracts are important, as is the duration of the contracts. Because of incompleteness, disputes 
will be more frequent and are less likely to be solved by formal procedures. 
Chapter 5 focuses on institutional arrangements for wildlife and landscape management in 
which individual farmers are involved. The results of a Tobit model show that farm 
characteristics were important for the probability of contract conclusion, and the amount of 
wildlife and landscape management. Especially farm characteristics related to present or earlier 
site-specific investments determine the probability of concluding contracts for wildlife and 
landscape management. External production circumstances (water drainage and the proportion of 
non-farmland) played an important role. If farm characteristics are well adapted for wildlife and 
landscape, less specific investments are needed to manage wildlife and landscape. The number of 
contracts and the revenue per contract increase in time due to changing attitudes of farmers and 
more opportunities for contracting. There were no differences between the regions. The empirical 
analysis provides a number of quantitative results. They should be handled with care, because 
estimations were not very stable. 
After a contract has been concluded the characteristics of a transaction and contractual 
arrangement can be analysed. A survey among individual farmers was developed concerning 
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wildlife and landscape management. Elements of this survey were the number of arrangements, 
the complexity of an arrangement, property rights and transaction costs. Most farmers had only 
one relation with a contracting party (governmental agency, environmental co-operative, nature 
conservation organisation, etc.). The majority of the farmers were involved in more than one 
transaction type at the same time (preservation, development, maintenance, products delivered). 
These transaction types were concluded with one of the three contracting parties distinguished in 
chapter 5. Different transaction types within one institutional arrangement make these 
arrangements complex. Using institutional arrangements of a more or less similar institutional 
design make the contracts differ in the degree of completeness, depending on the transaction at 
stake. More incompleteness results in an increased exposure to opportunism. 
Physical specific investments were used, although they were not large or specific. This 
result is comparable to the results of the Tobit model. Human asset specificity in form of 
learning-by-doing was important for most farmers. Compared with the Tobit model, the survey 
allowed directing the measurement more towards the relevance of human asset specificity. 
Parcels used for wildlife and landscape management had a relatively high percentage of attributes 
representing attractiveness for wildlife and landscape management. Sources of knowledge were 
the help of volunteers and professional journals. The involvement of volunteers as an extra party 
to the contractual arrangement increases the complexity. Farmers had the opinion that they 
owned a large share of the property rights with respect to land. Wildlife and landscape 
management was not considered an important source of income risk to total farm income. It was 
also not considered an important strategy for coping with income risks on a farm. Wildlife and 
landscape management was not an important factor for reducing income risk at the farm level. 
The cost of labour determine the transaction costs in monetary terms. 
The objective of chapter 6 was to develop a theoretical and empirical model for analysing 
the decisions of individual farmers whether or not to manage wildlife and landscape, and how 
much of these services to produce in a situation with and without co-operation from other 
farmers. The motivations for co-operation analysed are: (1) reduction of transaction costs and (2) 
building up of bargaining power. The model is applied to Dutch dairy farmers as the main users 
of agricultural land in the Netherlands. 
The reduction of fixed transaction costs makes it attractive for farmers to form an 
environmental co-operative in case of a fixed price for wildlife and landscape services. Therefore 
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more wildlife and landscape services are produced. However price - and therefore marginal costs 
- does not change, so if a farmer already produced wildlife and landscape services before the co-
operative existed, his production does not change, but his profit does. If demand is no longer 
perfectly elastic (price is endogenous), an increase in wildlife and landscape services production 
leads to lower prices offsetting part of the production and profit increase caused by lower fixed 
transaction costs. However, if the environmental co-operative acts as a monopolist, an improved 
bargaining position leads to a decrease in the production of wildlife and landscape services and 
higher prices, but also to a smaller number of farmers producing wildlife and landscape services. 
This situation could still be socially optimal, compared to a situation without the co-operative, 
because of a potential reduction in public transaction costs. The latter result show the importance 
of the entrance policy of the co-operative: who can become a member and under which 
conditions? 
Results presented in Chapter 6 are obviously subject to some qualifications. First, the 
model is a short-term model. Changes in technology are, for example, not accounted for. 
Moreover, aggregate welfare analysis is not possible because the model does not contain 
consumer benefits and public transaction costs. Extending the model in this direction could be 
worthwhile in future research. Notwithstanding these qualifications the model presented is a 
powerful tool for the study wildlife and landscape management and the motives for forming 
environmental co-operatives. 
In Chapter 7 a general description of environmental co-operatives cites the number co-
operatives, their geographical distribution, relevance for agricultural land use, activities and 
problems. In 1999 about 80 environmental co-operatives had about 6600 farmer 
members/participants and 1600 non-farmer members/participants. On average 6% of the total 
agricultural area was in use by environmental co-operatives. The average size of a single 
environmental co-operative was about 1600 ha. Most co-operatives were active in the northern 
and western Netherlands. In regions where a co-operative is located, about 50% of the farmers 
were members of an environmental co-operative. About 75% of the environmental co-operatives 
concluded contracts with individual farmers. These contracts ranged from maintaining hedges 
and farmland margin management, to tolerating meadow birds or geese. The main activities of an 
environmental co-operative were managing impure public goods like wildlife and landscape. 
Important services of environmental co-operatives were consultation with others on behalf of the 
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members, or working as a pressure group. Lack of financial resources, governmental regulation 
and available time were the main problems of environmental co-operatives. 
Five main explanations for the development of environmental co-operatives are discussed 
from an institutional economics point of view. They are a way to: (1) cope with market failure; 
(2) save on transaction costs; (3) build up countervailing power; (4) provide an alternative to 
government intervention; and (5) prevent hold-up problems. From the survey on environmental 
co-operatives (1999) it followed that these explanations were recognised as reasons for founding 
environmental co-operatives. Ranked in order of importance, elements of these explanations 
were: contributing to wildlife and landscape management, reacting to societal wishes, being an 
interest group, generating income from wildlife and landscape, and restrictions on farming 
opportunities following the development of wildlife and landscape management areas. 
The majority of environmental co-operatives in the Netherlands were formal associations 
and or legal co-operatives (circa 70%). This means that the majority of the environmental co-
operatives had a club arrangement. A minority of the environmental co-operatives were 
organised as foundations (25%). A club can be defined as a voluntary group of individuals who 
derive mutual benefits from sharing one or more of the following: production costs of activities 
and services, the members' characteristics (e.g., members have land, are farmers), or a good 
characterised by excludable benefits. Furthermore, the results of the survey show that in most 
environmental co-operatives, members explicitly choose to join (voluntarily), and delegation of 
authority is from the bottom-up via voting. Environmental co-operatives use exclusion 
mechanisms whereby non-members and/or non-payers can be barred from, for instance, 
individual wildlife and landscape management contracting. However, it is difficult to exclude 
people from the benefits of belonging to a pressure group. 
In order to become a legal entity environmental co-operatives have to follow the general 
rules and procedures in the Netherlands relevant to the institutional arrangement they want to 
choose. This means that the formal institutional environmental determines the institutional 
arrangement of environmental co-operatives. Although there exist general rules and procedures 
on organisational forms in the Netherlands, environmental co-operatives have some different 
kinds of (formal) institutional arrangements. Differences between environmental co-operatives 
have been found regarding: objectives of the environmental co-operative, voting rules, 
membership fees, types of memberships, etc. Important is that environmental co-operatives, in 
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the form of associations or foundations, are not allowed to redistribute profits among the 
members, whereas legal co-operatives may do this. 
The influence of the informal institutional environment as an argument for founding a club 
played a role for farmers. "Wishes of society" measures the perceived (by the farmers) reference 
level in a society. This level represents the quality of wildlife and landscape which the society 
believes should exist. The reference level of wildlife and landscape is used as a proxy variable 
for the institutional environment. 
Design principles employed for limiting the problems resulting from contractual 
arrangement failures and environmental co-operative arrangements are the main subject of 
chapter 9. The contractual arrangement failures consist of asymmetric information, like hidden 
information and hidden action, and lack of credible commitment and trust. Club organisation 
failures result from lack of sharing rules, inefficient voting arrangements, and exclusion 
mechanisms. These problems influence the effectiveness and efficiency of self-organising and 
self-governing forms of co-operation for management of wildlife and landscape. In our research 
evidence was found for the application of design principles in the environmental co-operatives in 
the Netherlands for reducing: 
• Hidden information 
Design principles used to reduce the problems of hidden information were signalling 
and screening. In our empirical research we found evidence for the presence of 
screening and signalling. 
• Hidden action 
The problems of hidden action and hidden information can be resolved by effort 
monitoring and incentive contracts. An alternative solution is to require posting of 
bonds to guarantee performance, which can be paid back if the performance is 
satisfactory or if the targets are reached. The survey showed that monitoring plays an 
important role in environmental co-operatives, and less attention is paid to the other 
possibilities. 
• Credible commitment and trust 
Credible commitment and trust can be created in an environmental co-operative via 
monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict-resolution mechanisms, reputation and 
foreclosing alternatives. Evidence was found that most co-operatives had the 
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possibility of using graduated sanctions and monitoring. The observed use of sanctions 
can contribute to the establishment of credible commitments by the environmental co-
operative. There were several types of conflict-resolving mechanisms in use. Since co-
operatives have existed for only a short time many organisations and activities were 
still developing. Due also to this, reputation building has not yet been possible for a 
large number of organisations. 
• Club organisation failures 
Environmental co-operatives use exclusion mechanisms, whereby non-members and/or 
non-payers can be barred. These mechanisms work well in case of wildlife and 
landscape management contracting, but are less effective with regard to their belonging 
to a pressure group. 
Summarising, most environmental co-operatives use all kinds of design principles which enable 
them to cope with hidden information, hidden action and club organisation failures, and help 
them to show credible commitments and trust with respect to wildlife and landscape 
management. 
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Dit proefschrift richt zich op vormen van grondgebruik waarbij landbouw wordt gecombineerd 
met het beheer van natuur en landschap. Het doel van dit proefschrift was een analyse van 
institutionele aspecten van contractuele arrangementen voor het beheer van natuur en landschap 
door boeren. Het verloop van het onderzoek kan worden weergeven aan de hand van de volgende 
drie fasen: (1) De onwikkeling van een initieel raamwerk en conceptueel model voor 
institutionele analyse; (2) de analyse van empirische objecten en (3) een eindanalyse. De 
empirische objecten worden gevormd door (1) een directe relatie tussen individuele boeren en de 
overheid en/of private partijen (contractueel arrangement) en (2) een indirecte relatie tussen 
boeren en de overheid en/of private partijen via een milieucoöperatie. Een belangrijke methode 
binnen dit proefschrift is de "literary approach" gecombineerd met een statistische analyse van 
enquêtes. Een literary approach is gebaseerd op de theorie en maakt gebruik van redeneringen op 
basis van dezelfde theorie. Andere methoden waren formele modellen betreffende de beslissing 
om contracten aan te gaan en modellen om de gevolgen van het afsluiten van contracten op 
bedrijfsniveau te analyseren. 
De standaard micro-economische theorie richt zich met name op de markt als exclusief 
mechanisme voor het coördineren van activiteiten. Indien de economische omgeving significant 
afwijkt van het kunstmatige neoklassieke patroon zal de markt falen en geen Pareto optimale 
uitkomsten opleveren. Overheidsingrijpen wordt dan vaak gezien als remedie, echter ook de 
overheid kan falen. Beide vormen van falen zijn voorbeelden van het falen van institutionele 
arrangementen. De Nieuwe Institutionele Economie richt zich op vraag wanneer institutionele 
arrangementen wel efficiënt en effectief zijn. 
De institutionele omgeving en institutionele arrangementen vormen de bouwstenen van het 
raamwerk in dit proefschrift om natuur- en landschapsbeheer te analyseren. De institutionele 
omgeving is de set van fundamentele politieke, sociale, en rechts grondregels die van belang zijn 
voor productie, ruil en verdeling. De institutionele omgeving hangt af van plaats, verandert in de 
tijd en is gedefinieerd voor activiteiten op een geaggregeerd niveau. 
In een samenleving bestaan allerlei arrangementen tussen individuen, individueen en 
groepen en tussen groepen. Een institutioneel arrangement is ontworpen om op zijn minst een 
structuur te geven waarin haar deelnemers kunnen samenwerken of concurreren. Institutionele 
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arrangementen kunnen formeel en/of informeel zijn. Markten en hiërarchieën zijn de twee 
uitersten vormen van institutionele arrangementen. In de gebieden waar deze uitersten elkaar 
overlappen ontstaan hybride vormen. Deze hybride vormen gebruiken naast prijzen en 
hiërarchische relaties ook andere coördinatiemechanismen zoals autoriteit. Voor autoriteit zijn 
wederzijdse toestemming en betrokkenheid essentieel. 
Uit de institutionele analyse in hoofdstuk 2 volgt dat de volgende karakteristieken relevant 
zijn bij de analyse van institutionele arrangementen: 
1. De transactie; 
2. De invloed van de institutionele omgeving met betrekking tot tijd, plaats en niveau; 
3. De instrumenten van een arrangement: incentivies, formele controle en autoriteit; 
4. Prestatie attributen: autonome veranderingen en gecoördineerde veranderingen; 
5. De rol van het contractrecht; 
6. Duidelijkheid omtrent residuele controle rechten; 
7. Het type arrangement. 
Verschillen tussen contracten corresponderen met de karakteristieken van de institutionele 
arrangementen waarin zij verankerd zijn. Samen met de verschillen in institutionele 
arrangementen verschillen contracten op de volgende punten: 
1. Het belang van de identiteit van de partijen; 
2. De contractduur; 
3. De mate van compleetheid; 
4. De aanwezigheid van waarborgen. 
De karakteristieken van institutionele arrangementen en de basis elementen van contracten 
illustreren dat orde kan worden aangebracht in de verzameling institutionele arrangementen en 
contracten. 
Het derde hoofdstuk richt zich op de identificatie van een geschikt institutioneel 
arrangement voor transacties voor natuur- en landschapsbeheer tussen individuele boeren en 
partijen zoals de regering en grote nataurbeschermingsorganisaties. Het raamwerk dat werd 
ontwikkeld in hoofdstuk 3 illustreert de complexiteit van de relaties tussen milieucoöperaties, 
overheden en individuele boeren. De institutionele arrangementen worden bepaald door 
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individueen, groepen, de institutionele omgeving, en de beschikbaarheid van resources en arbeid. 
Op hun beurt beïnvloeden institutionele arrangementen het gedrag van individueen, groepen, de 
institutionele omgeving, en de beschikbaarheid van resources en arbeid. Meetproblemen die 
betrekking hebben op de attributen van transacties voor natuur- en landshapsbeheeer betekenen 
dat de contracten niet compleet zullen zijn en dat de wensen van de verschillende partijen zoals 
de overheid niet allemaal in een contract kunnen worden vastgelegd. 
Uit de attributen van natuur- en landschapsbeheer volgt dat hybride contracten voor het 
beheer van natuur en landschap kunnen worden verwacht. De markt, met prijzen als enig 
coördinatiemechanisme zal falen door de specifieke attributen van natuur en landschapsbeheer. 
Door de relatie tussen institutionele arrangementen en contracten volgt dat een neoklassiek 
contracten verwacht mag worden. Dit betekent dan de specificiteit van het productiemiddelen 
hoog genoeg is om onderlinge afhankelijkheid tussen de partijen te laten ontstaan. De contracten 
zullen incompleet zijn en aanpassingen in de loop van de tijd van contracten zijn van belang 
evenals de duur van het contract. Door de mate van incompleetheid zullen zich regelmatig 
conflicten voor doen die niet altijd door formele procedures zullen worden opgelost 
Hoofdstuk 5 richt zich op institutionele arrangementen waarin individuele boeren deel 
kunnen nemen. De resultaten van een Tobit model laten zijn dat bedrijfskarakteristieken 
belangrijk waren voor de kans op het afsluiten van een contract voor natuur- en 
landschapsbeheer. In het bijzonder bedrijfskarakteristieken gerelateerd aan locatie specifieke 
investeringen bepalen deze kans. Externe productieomstandigheden (ontwatering en het aandeel 
niet agrarische grond op een bedrijf) spelen hierbij een belangrijke rol. Het aantal boeren dat 
contracten afsluit neemt toe in de tijd door een veranderende houding van boeren en door een 
toename van de mogelijkheden om overeenkomsten af te sluiten. Er zijn geen verschillen tussen 
regio's waargenomen. 
Nadat een contract voor het beheer van natuur en landschap is afgesloten kunnen de 
karakteristieken van de transactie en de contractuele arrangementen worden geanalyseerd. De 
meeste boeren hadden een relatie met één andere partij: overheden, milieucoöperaties, 
nataurbeschermingsorganisaties, etc. De meerderheid van de boeren was in meer dan één 
transactietype betrokken zoals het behouden van een bestaande natuurlijke of landschapplijke 
situatie, het ontwikkelen van natuur en landschap, het onderhouden van een landschapselement 
en het leveren van natuur- en landschapsproducten. Deze transactietypes konden worden 
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afgesloten met diverse partijen. Verschillende transactietypen binnen een institutioneel 
arrangement maken deze arrangementen complex. Het gebruik van institutionele arrangementen 
van een vergelijkbaar design resulteert in een verschillende mate van compleetheid, afhankelijk 
van het type transactie. Indien de mate van incompleetheid van een contractueel arrangement 
toeneemt wordt de kans op opportunisme groter. 
De gereedschappen en machines die werden gebruikt voor het beheer van natuur en 
landschap waren niet erg specifiek en de omvang van de investering bleef vaak beperkt. Dit 
resultaat is vergelijkbaar met de uitkomsten van het al eerder besproken Tobit model. Menselijk 
specifieke investeringen in de vorm van "al doende leren" waren van belang voor de meeste 
boeren. Percelen die worden gebruikt voor het beheer van natuur en landschap hadden een 
relatief hoge score op attributen van grond die het beheer van natuur en landschap attractiever 
maken voor de boer. De kennis over het beheer van natuur en landschap was afkomstig van 
vrijwilligers en uit vakbladen. De vrijwilligers als partij in een institutioneel arrangement maken 
deze arrangementen complexer. Natuur- en landschapsbeheer werd niet gezien als een 
belangrijke strategie om het inkomensrisico op een bedrijf te reduceren. 
Het doel van hoofdstuk 6 was om een theoretisch en empirisch model te ontwikkelingen 
voor de analyse van beslissingen van individuele boeren om al dan niet natuur en landschap te 
beheren, hoeveel te beheren, en om al dan niet samen te werken. De motivatie om samen te 
werken volgt uit de mogelijkheid om transactiekosten te reduceren en het opbouwen van 
onderhandelingsmacht. Het model is toegepast op Nederlandse melkveebedrijven. 
De reductie van de vaste transactiekosten maakt het voor boeren aantrekkelijker om een 
milieucoöperatie te vormen bij vaste prijzen voor het beheer natuur en landschap. Bij 
samenwerking veranderen de prijzen en daarmee de marginale kosten niet. Dit betekent dat een 
boer die al natuur en landschap beheerde voordat hij ging samenwerken zijn productie niet zal 
veranderen, echter zijn winst zal wel toenemen. Als de vraag niet langer prijs elastisch is (de prijs 
wordt endogeen) zal een toename in het beheer van natuur en landschap leiden tot lagere prijzen 
voor natuur en landschap. Indien een milieucoöperatie kan opereren als een monopolist heeft zij 
een betere onderhandelingsposititie waardoor er een teruggang is in het beheer van natuur en 
landschap, de prijzen stijgen en er minder boeren zijn die natuur en landschap beheren. Deze 
situatie kan nog steeds sociaal optimaal zijn in vergelijking met een situatie zonder 
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samenwerking omdat de reductie in de publieke transactiekosten door met één partij te 
samenwerken groter kunnen zijn dan bij samenwerken met veel partijen. 
Het model in hoofdstuk 6 is een korte termijn model waardoor bijvoorbeeld veranderingen 
in technologie niet worden meegenomen. Verder is een geaggregeerde welvaartsanalyse niet 
mogelijk omdat het model de baten voor consumenten en publieke transactiekosten niet 
meeneemt. Ondanks beperkingen is het model in hoofdstuk 6 geschikt om het aanbod van natuur 
en landschap te bestuderen. 
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt een algemeen overzicht gegeven van milieucoöperaties gericht op het 
aantal coöperaties, de geografische spreiding, het belang voor agrarisch grondgebruik, 
activiteiten en problemen. In 1999 waren er ongeveer 80 milieucoöperaties. Deze coöperaties 
hadden ongeveer 6600 boerleden/deelnemers en 1600 niet-boeren leden/deelnemers. Gemiddeld 
6% van het totale grondgebruik in hun gebied was in gebruik bij de milieucoöperatie en de 
gemiddelde omvang was ongeveer 1600 ha. De meeste coöperaties waren actief in het noorden 
en westen van Nederland. In de regio's waar de milieucoöperaties actief waren was ongeveer 
50% van de boeren lid of participant. Ongeveer 75% van de milieucoöperaties sloot 
overeenkomsten af met individuele boeren. Deze contracten liepen uiteen van het onderhouden 
van heggen tot randenbeheer en het toelaten van weidevogels of ganzen. De hoofdactiviteit van 
een milieucoöperatie was het beheer van inpure publieke goederen zoals natuur en landschap. 
Belangrijke diensten van milieucoöperaties waren het spreken met anderen namens de 
deelnemers/leden en het zijn van een belangengroep. Het gebrek aan financiële middelen, 
overheidsregelgeving en de beschikbare tijd waren de belangrijkste knelpunten voor de 
organisaties. 
Vijf hoofdredenen voor het oprichten van een milieucoöperatie waren: (1) het omgaan met 
marktfalen; (2) het besparen op transactiekosten; (3) het opbouwen van marktmacht; (4) het 
vormen van een alternatief voor overheidsingrijpen; en (5) het tegengaan van hold-up problemen. 
Uit de enquête volgt dat deze redenen werden herkend als redenen voor de oprichting van een 
milieucoöperatie. Elementen van deze redenen zijn onder andere (in volgorde van belang): 
bijdragen aan het behoud van natuur en landschap; het behalen van een inkomen uit natuur en 
landschap, en beperkingen in bedrijfsmogelijkheden volgent uit de ontwikkeling van gebieden 
speciaal voor natuur en landschap. 
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De meerderheid van de milieucoöperaties in Nederland is georganiseerd als vereniging of 
coöperatie (ca. 70%). Dit betekent dat de meerderheid een club arrangement heeft. Een 
minderheid van de co-operaties is georganiseerd als stichting. Een club arrangement kan worden 
gedefinieerd als een groep mensen die vrijwillig samenwerken om gemeenschappelijke voordelen 
te behalen uit het delen van een of meer van de volgende zaken: productiekosten van activiteiten 
en diensten, gemeenschappelijke kenmerken van de deelnemers (bijvoorbeeld het boer zijn), of 
het gemeenschappelijk gebruik van een goed dat wordt gekarakteriseerd door de mogelijkheid 
om met leden uit te sluiten. Uit de resultaten van een enquête onder milieucoöperaties volgt dat 
bij de meeste organisaties potentionele leden vrijwillig kiezen om lid te worden en dat de 
bevoegdheden van de leden worden gedelegeerd via stemrecht. Milieucoöperaties maken gebruik 
van uitsluitingsmechanismen waarbij niet-leden of met betalers kunnen worden uitgesloten van 
het gebruik van de club. Hierbij moet echter worden opgemerkt dat het voor sommige activiteiten 
het moeilijk is om mensen uit te sluiten door het karakter van deze activiteiten. 
Om een rechtspersoon te worden in Nederland moet de milieucoöperatie algemene regels 
en procedures volgen die van belang zijn voor rechtspersonen. Dit betekent dat de formele 
institutionele omgeving de organisatiestructuur te dele bepaald. Echter dit betekent niet dat het 
institutionele arrangement van alle milieucoöperaties gelijk is. Verschillen tussen coöperaties 
kunnen worden gevonden voor de doelen van de organisatie; de wijze van stemmen, 
lidmaatschapsgelden, type leden, etc. 
De invloed van de informele institutionele omgeving als een argument voor het oprichten 
van milieucoöperatie speelde ook een rol. De door boeren gevoelde "Wensen van de 
samenleving" is gebruikt als referentieniveau voor de vraag naar natuur en landschap in een 
samenleving. Dit referentieniveau is gebruikt als proxy variabele voor de informele institutionele 
omgeving en speelde voor veel milieucoöperaties een rol. 
Milieucoöperaties maken gebruik van algemene ontwerp principes om de problemen die 
volgen uit het falen van institutionele arrangementen tegen te gaan. Onderscheiden falen van 
contractuele arrangementen zijn: asymmetrische informatie (verborgen acties en verborgen 
informatie) en een gebrek aan geloofwaardige betrokkenheid en vertrouwen. Club 
organisatiefalen volgen onder andere uit een gebrek aan regels voor het delen van voorzieningen, 
niet efficiënte stemsystemen en falende uitsluitingsmechanismen. Deze problemen beïnvloeden 
de effectiviteit en efficiency van zichzelf organiserende en zichzelf besturende organisaties voor 
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het beheer van natuur en landschap. In dit onderzoek zijn aanwijzingen gevonden voor het 
gebruik van ontwerpprincipes door milieucoöperaties in de praktijk in Nederland: 
• Verborgen informatie 
Verboren informatie kan worden tegengegaan door signaleringsmechanismen en 
screeningsmechanismen. Er wordt in de praktijk gebruik gemaakt van de 
ontwerpprincipes screening en siganlling. 
• Verborgen acties 
Het probleem van verborgen acties kan worden tegengegaan door monitoring en 
incentive contracten. Een alternatief wordt gevormd door het vragen om het betalen van 
een waarborgsom. De enquête laat zien dat monitoren een belangrijke rol speelt bij 
milieucoöperaties. Er wordt minder aandacht besteed aan andere mogelijkheden. 
• Geloofwaardige betrokkenheid en vertrouwen 
Geloofwaardige betrokkenheid en vertrouwen kunnen worden bevorderd door 
monitoring, gepaste sancties, mechanismen om conflicten op te lossen, reputatie en het 
onmogelijk maken van alternatieven. Uit het onderzoek volgt dat de meeste organisaties 
gebruikt maakt van gepaste sancties en monitoren. Verschillende mechanismen werden 
gebruikt voor het oplossen van conflicten. Door hun relatief jonge levensduur waren 
veel organisaties nog in ontwikkeling. Hierdoor zal het opbouwen van reputaties vaak 
nog niet goed mogelijk zijn geweest. 
• Club organisatie falen 
Milieucoöperaties gebruiken uitsluitingsmechanismen waarbij niet leden of niet 
betalers kunnen worden uitgesloten. Deze mechanismen werken goed bij contracten 
met individuele boeren voor natuur- en landschapsbeheer. Uitsluiten van het zijn van 
een belangengroep is lastiger. 
Samenvattend, de meeste milieucoöperaties maken gebruik van allerlei type ontwerp principes. 
Dit zal het mogelijk maken om om te gaan met verborgen informatie, verborgen acties en club 
organisatiefalen. Verder maakt het gebruik van ontwerp principes het mogelijk om 
geloofwaardige betrokkenheid te laten zien met betrekking tot het beheer van natuur en 
landschap. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focused on land use in which agriculture is combined with wildlife and landscape 
management. The objective of the study was to analyse the design of contractual 
arrangements for wildlife and landscape management by farmers. An important method used 
in this thesis was a literary approach combined with statistical tools using data from mail 
surveys. The literary approach is based on theory and makes use of close reasoning. Other 
methods used were formal models concerning the decision to contract and the consequences 
of contracting at the farm level. This thesis has concentrated on the supply side, especially on 
the institutional organisation. The research focussed on institutional aspects of wildlife and 
landscape management and contributed to the study of wildlife and landscape because it helps 
to establish a link between supply and demand. This study has shown that contractual 
arrangements and environmental co-operatives are suitable arrangements for the provision of 
wildlife and landscape, and that they deserve attention from the viewpoint of empirical 
science as well as of policy makers. 
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